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INTRODUCTION
This issue is devoted entirely to articles examining the
history of social welfare. It did not come into being as our
other Special Issues do: with a formal proposal to the Editorial Board, a Call for Papers, and other solicitations of manuscripts.
In this case, we simply became aware of an accumulation of manuscripts on historical topics. With four or five in
the editorial pipeline, it seemed likely that we could publish
those which were accepted in the same issue. This collective
impact might give each paper more readers than it might
have had individually. Then a few more arrived, and the
possibility of filling an entire issue occured to us. We added
to the critical mass by delaying the publication of a few
previously accepted articles and putting pressure for speedy
revisions on more recently submitted manuscripts. At a
panel presentation during the Annual Program Meeting of
the Council on Social Work Education, I mentioned the
forthcoming issue and more manuscripts appeared. Most of
these did not arrive in time to be reviewed for this issue.
However, this only means that you will have more social
welfare history articles to look forward to in subsequent issues of JSSW.
I don't know whether this blossoming of productivity by
social welfare historians is an accidential, one-time event or
whether it is a sign of a growing movement. I don't know
whether they came to us by accident or because there are insufficient outlets for historical work and the JSSW is recognized as a journal which has successfully filled other gaps in
social welfare publishing. In any case, we are grateful for the
event and proud to have been able to facilitate this important area of scholarship.
ROBERT D. LEIGHNINGER, JR.
Editor

TEENAGE PREGNANCY, PROFESSIONAL
AGENDAS, AND PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
RICHARD A.

WEATHERLEY

School of Social Work
University of Washington

Many of the adverse consequences associated with adolescent
childbearing are due to poverty and inadequate health care. Historically, definitions of the problem have emphasized individual,
female culpability. Underlying social and economic factors have
received less attention. For many adolescents, the early initiation
of sexual activity and the failure to use birth control is associated
with their perception of limited life opportunities, as well as sex
role socialization inhibiting contraceptive initiative. This paper
considers the role of professional groups and service advocates in
defining the problem and developing policy alternatives. It examines the processes through which an issue having significant redistributive implications has been defined as one of individual female
deviance.
Adolescent pregnancy and childbearing gained prominence as a social problem in the late 1960's. Since that time,
popular and political interest has grown, as evidenced by increasing media, professional and philanthropic attention,
federal and state legislation, and the proliferation of local
services. As a public policy issue, adolescent pregnancy appears to be caught in what Anthony Downs (1972) termed
the "excited discovery stage."
There is ample reason for concern about early childbearing. The teen birth rate nearly doubled during the baby
boom years, 1945 to 1957. Although the birth rate has since
declined to pre-World War II levels, out-of-wedlock
childbearing and abortion rates among teens have increased
dramatically. Teen pregnancy and abortion rates are significantly higher than in comparable industrial nations with

similar rates of teen sexual activity. Pregnancy rates for
women aged 15-17 in the U.S. are more than twice those in
England, Wales and Canada, three times higher than in
France and Sweden, and nearly nine times those in the
Netherlands (Jones et al, 1985).
Early childbearing is associated with poor health consequences for the young mothers and their children, and diminished educational achievement, employment status and
income (Hayes, 1987). Annual public welfare, food stamp
and Medicaid costs attributable to adolescent childbearing
have been estimated at $16.6 billion (Burt, 1986).
As with any social problem, policy responses depend on
how the problem is defined (Kingdon, 1984). Historically,
the problem definitions of early out-of-wedlock childbearing
have emphasized individual female culpability. Until very
recently, structural factors including poverty, inadequate
health care, sexism and racial discrimination have received
little attention. Advocates and policymakers have implicated
early childbearing as a cause of poverty and its associated
ills, neglecting its etiology as a consequence of poverty. As a
result, remedial policies have been adopted to change individual behavior rather than altering the social conditions
which contribute to the behavior.
Efforts to diminish the adverse consequences of early
childbearing through services to individuals are both necessary and appropriate. However, such services may be of
limited effectiveness unless accompanied by policies addressing the underlying structural dimensions of early
childbearing.
This paper considers the social problem career of adolescent pregnancy and childbearing in its historical context. It
seeks to explain current policies by examining how service
providers and advocates have defined the issue. In raising
the issue to national prominence, advocates have been constrained by their respective professional agendas and a political process that is generally unreceptive to proposals challenging the structure of inequality.
Historically, two complementary processes have helped
to shape both the definition of the problem and the policy

responses. First, groups claiming jurisdiction have sought to
define the problem in ways that were consistent with their
professional and organizational missions (Larson, 1977). The
professional agendas of many of these groups have emphasized individual behavioral change and social control.
Second, the political process itself does not normally permit
challenges to prevailling social and economic arrangements.
Solutions to social problems must be deemed politically and
economically feasible in order to be considered (Kingdon,
1984). Problem definitions and policy proposals that pose
substantial resource demands or require income redistribution rarely find a place on the national policy agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Schattsneider, 1960).
Until the 1960's, three groups-physicians, social workers and religiously motivated maternity home operatorsplayed an especially significant role in defining the issue
and prescribing solutions for it. Their responses were
shaped in part by efforts to claim jurisdiction over young
unmarried mothers while establishing a basis for professional status. With some exceptions, their respective professional agendas favored interpretations that stressed individual, female culpability instead of the material context of
early out-of-wedlock childbearing.
Since the 1960's, a new set of actors has become involved. They include national foundations, coalitions of local
service providers, academic researchers, and advocacy
groups such as Planned Parenthood, the Alan Guttmacher
Institute, the Children's Defense Fund, and various right-tolife organizations. These groups have proposed new approaches such as school-based clinics, birth control advertising, sex education and chastity campaigns. Like earlier approaches, many of these initiatives fail to address the
structural context of early out-of-wedlock childbearing.
EARLY OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE

Three conditions have been especially important in
shaping responses to adolescent premarital pregnancy and

childbearing: a) the social stigma surrounding the issue that
is based in part on the morality of the traditional, patriarchal
family; b) the subsistence opportunities available to young
women, i.e., work, marriage, parental support and financial
aid; and c) the availability of contraception, abortion, and
adoption. These conditions changed over time; and they differed according to the race and social class of the young
woman.
The Rescue Homes
Religiously sponsored rescue homes were among the
first organized responses to out-of-wedlock childbearing.
The first rescue homes in the U.S. were opened in the
1880's. Their founders viewed the homes as providing "hospitality, kindness and evangelism," (McKinley, 1980, p. 189)
and "temporary homes and employment . . . for women and
young girls who have led profligate lives or having been
betrayed from the path of virtue are sincerely willing to reform . . ." (Wilson, 1933, p. 45). They represented the efforts
of middle-class men and women to enforce the ideals of
what Sheila Rothman (1978) has termed, "virtuous
womanhood." Moral redemption required a complete severance of ties with the outside world, long-term residence,
hard work and strict routine (McGregor, 1924, pp. 153-154).
The maternity home was considered the last resort of
pregnant, unmarried young white women. (Until the post
World War II era, out-of-wedlock childbearing among blacks
was ignored both as a matter of public policy and private
charity.) Throughout their history, the homes have served a
fraction of potential clientele. For the majority, there were
informal, private adoptions, and foundling hospitals where
they could abandon their babies. They could also try to raise
them alone, but this was a difficult task given the limited
employment and child care opportunities and the stigma of
unmarried parenthood.
Progressive Era Reforms
In the Progressive era, alarm over the high death rate
among children separated from their mothers at birth along

with the growing organization and professionalization of social agencies led to campaigns against "baby farms," "bootleg babies" or private placements as the new agencies
sought to extend their jurisdictions over adoptions. The U.S.
Children's Bureau was established in 1912 and its first effort
was aimed at reducing infant mortality, a task that necessarily involved addressing the plight of the unmarried mother
and her child. Children's Bureau studies showed that about
half the infants taken from their mothers at birth died. National and state conferences were organized to address the
issue of illegitimacy, and a growing concensus among social
work professionals held that babies and mothers should be
kept together, at least for the first three to six months.
Some reformers called for general improvements in
wages and living standards as well as preventive public
health measures. The new public health approach was
exemplified by New York City's sixty-eight Baby Health Stations. They distributed safe milk at reduced prices, provided
nutritional advice and child care instruction, and made referrals to dispensaries, hospitals and social agencies. Nurses,
trained at newly established nursing schools, staffed the centers (Rothman, 1978).
This community-based approach was embodied in the
nations's first maternal and child health legislation, the 1921
Sheppard-Towner Act. It provided federal matching grants
to the states to establish female-operated well baby clinics
and to educate women about motherhood. The American
Medical Association, realizing the potential of the new preventive medicine, subsequently declared pregnancy to be a
"medical problem," coming within the jurisdiction of physicians. They denounced Sheppard-Towner as a "Bolshevist
plot," and in 1929, succeeded in having it repealed
(Rothman, 1978).
Birth Control
The growth of the medical profession brought skirmishes between physicians and women reformers about
authority over women's sexual and reproductive lives. Margaret Sanger's birth control cursade gained acceptance in the

192 0's only after she altered her approach by advocating it as
a health measure instead of a women's rights, free speech issue. She enlisted the cooperation of the medical profession
in making birth control information and devices, primarily
the pesary, available to women. Sanger had earlier advocated the Dutch approach that relied on female public health
nurses to distribute diaphrams and instruct on their use. She
abandoned this approach as the price for gaining the support of organized medicine. But this concession effectively
guaranteed that contraception would be limited to middleclass women who saw doctors (Gordon, 1977; Rothman,
1978; Shapiro, 1985).
Aid to Dependent Children and Stigmatized
Parenthood
In theory, the federal Aid to Dependent Children program, adopted as part of the 1935 Social Security Act, made
the keeping of her child a more viable option for the unmarried mother. However, due to the continuing stigma of unmarried parenthood and the demand for white adoptable
babies, it remained a very limited option until after World
War II.
While there was no legal prohibition against helping
children born out of wedlock, the stigma was a barrier to
their eligibility. Only 3.5 percent of children receiving ADC
benefits during fy 1937 were with unmarried mothers. Five
of the thirty states reporting accepted no children born outof-wedlock, and another eleven states had accepted less than
fifty each (Labarree, 1939). There were several apparent reasons for this low percentage, but all reflected the stigma of
illegitimacy in one way or another.
Many state Mothers' Aid statutes had prohibited allowances to children born out of wedlock, and it was some
time before more liberal state statutes were adopted. In addition, with limited funds available, localities informally restricted eligibility to exclude the children of unmarried
mothers (Labarree, 1939). A contemporary observer noted
the "extraordinary ingenuity with which some local public
relief agencies are finding excuses for not granting relief to

unmarried mothers" (Brisley, 1938, p. 68). These restrictions
notwithstanding, many unmarried women were reluctant to
risk the public exposure that an application for assistance
necessarily entailed. Although the procedures were nominally confidential, the investigations of paternity, residence,
family support and employment, and review by a local
board, precluded secrecy (Judge, 1951).
Social Work and Unmarried Parenthood
The social work profession had initially emphasized the
environmental components of social problems as well as
their individual, psychological manifestations. This was the
thrust of Mary Richmond's influential books, Social Diagnosis
(1917) and What is Social Casework? (1922), both of which
sought to establish a scientific basis for the emerging profession.
The professionalization of social work also provided a
rationale for challenging the jurisdiction of the medical profession over family relations. One author noted that physicians too often claimed, "No unmarried mother wants to
keep her baby." She suggested that this is an issue for the
social worker, not the doctor, to decide since, ". . . the unmarried mother and her child are intensive case work problems ... and she [should] be given the same opportunity that
is given to other offenders in the light of our new understanding of human behavior" (Drury, 1925, p. 41).
Social work, in its striving for a professional identity,
eagerly embraced psychoanalytic theory in the 1930's and
1940's. Freudian theory provided a congenial fit with American individualism. The subsequent adoption of egopsychology, with its emphasis on the strength of the conscious ego, reinforced the endemic social Darwinism that
identified poverty and social problems as the fault of those
so effected (Wilson, 1977). In contrast to Mary Richmond's
Social Diagnosis, Virginia Robinson's 1930 book, A Changing
Psychology in Social Case Work, denigrated the old
"sociologic approach," with its concern for the environment,
and maintained instead, "that all social work is mental
hygiene. Case work not founded on the point of view of

personality and adjustment ... is simply poor casework,
superficial in diagnosis and blind in treatment" (Robinson,
1930, pp. 36, 48). This emphasis on the individual personality became a prevalent force within the profession and
served to deflect attention from social and economic reform
(Lubove, 1977). That emphasis, together with the emergence
of public welfare under the Social Security Act provided the
conditions for what has been described as private social welfare's disengagement from the poor (Cloward & Epstein,
1965).
In the 1940's and 1950's, a new kind of negative
stereotype was applied to the young, unmarried mother. In
the new formulation, the unmarried pregnant girl was not
just immoral. She was neurotic. Social workers knew "from
psychiatric orientation and from casework experience that
most unmarried pregnancy has a neurotic base. It is frequently a symptom of unresolved love-hate parental relationships, originating in early childhood" (Sherz, 1947). Her
own assessment of her situation represented a self-serving
effort to deny the neurotic basis of the behavior and manipulate her would-be helpers. In blunt terms, "Most unmarried
mothers are serious neurotics . . ." (Young, 1947, p. 28).
A leading text of the day, and according to its publishers, the "first book length treatment of [this] major social
problem," was social worker Leontine Young's Out of Wedlock (1954). It became required reading in schools of social
work for at least a decade, and its diagnostic and treatment
prescriptions, based on an imprecise rendering of concepts
of Sigmund Freud and Helen Deutsch, became the accepted
orthodoxy. In this view:
...very few of these girls are interested in men .... For
many, their only sexual experience seems to be the relationship which results in pregnancy, and this has usually been
brief and unhappy.... An astonishing number of unmarried
mothers meet the fathers of their babies in casual, unconventional fashion. They "pick up" a man in trains, in hotels, at
dances and large parties, or they meet him on "blind dates"
with casual acquaintances .... She is like a person in a trance
who goes through all the motions but has neither awareness

nor understanding of their meaning. Hence her failure to
think of self-protection. .

.

. Why should a girl so blind her-

self? What does she want so badly that she is willing to pay so
high a price for it? Obviously, she wants a baby-but specifically, an out-of-wedlock baby-without a husband (Young,
1954, p. 28).
Implicit in this interpretation is a denial of female sexuality, a disregard for the role of male partners, and an assumption that pregnancy is desired. Consistent with a post
World War 1I preoccupation with "domineering women,"
Young and her contemporaries attributed the problem to
improper parenting by the girl's mother: "The great majority
of unwed mothers come from homes dominated by the
mother . . . a woman who has never accepted her own femininity. . ." (Young, 1954). This characterization reinforced

female culpability and anticipated subsequent culture of
poverty arguments.
UNFIT AND UNWORTHY: SECURING THE RELINQUISHMENT
OF THE CHILD

If the unmarried mother was a "serious neurotic" exhibiting "delinquent behavior," her fitness as a parent was
open to question. The new psychoanalytically-oriented social
worker unequivocally supported what had by then become
standard practice, namely the surrendering of the baby for
adoption. The babies were a valued commodity in the adoption market, and the social workers and adoption agencies
served an important brokerage function.
There were two reasons cited for the young unmarried
mother's presumed unfitness to raise her child, one
psychological and the other circumstantial. First, the baby
was considered a byproduct of the delinquency of an immature, neurotic girl who lacked the personal prerequisites for
responsible parenthood: "Our experience has shown that
with rare exceptions it is the neurotic girl who keeps her
child" (Scherz, 1947, p. 61). Second, the community's disapprobation and the relative lack of community resources, including public assistance and child care, were deemed in-

surmountable obstacles to her keeping her baby. If an argument could be made that one of these two obstacles might
be overcome, the two taken together were almost invariably
considered as barring her raising the child (Sherz, 1947;
Young, 1953).
The maternity homes were a key component in the
evolving network of specialized agencies dealing with the
unwed mother and her child. By the 1950's and 1960's, the
more modern maternity homes reflected a peculiar mixture
of therapeutic case work intervention and moral rescue.
They served "essentially respectable girls who had made a
mistake," never-married girls pregnant for the first time
(Rains, 1970, p. 220). The major functions of the homes were
concealment and the moral reinstatement of the girl through
her acceptance of responsibility for her mistake. While adoption was considered in theory an open issue, in practice,
one's intention to surrender was taken as a foregone conclusion. Failure to accept psychological responsibility for their
pregnancies or persistence in seeking to keep the baby was
viewed as "denial" (Judge, 1951; Rains, 1970).
The maternity homes began to die out in the 1960's despite the sharply rising rate and incidence of adolescent
childbearing after World War II. Salvation Army officials
"watched in despair as social acceptance of teenage and
single-parent pregnancy, changed public morals, steeply rising costs ...
and-hardest of all to bear-abortion ..
emptied their facilities (McKinley, 1980, p. 207).
Between 1945 and 1957, the baby boom years, there was
a sharp increase in the adolescent birth rate, paralleling that
for older age groups. There followed a liberalization of attitudes about sexual behavior to what had occurred in the
1920's. There were also significant developments in the
technology and availability of contraception and abortion,
and a shift among young white women from the relinquishment to the keeping of their babies born out of wedlock. The 1960's brought a major expansion of welfare state
programs and greater governmental attention to a variety of
social problems including many related to early childbearing. New programmatic interventions were developed, and

government-sponsored research yielded considerable information about the causes and consequences of adolescent
pregnancy and childbearing.
The Teenage Pregnancy Epidemic
The adolescent birth rate (15-19) in this century was relatively stable, fluctuating between about 50 to 60 per 1,000
until 1946. It then climbed from 51.5 to a high of 96.3 per
1,000 in 1957, the peak year of the baby boom (Furstenberg,
1981; Moore, 1985). The rate has declined steadily since
then, reaching prewar levels in the late 1970's. Births per
1,000 females, 15-19, were 89.1 in 1960, 68.3 in 1970, 53.7 in
1977, and 52.9 in 1981 (Moore, 1985; Vinovskis, 1981).
Underlying these trends were changes in sexual behavior, attitudes and public policies. The period from 1965
to 1975, the time of the sexual revolution, was marked by a
decline in abstinence codes and a much greater acceptance of
sexuality for all age groups. The shift in attitudes toward a
code of what Ira Riess (1980) characterized as "permissiveness with affection" is illustrated by opinion poll responses.
In 1963, 80 percent of adult respondents disapproved of
premarital intercourse; but by 1975, only 30 percent disapproved (Riess, 1980).
The earlier abstinence codes had been reinforced by professional practices and public policies. In limiting the
availability of contraception, public policies had offered a
choice between abstinence or pregnancy (Rodman et al.,
1984). There was little change in the technology, availability
or use of contraception from the 1930's until the early 60's
when the birth control pill and IUD became available. Until
then, the level of effective use provided little or no protection (Cutright, 1972a). A series of Supreme Court decisions
between 1965 and 1980 struck down state laws prohibiting
the dispensing and use of contraceptives and upheld minors'
rights to contraceptive services (Rodman et al, 1984). Despite
these changes, however, significant administrative, financial
and social barriers continued to inhibit access to contraception, especially among the young.

FROM PRIVATE CONCERN TO PUBLIC ISSUE: THE
EMERGENCE OF TEEN PREGNANCY AS A SOCIALPROBLEM

In the early 1960's, the U.S. Children's Bureau and the
service constituency it fostered sought to implicate adolescent childbearing as a cause of other concerns of the day
such as juvenile delinquency, poverty, illegitimacy, welfare
dependency, and the "population problem." Prior to that
time, teenage pregnancy and out-of-wedlock childbearing
had been considered an individual, private matter. The expansion of government social programs in the 1960's and
early 1970's also provided resources for the establishment of
local adolescent pregnancy programs, support for advocacy
groups, and money for research.
One behavioral change that had a direct bearing on subsequent policy responses was the dramatic shift among
young white unmarried women from relinquishing their
babies for adoption to keeping them as black women had
always done. This restricted the supply of white infants
available for adoption, thereby contributing to the "baby
famine" (Benet, 1976). In the 1960's, about 90 percent of
babies born out-of-wedlock were relinquished for adoption.
By the mid-1970's, about 90 percent were kept by their
mothers (Vinovskis, 1981). As Steiner (1981) observed, "As
long as it was unthinkable for a visible, unwed adolescent
to keep her child, neither prevention nor long-run services
to mother and child got much attention even from the most
compassionate policy-makers" (pp. 72-73).
The federal policy interest in adolescent pregnancy derived in part from its recognition as a problem of middle
class whites. Its transition from being viewed as a black
phenomenon to being perceived as more general and wide
spread was accompanied by a shift in causal explanation and
terminology. Early, out-of-wedlock childbearing among
blacks had been attributed to inherent sociological and cultural factors such as the supposed weakness of family
structures, and the alleged acceptance of illegitimacy in the
black community. White illegitimacy was more prone to individualistic, psychological and moral explanations (Ladner,

1972). Now, with white adolescents keeping their babies, increasing professional concern was expressed about the health
and developmental implications for the infants. Single adolescent parenthood was presumed by many to be invariably
detrimental, although, as shown below, the research evidence presents different picture.
POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND FEDERAL LAW: THE
ADOLESCENT HEALTH SERVICES AND PREGNANCY
PREVENTION ACT OF 1978

In 1963, the Children's Bureau funded a demonstration
project serving pregnant adolescent girls at Washington,
D.C.'s Webster School. It offered prenatal care, counselling,
and education, and became a prototype for subsequent efforts to establish local comprehensive service programs. By
1967, thirty-five local programs had been launched with
Children's Bureau funding. The central concept involved the
provision of short term health, educational and social services, usually by several different agencies.
This concern for pregnant and parenting adolescents fit
within the traditional purview of the Children's Bureau and
permitted the Bureau to embrace an issue of increasing public and political concern at a time when the Bureau's status
was threatened by reorganization (Nelson, 1984). The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 gave new impetus to the
Bureau's efforts to foster the development of local comprehensive service programs for pregnant and parenting adolescents. A number of local programs were started with Economic Opportunity Act funds and maintained with the aid
of other federal anti-poverty grants in the 1960's. Interest in
creating a special adolescent pregnancy program increased
sharply after the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision provided constitutional protection for abortion. In 1975, during the Ford
Administration, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced the
School-Age Mother and Child Health Act and conducted
hearings on it in his Health Subcommittee. The rationale for
this and comparable bills introduced by Representative Albert H. Quie and Senator Birch Bayh was to provide "life

support" services to teenage girls and their children, and
foster the preservation of life (Steiner, 1981).
President Carter's Adolescent Pregnancy Initiative
President Carter and his Secretary of Health Education
and Welfare, Joseph Califano, were both on record as opposing abortion, but were looking for some way to appease
both anti-abortion and pro-choice advocates (Steiner, 1981).
The Administration's legislative proposal was based on a
HEW March 17, 1977 Special Task Force memorandum
recommending a "Family Development Program," that
would "provide practical, ethical and politically viable alternatives to abortion [and] verifiable improvements in family life"
("Family Development Program," March 17, 1977, p. 656).
The prototype for the proposed national program was the
Johns Hopkins Medical School comprehensive services center supported by the Kennedy Foundation, an approach
adopted at the urging of Eunice Kennedy Shriver (Steiner,
1981).
The Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1978 stressed short term, coordinated services to
the already pregnant, advocacy of sexual abstinence, and
promotion of adoption. It was repealed under the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) and replaced by Title XX of
the Public Health Service Act. Title XX represented a retreat
from the modest objectives of the 1978 law in several respects. In defining the problem as one of fragmented and
uncoordinated services, it failed to address the absence of
many key service components. By establishing a demonstration grant program, it institutionalized the inadequate funding levels and offered no options for the thousands of
localities that could not qualify for assistance. Most importantly, it further de-emphasized family planning services.
Annual appropriations for either law have never exceeded
the $13.4 million allocation for FY 1984. Altogether, fewer
than 100 programs received grants between 1979 and 1984.
Even before the passage of federal legislation, a number
of localities had initiated local programs. A 1976 survey
identified 1,132 programs; however, only 4.8 percent, i.e. 54,

provided pre and postnatal care, education and social services (Eddinger & Forbush, 1977). A subsequent study identified 1,117 local programs of which 25 percent (274) were
deemed comprehensive because they listed the ten core services identified in the 1978 Act (JRB Associates, 1981). As
these surveys showed, a number of communities established
programs, but few were comprehensive. This is not surprising in view of the conditions under which these programs
operated.
A study of local programs found the constraints so formidable that only under exceptional circumstances could
comprehensive services be sustained. The constraints included the absence of a firm funding base, an insufficient
health and welfare infrastructure, negative attitudes toward a
stigmatized population, and an unproven interventive
technology. A gender-based division of labor further impeded access to resources. The female program staff often
had difficulty in convincing male resource gate keepers of
the urgency of what was commonly regarded as a female issue. When programs were established in schools, they frequently served organizational interests by removing pregnant students from the regular classrooms and isolating
them in special self-contained programs for the duration of
their pregnancies (Weatherley et al., 1986; Perlman &
Weatherley, 1986). Evaluations of federal demonstration
projects have found that while some may have improved
pregnancy outcomes of some participants, they have generally been unsuccessful in reducing welfare dependency,
school leaving, and repeat pregnancies, or in providing employment, all goals of these programs (Burt et al., 1984; Polit
& Kahn, 1985).
OPENING THE POLICY WINDOW

The exigencies of political agenda building demand that
a social issue be perceived as a national crisis in order to
gain the attention of policy decision-makers. Advocates have
strong incentives to dramatize the adverse consequences of a
social condition and minimize the costs and difficulty of

ameliorative efforts. As a result, policy advocates have often
emphasized the dire consequences of teenage pregnancy
while obscuring its etiology in poverty, racism and sexism.
Three kinds of processes have been involved in sustaining popular and official perceptions of teenage pregnancy as
a crisis demanding governmental attention: a) rhetorical devices stressing the gravity of the problem and the threat it
poses to the social order; b) issue expansion, whereby teen
pregnancy is implicated as a cause of other recognized social
problems; and c) selective utilization of empirical evidence.
Rhetorical devices include the use of medical metaphors
such as "epidemic" and "contagion," and labeling the issue
as "a crisis." Young unmarried mothers are described as
"children" and "immature," irrespective of their age, individual circumstances and maturity, and their children are referred to as "illegitimate." The dramatic rhetoric and sense
of crisis it conveys, and the potential for gripping pictoral
representation has made the issue an appealing subject for
the media, thereby reinforcing the interest of political actors
(Declerq, 1978; Vinovskis, 1981).
Beginning in the 1960's, policy advocates portrayed
teenage childbearing as a cause of poverty, crime, delinquency, school drop out, unemployment, child abuse, welfare dependency, mental retardation, and a variety of health
and developmental problems. The seriousness of the problem was reinforced by a selective presentation of the empirical evidence. Statistical data were reported in ways that
suggested a growing problem. This was done, for example,
by lumping together the 17-19 year olds who have the most
children with less mature, younger girls; by reporting the
increasing numbers of births to the baby boom cohort which
was actually experiencing falling birth rates; and stressing
rates of increase among the youngest girls, aged 10-14, from
0.8 births per 1,000 in 1966 to 1.1 in 1983, without mentioning the relatively small numbers involved-9,773 in 1982
(Levine & Adams, 1985).
Most common was the attribution to teen pregnancy of a
series of dire consequences, an association based on the

ecological fallacy. There is a large body of literature documenting the ill effects and social costs of early childbearing
and parenthood. However, many of these adverse consequences result not from pregnancy per se but from poverty
and the unequal access to resources and services. Nonetheless, individualistic interpretations of the issue persist. This
is not only because out-of-wedlock parenthood is a violation
of maternity norms (Schur, 1984), but also because there is
no constituency to support the redistributive policies that a
structural interpretation would imply. Interest groups are
constrained to put forth strategies consistent with the electoral interests of political actors.
Teenage mothers were innacurately deemed biologically
too immature for safe childbearing; their high premature delivery rate was considered inevitable, unaffected by even the
most comprehensive prenatal care (Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1976, p. 21). They were said to be more prone to child
abuse (Bolton, 1980), though empirical studies have failed to
confirm this (Gelles, 1986). It was often asserted that teen
pregnancy caused school leaving (Alan Guttmacher Institute,
1976; Fine and Pape, 1982), though half the young mothers
who have left school dropped out before becoming pregnant.
A Time magazine cover story captures the popular theme
of female culpability. The article, "Children having children:
Teen pregnancies are corroding America's social fabric,"
states: Teen pregnancy
imposes lasting hardships on two generations: parent and child. Teen mothers are, for instance, many
times as likely as other women with young children to live
below the poverty level. According to one study, only half of
those who give birth before age 18 complete high school (as
compared with 96% of those who postpone childbearing). On
the average, they earn half as much money and are far more
likely to be dependent on welfare: 71% of females under 30
who receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children had
their first child as a teenager.
As infants, the offspring of teen mothers have high rates of
illness and mortality. Later in life, they often experience educational and emotional problems. Many are victims of child
abuse at the hands of parents too immature to understand

why their baby is crying or how their doll-like plaything has
suddenly developed a will of its own. Finally, these children
of children are prone to dropping out and becoming teenage
parents themselves. According to one study, 82% of girls who
give birth at age 15 or younger were daughters of teenage
mothers.
With disadvantage creating disadvantage, it is no wonder
that teen pregnancy is widely viewed as the very hub of the
U.S. poverty cycle (Time, Dec. 9, 1985, p. 84).
Such interpretations notwithstanding, there is a substantial body of evidence confirming that many of the problems
associated with teen pregnancy and childbearing are due to
poverty, exacerbated by inadequate health and welfare services. Poor teenagers are more prone to bear children as well
as drop out of school, be unemployed, receive public assistance and have health problems (Cutright, 1972b; Menken,
1972, p. 334; Osofsky & Kendall, 1973, p. 115).
More recent research has reaffirmed the links between
poverty, poor health care, and the ill effects of teen pregnancy. Baldwin and Cain's review of the research (1980) led
to the conclusion that the perinatal and neonatal risks of
early childbearing were directly related to the quality of prenatal care. They cited a study of 9,125 births in Copenhagen,
Denmark that found that the children of younger mothers,
drawn from a lower socioeconomic group, actually had lower
rates of stillbirth and neonatal mortality than the children of
older, more economically secure mothers. The younger
mothers and their children also had better indicators of general health. These excellent results for young women at apparently high risk were attributed to the superior system of
prenatal care. Similar results were also reported in American
studies when high quality prenatal care was provided.
A summary of research reviews states, ".
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than older mothers of similar SES and race (Mc Anarney &
Thiede, 1983, p. 378).

Class and Race Dimensions of Adolescent Childbearing
Concerns about teenage illegitimacy, especially among
blacks, and the attendant welfare costs have been cited
among the reasons for passage of the Adolescent Health,
Services, and Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act of 1978
(Vinovskis, 1981). Some of the reasons for the increased
out-of-wedlock birth rates have received little attention in
policy debates, however. A major factor has been the declining rate of marriage (Hayes, 1987, p. 77).
After a sharp rise in the adolescent marriage rate following World War II and continuing through the 1950's, the rate
has since been steadily declining, as it has for older women.
In 1960, only a third of the women between 20 and 24 had
not married; by 1978, almost a half in this age group were
unmarried, although in general, the declining marriage rate
has been accompanied by a commensurate increase in
cohabitation (Bell, 1983). Three structural factors are associated with the postponement of marriage since the 1960's:
youth unemployment, prolonged high school and college
education, and a skewed sex ratio reflecting a shortage of
males, especially between ages 15-35. The impact of unemployment and the declining pool of available males has been
particularly severe for blacks.
The percentage of men who have ever married varies directly with their income at every age and educational level.
The employment picture for young people has been especially bleak since the 1960's. This is due to economic stagnation compounded by the entry of the baby boom cohort and
an increasing percentage of women into the labor market.
Youth unemployment rates have remained consistently high,
especially for black males, even in periods of recovery.
Since men, on the average, marry women about four
years younger, one effect of the baby boom was to create a 5
to 10 percent surplus of women at the age when most first
marriages occur. This marriage gap was exacerbated by a
higher male mortality rate. Males between the ages of 15 and
35 are especially prone to death from accidents, murder and
suicide, and a substantial percentage are incarcerated. Violent death and incarceration take an especially high toll

among black males, and with the high rate of unemployment, there is a dearth of potential marriage candidates,
especially among blacks (Bell, 1983).
Premarital Sexual Activity, Contraception, and Abortion
During the 1970's, there was a substantial increase in the
percentage of unmarried adolescents who were sexually
active. The proportion of unmarried girls 15-19 who had
ever had intercourse increased from 28 percent in 1971 to 46
percent in 1979, and then declined to 42 percent in 1982. The
proportions of black girls who were sexually active during
this period ranged from 13 to 31 percentage points higher
than white girls (Hayes, 1987, p. 40).
Socioeconomic status is strongly associated with age at
first intercourse, contraceptive use, abortion and childbearing. Using the mother's educational attainment as a measure
of socioeconomic status, the lower her level of schooling, the
more likely her adolescent child would become sexually
active. An analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth data found that 53.7 percent of those girls whose
mothers had not completed high school were sexually active
by age 18, compared with 34.1 percent whose mothers continued beyond high school (Hayes, 1987, p. 45).
The causes of adolescent childbearing are complex, and
no single explanation can account for the variety of behaviors and circumstances involved. Middle and upper-class
adolescents become pregnant as do those from impoverished
backgrounds. Yet a number of studies have pointed to the
associations between poverty, the early initiation of sexual
activity and the failure to use contraception. As summarized
in a review of the research, the following factors appear to
be central:
•.. poverty, living in a one-parent family, minority group
membership, low education and occupation of parents, low
economic achievement and low educational-occupational goals
of the young person (Chilman, forthcoming, p. 7).
The linkages between one's life circumstances and sexual
and contraceptive behavior remain unclear. However, there
is evidence that adolescents who perceive some benefit in

avoiding pregnancy and childbearing are more likely to do
so. They tend to be those who have high aspirations and see
some likelihood of achieving their life goals. Conversely,
those who have low self-esteem, fatalistic attitudes and a
lack of efficacy are more likely to bear children (Chilman,
forthcoming; Furstenberg, 1976; Moore, et al., 1986).
Contraception
Despite the major strides in the availability of contraception during the past twenty-five years, problems remain.
Federally funded family planning services first became available under the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964, and services expanded rapidly in the early 1970's with the 1970
enactment of the Family Planning Services and Population
Research Act, Title X of the Public Health Services Act. Title
X initially drew support from a coalition of women's rights
and population control advocates, many of whom were concerned about growing AFDC enrollment. However, Title X
has since been opposed by conservatives who contend that
it fosters promiscuity and erodes parental authority. With
the passage of Title X, there developed a two-tier system of
service delivery, with government sponsored family planning services targeted to the poor, the young and minorities,
while white, middle-class women relied more on private
physicians. However, with limited funding for Title X, there
remains a substantial gap in available services.
An Alan Guttmacher Institute study in the mid-1970's
estimated that a minimum of 1.6 million adolescents at risk
were unserved by either a private physician or an organized
program (Dryfoos & Heisler, 1978). There is little reason to
believe this situation has improved since then. A national
survey of adolescent girls confirmed this picture of family
planning availability and utilization:
If we add together those who never use contraception and
those who have never used medical methods, we have around
70 percent of the sexually active who are not being reached
through organized services. In addition, there is the large
group of young women who ultimately use medical methods,

but whose acceptance of these methods comes after an extended period of nonuse, which in many cases involves an unintended pregnancy. In terms of their penetration of the market
for teenage contraception, the nation's physicians and clinical services can reasonably be regarded as marginal suppliers (Zelnik,
Kanter and Ford, 1981, pp. 129-130, emphasis added).
While reproductive processes are "natural," they are also
shaped by material and social conditions. The introduction
of the birth control pill and IUD in the early 1960's shifted
primary contraceptive responsibility from males to females.
For young, unmarried women, the use of contraception,
especially the pill, diaphragm and IUD, conflicts with strong
social sanctions against being sexually assertive.
Kristin Luker (1975) put it this way: ".

.

. our present

contraceptive technology has increasingly created an ideology that says un unwanted pregnancy is the woman's fault."
She argued that the failure of many young unmarried
women to contracept represents a kind of rational risk-taking
where women "weigh the actual costs of contraception
against a discounted risk of pregnancy" (p. 41). The costs of
contraception for young unmarried women include the
flaunting of taboos by planning to have sex, being sexually
available and experienced.
Despite the technological shift to female contraceptive
methods, Zelnik, Kanter and Ford (1981) found that 40 percent of adolescent girls who used birth control relied on
male methods, the condom or withdrawal. However, adolescent males remain insufficiently concerned about their contraceptive responsibility (Chilman, forthcoming, p. 10).
Abortion
Abortion also has played a central role in limiting the
number of births to teenagers during the past fifteen years.
From 1973 to 1982, the proportion of teen pregnancies terminated by abortion rose from 24 to 39 percent (Levine and
Adams, 1985). The abortion rate might be even higher were
it not for the 1976 Hyde amendment prohibiting federal
funding for abortions (Steiner, 1981).

When one considers the differences in the availability
and utilization of contraception and abortion, along with the
availability of the marriage option, the class dimensions of
teenage pregnancy stand out. Low income and minority girls
become sexually active earlier and are much less likely to use
contraception or rely on abortion than white, middle class
adolescents. Zelnick, Kanter and Ford (1980) found little difference in contraceptive use between black and white teenagers when controlling for age, socioeconomic and family
status, and age at first intercourse. Even before passage of
the Hyde amendment, abortion was used mainly by the
middle classes. The poor pregnant teenage girl is about
two-fifths as likely to abort irrespective of race. Considering the effects of both marriage and abortion, Zelnik, Kanter
and Ford (1981) found:
those in the lowest SES category were 9 times as
likely to deliver illegitimate births as those in the highest
category; among whites the differences are even more extreme, in that none of the women in the highest [SES] category delivered an illegitimate birth, all of their illegitimate
pregnancies having been 'resolved' either by abortion or by
marriage" (p. 158).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As a social problem, early unintended pregnancy and
childbearing can be defined in different ways. It may be
seen as resulting from impoverishment, restricted educational, vocational and marriage options, inadequate preparation for sexuality, lack of information and access to contraception and abortion, and social prohibitions against
female birth control initiatives. The adverse consequences
associated with early childbearing may also be seen as manifestations of poverty, an inadequate health care system, and
the lack of public child development supports. Such interpretations call attention to the structural components of
the issue and reveal ways in which individual behavior and
social policy are constrained by economic inequality and racial and gender bias. They suggest the need for basic re-

forms to reduce poverty and inequality and improve access
to health care, family planning and other essential services.
Historically, however, the dominant problem definitions
have focused on the individual girl rather than the social
context of childbearing. It has been her immorality,
neurosis, or ignorance, or the lure of public support that
caused her to become pregnant. Her immaturity was itself
the cause of poor pregnancy and developmental outcomes.
Her behavior threatened the social fabric by perpetuating
the culture of poverty and spawning a host of costly social
ills.
The predominance of individualistic definitions of the
problem is not accidental. The prime arbiters in defining
adolescent pregnancy have been the service providers, helping professionals, academics, bureaucrats and politicians
who have some vested interest in the issue. Given the constraints of the political system, the policy options they promote must be acceptable to dominant interests if they are to
receive serious consideration. This rules out universalistic
health care, income support, and full employment policies
that might alter the social context of early childbearing,
especially among minorities and the poor.
Policies to promote early sexuality education, birth control information and access, and contraceptive responsibility
would benefit adolescents at all income levels. While such
policies are not as costly as basic welfare state reforms, they
threaten patriarchal family values by appearing to sanction
adolescent sexuality. A National Academy of Sciences panel
concluded, "The problems of adolescent pregnancy and
childbearing are solidly rooted in many of the forces and
principles that shape our society-individualism, family autonomy, and free enterprise" (Hayes, 1987, p. 293).
Changing circumstances, most notably concerns about
the spread of AIDS, and the efforts of both new and established advocacy groups have opened the national policy
agenda to a somewhat wider range of options. There is increasing recognition of the role of poverty, racial discrimination, and sexism in early childbearing. However, many of

the more recent proposals continue to focus on individual
change. Remedial education, employability training, values
clarification, assertiveness training, life skills planning, and
mentoring programs may be of limited benefit unless adolescents perceive that there are meaningful life options available to them. Even incremental efforts to strengthen existing
family planning, income maintenance, nutritional and maternal and child health programs are most welcome, as are
campaigns promoting sex education and contraception. It is
not likely, however, that the rate of adolescent childbearing
or the incidence of adverse health and social consequences
will be significantly altered without major changes in income distribution, employment opportunities, gender roles,
and health and welfare services.
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NOT FOR POVERTY ALONE:
FOSTER CARE POPULATION TRENDS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Leroy H. Pelton
School of Social Work
Salem College, Salem, Massachusetts
Trends in the size of the national foster care population from 1910
to 1983 are examined in the context of child welfare policy toward
dependent and neglected children. Several major turning points in
the child placement rate are identified, and the reasons for them
are explored. The relationship between poverty and foster care
placement is discussed, and it is concluded that the child placement
rate is not related to the poverty rate, but rather, to how our
society chooses to intervene with the children of families living in
poverty.

One can hardly imagine a more profound intrusion of
government or society into the lives of families than the separation of children from their parents. When such separation
is effected through no fault of the children, the question
arises as to what conditions of the family or faults of the
parents might be defined by society as rightful or necessary
cause for such extreme action.
At least since the early 1900s, a strongly stated commitment and policy toward maintaining children in their own
families, whenever possible, has emerged in the United
States. The 1909 White House Conference on the Care of
Dependent Children issued the following famous conclusions:
"Home life is the highest and finest product of civilization ...Children should not be deprived of it except for ur-

gent and compelling reasons. Children of parents of worthy
character, suffering from temporary misfortune, and children
of reasonably efficient and deserving mothers who are without support of the normal breadwinner, should as a rule be
kept with their parents, such aid being given as may be

necessary to maintain suitable homes for the rearing of the
children . . . Except in unusual circumstances, the home
should not be broken up for reasons of poverty, but only for
considerations of inefficiency or immorality ... " (in
Bremner, 1971, p. 365).
This was seemingly the dawn of a new era in child welfare, in which the emphasis, in policy at least, was clearly
shifting toward maintaining children in their own homes.
The expressed concern that children should not be removed
from their parents for reasons of poverty seemed to contrast
sharply with the "child-saving" philosophy which predominated through the nineteenth century and which emphasized the "rescuing" of children from pauper families
(Leiby, 1978, p. 144).
As late as 1899, the first law to establish a juvenile court,
in Illinois, lumped dependency and neglect together: "(T)he
words dependent child and neglected child shall mean any
child who for any reason is destitute or homeless or abandoned; or dependent upon the public for support; or has not
proper parental care or guardianship; or who habitually begs
or receives alms; or who is found living in any house of ill
fame or with any vicious or disreputable person; or whose
home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on the part
of its parents . . .is an unfit place for such a child . . ." (in
Bremner, 1971, pp. 506-507).
This law, considered a reform because it removed child
welfare matters from the criminal court, went on to state that
when any child was found to be dependent or neglected, the
court may order the commitment of such a child to an institution or foster home. Thus dependent and neglected
children were to be dealt with in like manner.
Such approaches to dependency and neglect in the late
nineteenth century were the vestiges of longstanding
theoretical beliefs about poverty, according to which the
causes of poverty were seen as residing within the poor
themselves. It is but a short step from this view to the notion that poor people are not "fit" to raise children, that
their pauper characteristics are synonymous with neglect

where children are involved, and that children should be rescued from their pauper influence. Theoretically, there may
never have been much opposition to the idea that poverty
alone should not be grounds for breaking up families, or to
the premise that parents of "worthy character" who are "efficient and deserving" should keep their children. It was just
that poverty was thought to coincide with faulty parenthood
and unworthiness of character.
There were some departures from this stance. As early as
1887, the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Children stated in its Seventh Annual Report that "we
never take neglected children by law from their parents,
where the neglect arises from honest poverty alone" (in
Bremner, 1971, p. 208). Leaving aside the issue of whether a
child is removed "by law" or through other means, the
questions raised are how much and whose poverty has been
seen as "honest" and "alone," how much and whose behavior has been judged neglectful, and whether changing
views of poverty and neglect and their relationship to each
other have affected the issue of separation.
There can be no doubt that, in modem times, the verbal
banner under which the organized forces of child welfare
ride is "protect the child and preserve the family," "prevention" of child neglect and abuse as well as foster care placement itself, the foster care only as a "last resort." The byword is prevention. The mere thought, moreover, of placing
children for reasons of poverty would seem outrageous to
many.
The New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services
(1984), for example, proclaims its mission to be to "protect
vulnerable children ...
support family preservation ...
prevent family violence and disruption." The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-272)
provides that "reasonable efforts will be made ... to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his
home, and . . . to make it possible for the child to return to
his home . . ." Although this Act has been hailed as a reform, the modern rhetoric of prevention goes back at least as
far as 1951, when the American Humane Association's

standards for child protective work proclaimed that "protective service . . . is directed not so much at rescuing the child
from the home, as preserving, where possible, the home for
the child" (in Bremner, 1974, p. 853).
If there has been any change at all in stated policies
toward the separation of dependent and neglected children
from their parents, from the 1909 White House Conference
to the present, it is this: There has been an increasingly
greater emphasis on prevention of child neglect and abuse
and, beyond not wishing to separate children for reasons of
poverty, on keeping families together even in which child
maltreatment has occurred, by rehabilitating the parents.
The undeniable policy thrust, however, over the course of
three quarters of a century, has been to keep families together. This stated policy has, if anything, grown stronger
and more unequivocal in its expressed intent of doing whatever may be necessary to prevent the separation of children
from their parents.
In fact, however, from long before the turn of the century until present times, there has always been a considerable number of children in the United States living in foster
care, who had been put there-in foster family homes, institutions, group homes, or other living arrangements with
non-related individuals-through no fault or handicap of
their own, by child welfare agencies. While the rationales
and motives for separating children from parents have
changed over time, a predominant characteristic of displaced
children in this country has not changed: by and large they
have continued to be poor children from impoverished
families. 1
The purpose of this paper is to examine trends in the national foster care population through the twentieth century,
to explore the possible causes of these trends, and to compare policy to reality.
THE RATE OF CHILD PLACEMENT,

1910-1983

Estimates of the nation's foster care population at various points in time between 1910 and 1983 are presented in

Table 1 and plotted in Figure 1. They all refer to one-day
counts.
The figures for 1910, 1923, and 1933 are based on U.S.
Census statistics. 2 The estimates presented for 1961, 1963,
and 1965 are derived from a new state reporting system instituted by the U.S. Children's Bureau in 1960. 3 It is known
that the foster care population declined after the mid-1930s,
and it is believed that the foster care population did not
reach its 1933 numerical level again until 1961-1962 (Low,
1966; Boehm, 1970, p. 255). However, the turning point is in
doubt, and the upward trend might have begun as early as
1957, and even as early as the late 1940s (as depicted
hypothetically by the dashed curve in Figure 1). 4 The estimates for 1975, 1977, 1979, and 1980, and the first estimate
listed for 1982 are based on studies, employing varying
methodologies, by the Children's Defense Fund, Westat,
Inc., the U.S. Office of Civil Rights, the Child Welfare
League of America, and Maximus, Inc., respectively. Finally,
the 1981 estimate, the second and third estimates listed for
1982, and the 1983 estimate are derived from surveys by the
American Public Welfare Association.It would be an understatement to say that the various estimates presented here are not strictly comparable. Not only
are they derived from several different methodologies, but
definitional differences (concerning the types of placement
6
arrangements to be included) plague most comparisons.
Moreover, certain implausible fluctuations, such as an apparent decline by 200,000 children in two years (from 1977 to
1979), further diminish our confidence in the precision and
7
consistency of these figures .
Nonetheless, if we were to suspend belief in the various
estimates as precise point figures and regard each estimate
as merely representing a range and having a margin of error
of thousands or even tens of thousands, we have reason to
have confidence in the trends that emerge. Thus, for example, we have reason to believe that the high point of the foster care population in this century occurred during 1975-77,
based as it is on two independent estimates, although we

have little confidence in precisely what the population size
was at that time. Indeed, in Figure 1, we observe that a
small number of clear trends do emerge, and that at least
from 1961 on, the beginning and end of each trend is backed
up by estimates at no less than two points in time.
The trends we see are these: the foster care population
increased from 1910 until 1933, declined until sometime before 1961, increased until its high point during 1975-77, and
declined until 1982. There are indications, based on three estimates derived from consistent studies using the same
methodology and procedures (the American Public Welfare
Association surveys), that by 1983 the foster care population
8
was on the rise again.
Since the child population of the United States did not
remain static over the course of this century, it is necessary
to adjust our figures by calculating child placement rates.
The U.S. Census statistics for the population of individuals
under eighteen years of age are presented in Table 1 (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 10, Series A29-42; U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1984, p. 29, No. 31). The child placement rates, also presented in Table 1, and plotted in Figure
2, indicate the number of children in foster care per every
1,000 children living in the United States at the time. We see
that these estimated child placement rates indicate the same
trends as do the absolute foster care population estimates.
INTERPRETING THE TRENDS: FACTORS RELATED TO
CHANGES IN THE RATE OF CHILD PLACEMENT

The 1909 White House Conference, through its stand
against breaking up families for reasons of poverty alone,
and despite its leaders' distaste for public as opposed to private charity, paved the way, together with the emerging
recognition in the early 1900s of the social origins of poverty, for mother's pension legislation (Lubove, 1968, pp. 9899). The first statewide mother's pension law was enacted in
Illinois in 1911, and within the next decade 40 states passed
similar legislation (Axinn and Levin, 1982, p. 149).
The express intent of the mother's pension movement
was to avert the break-up of families for reasons of poverty
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alone, by giving financial aid, to "deserving" mothers at
least, so as to allow them to keep their children (Thompson,
1919, p. 11). Juvenile court judges had been distressed over
what they had been forced to do. Reflecting the new understanding of the social origins of poverty, Kansas City
juvenile court judge E.E. Porterfield, in arguing for a
mother's pension act before the Missouri state legislature,
proclaimed: "If the poverty of the mother forces her to neglect her child the poverty should be removed and not the
child" (Lubove, 1968, p. 100).
However, competing undercurrents and reservations undermined this intent. The misgivings that private charities
had about public pensions, the enduring individualistic
view that character deficiencies caused poverty and, beyond
that, the fear that aid would promote a "spirit of dependency" and thereby undercut initiative and striving toward
economic independence on the part of the mothers, no
doubt contributed to the fact that the funds allocated for
mothers' pensions were extremely meager and that the individual benefits failed to address the concrete needs created
by poverty (Leiby, 1978, p. 151; Lubove, 1968, pp. 101-110;
Thompson, 1919, p. 19).
Yet the inadequacy of funding under the mother's pension laws cannot explain, by itself at least, why the child
placement rate actually increased between 1910 and 1933.
This increase is made more remarkable by the fact that the
orphan population in our country, once quite large, declined
enormously during that time (see Table 1 and Figure 1)
(Shudde and Epstein, 1955). It would be difficult to imagine
that such "full" orphans, when they existed in large numbers, did not contribute substantially to the foster care population. 9
The mother's pension laws provided for field investigators to judge which mothers were "inefficient" or "immoral," and which were deserving of aid (Lubove, 1968, p.
109; Thompson, 1919). As Lubove (1968, p. 108) states: "An
uneasy balance of economic and vague moral criteria complicated the administration of this legislation." Moreover, relief
was combined with "social treatment." Again as Lubove

(1968, p. 110) states: "Application for a pension was
presumptive evidence of an inadequacy which differentiated
the family from the community mainstream and justified intervention in the client's personal life."
It is possible that, in the absence of appreciable material
assistance, increasing numbers of dependent children were
redefined as neglected children, and that the mother's pension laws aided this development by sending out investigators to detect, according to their own lights, deficiencies
in the conditions of the home and in the mother's moral
character.
In 1910, Roswell McCrea wrote: "It is a practical experience . . . that the line between destitute and neglected children is a very shadowy one" (in Bremner, 1917, p. 214). This
line would remain hazy so long as adequate financial aid
would not be given to destitute families. The distinction between poverty and neglect would become even more difficult
by the 1920s when, due to the strong influence of
psychoanalytic theory on social work practice, casework
came to be based upon a psychodynamic model, and the
casework focus shifted further than in its recent past from
the environment to the individual (Woodroofe, 1968, pp.
118-147; Lubove, 1965, pp. 80-117). Children would no
longer be removed for reasons of poverty, thus in keeping
with the 1909 White House Conference doctrine, but rather
for psychological defects of the parents presumably resulting
in neglect, and the child placement rate continued to increase.
The subsequent decline in the child placement rate, from
the mid-1930s, has been attributed by child welfare experts
to the Social Security Act of 1935, with its provision of federal funding for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), and it
would be difficult to deny such a causal link (Low, 1966;
Boehm, 1970, pp. 224-225). While the financial benefits
under this program were still inadequate, they were much
better than before.
During the coming decades, many mothers would be
denied financial assistance on the grounds of failing to meet

locally established "suitable home" criteria (Bell, 1965, pp.
93-110). But since, as previously noted, we cannot pinpoint
how long the decline in the child placement rate lasted, it is
difficult to determine whether the decline continued despite
this phenomenon, or whether this phenomenon contributed
to the subsequent upturn.
In any event, it appears that some semblance of material
provision, however still inadequate, to address the concrete
needs of poverty, had an impact on the rate of child placement by preventing the need of separating children from
their parents in many instances. However, the steep decline
of the orphan population during that time raises an unresolved question of just what proportion of the decrease in
the child placement rate may be attributable to the financial
aid itself under the Social Security Act.
We next face the question of why the child placement
rate might have risen during the 1950s, and why it soared
beginning with the early 1960s. During the 1950s and early
1960s, public spending for child welfare services in this
country had increased to substantial levels. Such expenditures doubled from $104.9 million in 1950 to $211.5 million
in 1960, and the federal share of these expenditures had
grown from 4.0% to 6.3% (Bixby, 1981). Concurrently, the
number of employees in public child welfare programs rose
considerably (U.S. Children's Bureau, 1953; 1963, Table 21;
1964, Table 21; Low, 1957, Table A).
The major service of child welfare agencies traditionally
has been foster care placement. In 1956, for example, 72 percent of total expenditures for child welfare services by state
and local agencies went for foster care payments (Low, 1958,
Table 1). Thus increased money available to hire more employees simply meant that more placements could be made.
Several important occurrences may account for the explosion in the child placement rate from the early 1960s until
the 1975-77 period. In the early 1960s, C. Henry Kempe and
his colleagues "discovered" child abuse. Focusing on extremely brutalized young children and infants, this team
dramatically called attention to what it labeled the "Battered

Child Syndrome," and alluded to psychodynamic causes and
"defect in character structure" as underlying this "syndrome" (Kempe, et al., 1962). This "discovery" drew an
enormous amount of professional and media interest, and
child abuse became a national issue (Pfohl, 1977; Antler,
1981; Nelson, 1984). The passage of reporting laws, requiring
physicians, social workers, other professionals, and even all
citizens, to report cases of suspected child abuse as well as
neglect, developed as a major strategy in dealing with child
abuse and neglect. By the end of 1963, thirteen states had already enacted such laws, and by 1973, every state had
passed a mandatory reporting law (Antler, 1981). In 1973, the
passage of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
established a National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
within the Children's Bureau, and served to draw further attention to the issue of child abuse.
This child abuse movement further encouraged intervention into the lives of families, based on psychodynamic conceptions of the faults of the parents. But this movement,
which we will argue here was the driving force behind the
increase in the child placement rate, would not have eventuated in this result if new resources had not become available.
As it happened, Title IV of the Social Security Act was
amended in 1961 to make federal monies available to states
for court-ordered placement of children from families receiving ADC (later AFDC) (Rosenthal and Louis, 1981). However, state child welfare agencies continued to circumvent
the courts in the large majority of their placements
(Mnookin, 1973; Gershenson, 1984). Thus if this AFDC-FC
program functioned as an incentive to increased placement,
it did so to a limited extent.
More importantly, the Public Welfare Amendments (to
the Social Security Act) of 1962 provided grants-in-aid to the
states for social services. These amendments compelled the
federal government to match, by 75%, whatever state governments spent on "social services," a term that was left illdefined, with no ceiling placed on the amount that could be

spent (Derthick, 1975, pp. 1-14). The amendments of 1967
further expanded the scope of spending. Under these
amendments, federal spending for social services rose from
$194 million in 1963 to $354 million in 1969, and then soared
to $1.7 billion by 1972, after which Congress enacted a $2.5
billion ceiling (Derthick, 1975, pp. 1-14). Federal spending
did reach $2.5 billion by 1977 (Bixby, 1981). It is not known
exactly how all of this money was spent, but there are indications that a large proportion did go for foster care (Derthick, 1975, p. 2; Mott, 1976, p. 25). Total expenditures (including federal, state, and local) for social services increased
from $712.6 million in 1970 to $3.2 billion by 1977 (Bixby,
1981).
In addition, under these same amendments, fixed federal
grants to states specifically earmarked for child welfare services rose from $13.4 million in 1960 to $56.5 million by 1977
(Bixby, 1981). These expenditures, however, continued to
constitute only a small portion of total expenditures specifically designated as child welfare spending, which rose from
$211.5 million in 1960 to $810 million by 1977, indicating
that the states themselves contributed heavily to increased
child welfare spending (Bixby, 1981).
Public child welfare agencies expanded enormously during this period, allowing these agencies to investigate more
and more cases. In New Jersey, for example, the number of
employees of the state child welfare agency rose from under
500 in 1965 (when it was the Bureau of Children's Services)
to over 2,000 in 1975 (as the Division of Youth and Family
Services) (Governor's Budget Message, 1966, 1977). The
caseload more than doubled from 19,249 children in 1968 to
44,688 children in 1974 (New Jersey Bureau of Children's
Services, 1968; New Jersey Division of Youth and Family
Services, 1974).
Ironically, although the intent of the amendments was to
"strengthen family life," they served to provide the resources for a child abuse crusade whose thrust was to detect
psychological defects in impoverished parents rather than to
provide concrete services in the home. The crusade provided

the reports to be investigated and the rationale for child removal; the amendments provided the resources for more
caseworkers to be hired who could investigate more reports
and remove more children.
An increase in the number of caseworkers would not
necessarily have led to more removals were it not for the fact
that foster care was the primary resource that child welfare
agencies possessed. If these agencies had used the social
services monies to develop concrete supportive services for
the home, then the increased number of workers could have
provided more of these, rather than more foster care.
But of great significance was the fact that child neglect
had been redefined, in a sense, as child abuse (Wolock and
Horowitz, 1984). The image created in the public's mind
through the media, often through vivid photographs, was of
brutally battered children of the type that Kempe had seen
in his Denver hospital. The large, often exaggerated numbers, however, cited by proponents of the movement in
order to claim that child abuse had reached "epidemic proportions," referred mainly to cases of far milder abuse, and to
the many more cases of marginal neglect seen by public
agencies (Pelton, 1978). Aiding this conception of an
epidemic was the psychodynamic medical model of child
abuse introduced by Kempe and his associates which the social work profession, long enamored of psychodynamic explanations of behavior, embraced wholeheartedly, and the
contention that child abuse and neglect "afflicted" families
without regard to socioeconomic standing (Pelton, 1978).
Hence child neglect, together with abuse, was seen no
longer as an aspect or result of poverty, but as a psychological problem, calling for psychological treatment. When the
suspect parents did not respond to "treatment," the children
were more likely to be shipped off to foster care, this removal aided by the new and more severe image of what neglect entailed. The fact that the children removed were, as
such children have always been, among the poorest children
in our society, did not disturb the removers, who held, and
continue to hold, to a belief in the myth of classlessness (Pelton, 1978). Under the influence of the new model, even if

more money had been wrested from foster care, it more
likely would have gone for more counseling and therapy
than for concrete services. In any event, the psychodynamic
medical model and the myth of classlessness have facilitated
child removal by encouraging the already present inclinations to look for personal deficits in poor people and to overlook the socioeconomic factors involved.
So powerful was the combination of forces described
above that it led to the increase in the child placement rate
despite the fact that, at least from the late 1950s on, many
studies and reports began to indicate to child welfare professionals that separation and the foster care system were doing
considerable harm to children (e.g. Maas and Engler, 1959;
Wald, 1976). However, due to eventual alarm over the large
number of children in foster care and the fact that many
children were remaining in foster care for very long periods
of time, "permanency planning" became a broad and popular movement within the child welfare field during the late
1970s, and later became a major aspect of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. The main thrust of
this movement has been aimed at children already in foster
care: to either get them returned home or freed for adoption.
The decline in the child placement rate between 1977 and
1982 is attributable to conscious efforts on the part of public
child welfare agencies to decrease the size of the foster care
population.
As we have noted, there are indications that the child
placement rate was on the rise again by 1983. Indeed, more
children entered foster care in FY 1983 than in FY 1982 (Tatara and Pettiford, 1985, pp. 33-34). It is possible, then, that
the rise is due to a continuing failure to deal with the "front
end" of the foster care system, i.e., prevention of foster care
placement in the first instance. The permanency planning
philosophy, because it is largely directed at children already
in foster care, and because it has spurred a push toward
adoptions as well as toward returning children home, may
lead to increasing numbers of displaced children remaining
where they are, but now with adoption papers in hand and
parental rights terminated. The child placement rate is on

the rise again despite this push toward adoption. It is as
though the child welfare establishment wants to have it both
ways: the child abuse crusade continues unabated so that
children are placed in foster care almost as readily as before,
and attempts are made to keep the foster care population
down by getting children out of foster care more quickly.
Prevention continues to take a back seat.
CONCLUSIONS

As stated before, it is largely poor children who populate
the foster care system. In her 1967 paper on foster care, after
reviewing some of the evidence on the high incidence of
poverty among families whose children are placed in foster
care, Bernice Boehm (1970, p. 222) wrote:
"It is more than half a century since the tenet was first
enunciated that 'no child should be separated from his family
for reasons of poverty alone.' It is unforgivable that in more
than half a century this basic principle, to which there is such
strong commitment, has not been implemented. It may be true
that in many instances we do not place for poverty alone, because poverty seldom comes 'alone.' "
Now, three quarters of a century have elapsed, and
Boehm's statement still holds true. It is as though some minimal quota of children from poor families is still being sent
into foster care, but for different stated reasons. Before the
turn of the century, poverty itself would suffice as the reason, although there was the implicit assumption that poverty
itself was an indication of the unfitness and immorality of
the parents. Later, when poverty was identified as a force
outside of parents, and it was held that children should not
be removed for reasons of "poverty alone," it was incumbent upon the child removers to make separate "findings" of
the unfitness and immorality of impoverished parents. And
in more recent times, the parents are not perceived as immoral, but as psychologically defective in some way. If poverty can no longer be located in the parents, then at least the
effects of poverty on parents and children can be located
there, and children would not be removed for "poverty

alone." The behavioral effects of poverty would now call
forth the attribution of motives and personality characteristics indicative of psychological deficiencies. Thus the
reasons would be couched in the modern benevolent language of psychology, but the results would be the same: the
victims of poverty would be blamed, and the children would
be removed.
The number of related children under age eighteen living in families below the poverty level, as well as the poverty rate for such children, for selected years from 1960 to
1982, are shown in Table 1 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1983,
p. 21). The poverty rates for children are also plotted in Figure 2. It can be seen that the child placement rates bears no
apparent relationship to the poverty rate. For example, during the period 1960-75, the poverty rate declined and then
rose, but the child placement rate rose throughout.
On the other hand, we must keep in mind that the children in foster care, by and large, come from families living
in poverty. Indeed, it is somewhat misleading to calculate
placement rates based on the total child population of the
nation, since the "pool" from which foster children are
drawn more closely corresponds to the smaller "pool" of
children who live below the poverty level. Poverty placement rates (i.e., the number of children in foster care per
every 100 children living with their own families below the
poverty level) for selected years from 1961 to 1983 are presented in Table 1 and plotted in Figure 2. We see that trends
in the poverty placement rate parallel those in the original
placement rate, although at far higher levels. If foster care
population estimates could be taken at face value, we would
be able to say that in the 1980s, about two children reside in
foster care for every 100 children residing with their own
families below the poverty level.
When AFDC recipient families on the caseload of New
Jersey's state child welfare agency for alleged abuse and neglect were compared with AFDC families not known to that
agency, the former were found to be the poorest of the poor
(Wolock and Horowitz, 1979). It is possible that the "pool"
from which foster care children are drawn is even smaller

than the one we have just indicated: they may be drawn
from an underclass of families most deeply submerged
below the poverty level. This might explain why the fivefold
increase in the number of children covered by AFDC benefits between 1955 and 1975 did not serve to stem the rise in
the placement rate ("Current Operating Statstics," 1985, p.
74). That is, foster children might largely come from a
harder-core subset of impoverished families who have always availed themselves of AFDC support.
We may conclude that the child placement rate is not related to the poverty rate, but rather to how our society has
treated or dealt with the children of families living in
poverty, and especially of those most deeply submerged in
poverty. There has always been a sufficient "pool" of impoverished families available to supply large numbers of
children to the foster care system. The crucial variable affecting child placement rates has been the nature of the social
interventions engaged in by society, not the fluctuating size
of the poverty population. One hestiates to say that the crucial factor has been "social policy" in regard to child welfare,
for the stated policy through much of this century has been
to strengthen and preserve families. Rather, we must look to
the social programs implemented, sometimes in the name of
that policy, and often misguidedly, that have reflected
deep-rooted attitudes toward poor people, and toward approaches needed for the protection of children.
In recent years, perhaps a cyclical pattern has been set in
motion in which periodic concerns over child abuse prevention will push up the foster care placement rate, until alarm
is again expressed over the rising foster care population. The
perception of the value of child abuse prevention as seemingly in conflict with the value of separating as few children
as possible is, however, only a product of particular conceptions of child abuse, based on the psychodynamic medical
model of child abuse originated by C. Henry Kempe and his
colleagues back in the early 1960s. The abiding and prevalent inclination in our society to seek the causes of harm to
poor children in the supposed personality deficits of their

parents, whether couched in terms of moralistic or
psychological shortcomings, rather than in socioeconomic
conditions and forces, will continue to create imagined conflicts between prevention and family preservation.
Under these dynamics, we may expect no sustained reduction in the child placement rate below recent levels.
Child welfare officials will continue to respond merely to the
immediacy of events, such as a rise in the foster care population, without any significant reform occurring. This pessimistic conclusion is premised on the belief that the social
awareness of our society that does indeed find expression in
many of its social policies is nonetheless underlain by a
deep-seated suspicion of the poor, and that this suspicion
will continue to guide the manner in which our programs
are carried out and, in effect, the way we deal with the poor.
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studies, such as Gruber's on foster children in Massachusetts, leave
no doubt that most such children come from impoverished families.

2.

Of the total of 151,441 children in foster care in 1910, 39,927 were
outside of institutions (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1913, p. 28, Table
19). On February 1, 1923, there were 218,523 children in the care of
institutions and child-placing societies primarily for the care of dependents (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1927, p. 18, Table 2). The figure
for 1933 indicates the number of children in agencies' institutions
and foster homes, representing institutions and agencies caring for
dependent and neglected children (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1935,
p. 8, Table 4; p. 1).

3.

The figure for 1961 represents
dent and neglected, in foster
(U.S. Children's Bureau, 1962,
and 1965 represent the same

children in institutions for the depenfamily homes, and in group homes
p. 30, Table 25). The figures for 1963
categories (U. S. Children's Bureau,

1964, p. 9, Table 6; 1966, p. 15, Table 2). We do not present the 1960
statistics here because of an apparent incomplete implementation of
the system during its first year of operation (see Jeter, 1962; U. S.
Children's Bureau, 1961).
4.

See, for example, Jeter and Lajewski (1958). Before 1961, the estimates
reported in the Children's Bureau Statistical Series did not include
children served only by voluntary child welfare programs. This led to
considerable undercounts of children in institutions. Considering all
available information, our best guess is that it is not likely that the
foster care population, after 1933, ever dipped below 200,000, nor the
child placement rate (see text) below 3.5.

5.

The estimate for 1975 is from a Children's Defense Fund study, based
on a variety of statistical data (Knitzer, Allen, and McGowan, 1978).
The 1977 estimate, from a Ewstat study, is based on a sample of almost 10,000 case records from a sample of 315 local public child welfare agencies (Shyne and Shroeder, 1978). The 1979 estimate is based
on a survey by the U.S. Office of Civil Rights requesting all of the
more than 2,400 public child welfare agencies in the country to provide statistical information (U.S. Office of Civil Rights, 1980). The
1980 estimate was derived from state statistical reports by the Child
Welfare League of America (1983). The 243,000 figure for 1982 was
due to a study by Maximus, Inc., based on a sampling of case records
from a national sample of 167 local public child welfare agencies
(Maximus, Inc., 1983). Finally, the American Public Welfare Association estimates for 1981, 1982, and 1983 were derived from state statistical reports (see Tatara and Pettiford, 1985, p. 32, Table III). The 1982
262,000 figure refers to the last day of FY 1982, the 263,000 figure to
the first day of FY 1983, and the 269,000 figure to the last day of FY
1983.

6.

For example, there has been variation in regard to the inclusion of
children in pre-adoptive homes, emergency care, detention centers,
runaway shelters, independent living arrangements, and those living
with relatives and whose placements were arranged and/or paid for
by public child welfare agencies. According to Dr. Charles Gershenson of the Children's Bureau, 10 different state definitions of foster
care are currently in use (Gershenson, 1985). According to Dr. Toshio
Tatara, who directs the American Public Welfare Association data collection effort, 34 states define children in pre-adoptive homes as part
of the foster care population, while the remaining states consider
such children to have left foster care (Tatara, 1985).

7.

According to Dr. Charles Gershenson, it has been determined by
Westat and the Children's Bureau that of the apparent decline of
200,000 children from the 1977 Westat estimate to the Office of Civil

Rights figure for 1979, 110,000 was due to definitional differences
and therefore was not real.
8.

At the time that this article went to press, the latest as yet unpub
lished statistics available from the American Public Welfare Associa
tion surveys indicated a continued rise in the foster care population
to 276,000 at the end of FY 1984.

9.

For example, according to a report by the State of New Jersey Pension Survey Commission (1932), there were 3,685 children under statE
supervision in foster homes and institutions in October 1931. 01
these plus another 894 children placed with relatives, 557 were orphans.
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Although social and economic conditions and prevailing popular
philosophies may affect the success or failure of an attempt at
change in social welfare policy and practice, the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the political forces for and against the change
may be more important. In 1897, fourteen years before the passage
of the first U.S. Mothers' Pension law in Illinois, New York State
Senator John Ahearn attempted such a law in New York. Although
the bill was passed unanimously by both houses of the State Legislature, it was never signed into law. The reason was that the children's institutions and other philanthropic organizations formed a
coalition and effectively organized against the proposed bill, while
supporters of the bill were not organized. Although it failed, this
attempt contributed to the future passage of Mothers' Pensions law
by helping to bring the issue to public attention, and stimulating
the creation of other programs that would address the problem.
At approximately thirty year intervals, attempts are
made to significantly change the policies and practices of the
social welfare institutions in the United States. In 1935, for
example, the Social Security Act became federal law. In the
1960's, attempts were made, at various levels of government,

to liberalize the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program. Currently, major changes, such as the
addition of work requirements for mothers of young children, are also being considered. While reforms of the 1960's
were often met with strenuous resistance, current proposals
appear to be gathering general support.
Why are some proposed changes implemented, while
others are not? The answer lies, in part, in social and economic conditions, and prevailing philosophies of the times.
Still more influential, however, may be the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the political forces for and against the
changes, with whom those forces are allied, and how well
they are organized.
Such failures to initiate reforms, however, may also be
precursors of successful attempts. Outcomes may be (1) that
the issues are brought to public attention for later action; (2)
that more effective efforts may then be organized; and (3)
that alternate programs addressing the problems may be developed.
This paper examines one historical instance of successful
resistance to reform; the failure of an attempt to change public policy regarding dependent children and their families in
New York City at the turn of the century. It also examines
the contribution of that effort to eventual success.
THE STORY OF THE DESTITUTE MOTHERS' BILL

On March 30, 1897,1 State Senator John Francis Ahearn
of New York City introduced a reform bill in the New York
State Legislature. His bill would have provided funds for
some destitute New York City parents and would have
enabled them to care for their own children instead of being
forced to place them in institutions. The act, which was
called the "Destitute Mothers' Bill", read as follows:
"When any child shall hereafter be committed to the care
of any institution in the city of New York, the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children in said city, shall, upon the

application of the parent or guardian of such child, in a proper
case, after a careful and thorough inquiry, direct that the custody of such child be given to its parent or guardian, and in
such event the comptroller of said city of New York is
authorized to pay said society, for transmission by it to such a
parent or guardian, the money allowed by law for the maintenance, care and welfare of such child and paid by said city to
the institution to which it may have been committed.
"The said society may revoke any such change of custody
and return such child to the institution to which it was originally committed, whenever in its judgment the interests of
said child will be benefited thereby . . ."
The New York City charitable organizations were in
complete and unanimous disagreement with this reform
proposal. But initially, they took no action, since they had
been assured that the bill would be killed. Nine days after it
was introduced, however, the "Destitute Mothers' Bill"
unanimously passed the Senate, and the day after, the Assembly. Neither body had held hearings. Since this proposed law would apply exclusively to New York City, 2 however, the Mayor was required to hold a public hearing. This
was scheduled for April 21st. In preparation, the State
Charities Aid Association circulated an alert to all New York
City Charitable organizations. The alert was successful. At
the hearing, which lasted less than one hour, there were
only two speakers for the bill, and more than twelve against.
Among the twelve against were representatives of both private and governmental agencies: William R. Stewart,
President of the State Board of Charities; John P. Fauvre,
Commissioner of the New York City Department of Public
Charities; John B. Pine, representative of the State Charities
Aid Association; representatives of agencies that maintained
children's institutions and agencies that worked with poor
families; and Elbridge T. Gerry, President of the Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the agency that would
be charged with dispensing payments and supervising the
destitute families should the Ahearn bill become law.

The agencies' arguments attacked all key provisions of
the proposed bill. If it were passed, they said, a system of
public outdoor relief would be reestablished in the City, and
this, they claimed, would "promote pauperism, discourage
self-reliance and thrift, and . . . (would be) liable to flagrant
abuses" (Twenty-fifth Annual Report . . ., 1897, pp. 81-82).
In addition, it was argued that the sum was set without relation to the need of the parties to be aided; administration of
the law was to be placed in the hands of a private corporation with no responsibility to the taxpayers; parents receiving two dollars per week per child would not have enough
money because they would not be supplemented with additional private funds as were the institutions; and above all,
it was objected that the bill would encourage "shiftless
fathers" to desert their families since the later could then be
supported by public monies. Based on this assumption, it
was argued that the number of children to be supported as
public charges would grow. The City was then spending almost $2,000,000 per year for the care of dependent children:
if the bill were passed, many additional families would
surely apply for public money because they would no longer
have to suffer the pain of separation in order to feed their
children.
The only speakers in favor of the bill were Bernard
Downing, who represented Senator Ahearn, and Mrs. Silas
P. Severidge, who said that she devoted a great deal of her
time to visiting the poor, but was not connected with any
particular organization. Mr. Downing focused his testimony
on the harm to children that results from institutionalization.
As reported by Homer Folks in the July-August issue of the
Charities Review, Downing said that he ". . . wished that a
Dickens might be present to portray these benevolent managers, who insisted that the only proper way to assist a poor
mother was to take her children away from her and support
them in their institutions" (Folks 1897, p. 497). Folks reported that Mrs. Severidge "assured the Mayor that, if he
could appreciate the distress and suffering of parents who
had been compelled to give up their children, he would not

withhold his signature from the bill" 3 (Folks, 1897, p. 497).
The Mayor had fifteen days from the time he received
the bill to return it to the Legislature with his comments.
His disapproval reached them on the last possible day. Unfortunately for the proponents of the bill, this was the last
day of the legislative session, and it was too late for the
legislature to re-vote it over the Mayor's disapproval. It was
never signed by the Governor.
In 1898, on the first day of the next legislative session,
the Destitute Mothers' Bill was again introduced by Senator
Ahearn. This time the charity organizations were ready: they
called for and got hearings before the Senate Committee on
the Affairs of Cities. 4 The bill was bottled up in this committee and never reached the floor for a vote, nor did it the following year, even when it was introduced in modified form
to meet the objections of the charity organizations.
The Sixteenth Annual Report of the Charity Organization Society of New York describes that hearing. 5 It was
argued that:
"... this plan is a scarcely disguised form of outdoor relief, that there are serious objections to any plan by which the
State undertakes to pay parents for the care of their own children, and that 'shiftless fathers' would be quite as apt as 'destitute mothers' to claim the indulgence of the Society and the
public. All these and other weighty, if less obvious arguments
were urged in a variety of telling addresses before the Senate
Committee by a strong representative delegation from the
charitable societies and institutions of New York City, and the
committee, accepting the views thus presented, allowed the
1898,
bill to remain unreported (Sixteenth Annual Report ....
10-11).
pp.
The bill failed despite the fact that there had begun to be
public distrust of children's institutions. Abraham Epstein,
describing public opinion in the 1890's observed that there
was a
... realization that huge asylums were bad for children,
mothers and society . . . Institutional life dulled and blighted
the inmates. Institutional children were frequently slower to

develop, and altogether too many were unable to cope with
life outside of the institution. Even a second-rate mother was
recognized as better than the very best institution, while a
good mother could do for her own children what no other
woman or organization could do .

.

. Some low-grade institu-

tions also showed exceedingly high death rates which shocked
the nation" (Epstein, 1933, p. 623).
From 1894 through 1898, the New York Times carried
numerous stories about institutions' mistreatment and illegal
transport of children West, and also related instances in
which institutions refused to cooperate with the Commissioner of Accounts when he tried to investigate alleged City
overpayments for the care of children who were public
charges. On June 5th of 1895, for example, an article appeared under the headline, "Deborah Nursery: Superintendent B. Abrams charged with cruelty" 6 from March, 1894
through October, 1897, nineteen stories appeared about allegations of cruelty and corporal punishment of inmates by
the Superintendent of the Westchester Temporary Home for
Destitute Children, J.W. Pierce. 7 In June 1897, stories appeared relating that "New York Foundling Asylum Agent R.
Curran sells children in Chicago" 8; on April 1, 1897, there
was a report that "John Neese (was) sent West by Gerry
Society Without Guardian's Permission" 9 . In November,
1894, a story appeared relating that "Charitable institutions
(are) paid for more County Wards than Legal .. ."10; in
August, 1896, there was a report of investigations by the
Commissioner of Accounts over overpayments by the City
Controller to the Infant Asylum1 1 ; and in May, 1898, there
were several articles about another investigation by the
Commissioner of Accounts: this time, of the Immaculate
12
Virgin Mission on Staten Island
Not only the New York Times, but other periodicals published articles opposing the use of institutions for the care of
dependent children. An example of such an article appeared
in the North American Review of April, 1897. It depicted the
"evil results of institutional life and training." Its author,
Henry Smith Williams, cited the fact that New York City
was then caring for 16,000 children in twenty-five institu-

tions, one in thirty-five, at a cost of about four million dollars annually. He believed such care was inappropriate and
expensive:
"... About 70,000 children in the U.S. are being reared in
this abnormal way, and the taxpayers and benevolent individuals are together paying over $10,000,000 a year . . . How
much it cost them later on to complete the task in the police
courts, almshouses, work houses and prisons, it would be impossible to correctly estimate" (Williams, 1897, pp. 404-414).
Nor was the press alone. Judges, who in some places
had the responsibility for committing children to be cared
for at State expense, often became spokesmen against institutional child-rearing. Senator Ahearn, who had spent five
years as a clerk of one of the New York City police courts,
witnessed countless cases of children removed from their
families and sent to institutions solely because their parents
were unable to provide for them financially.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "NEW

YORK

SYSTEM"

FOR THE

CARE OF DESTITUTE CHILDREN

To understand why the care of dependent children had
become a serious public concern in New York City, it is
necessary to consider how children's institutions evolved
there.
While social welfare services were developing largely as
government-run entities in most parts of the United States,
New York City had instead developed a system of publicly
funded private agencies, largely controlled by their philanthropic boards.
As early as 1811, the New York State Legislature provided funds for the institutional care of dependent children
by private agencies. By the middle of the century, large-scale
immigration, uncontrolled industrialization and sharp business swings were responsible for the development of a
growing class of urban poor. The number of children whose
parents were unable to care for them multiplied. Immigration brought social disorganization: parents who had difficulty coping in a new land with a new language, culture and

societal values had the added difficulty of coping with unemployment, low pay, and the demands of working long
hours in order to eat. Some were unable to provide needed
food, clothing and shelter. Many were unable to exercise the
necessary parental guidance and control that would insure
that the children would grow up with the ability to function
appropriately. Some children became vagrants.
Brace's solution was the "placing out" of children with
families in the country. From 1853 through 1890, the Children's Aid Society moved more than 85,000 children from
New York City to farm families in upstate New York, New
Jersey, and as far away as Minnesota, Kansas and Texas. 13
Not all of these children were abandoned vagrants or orphans, however. Many were brought to the Society by parents who were too poor to provide food and other necessities. Giving them up was the only way to keep the children alive. He placed children without regard to religion.
While many of the new immigrants were Roman Catholics,
and later, Jews, most of the farmers who received the children were Protestants.
In reaction, Catholics and Jews created large congregate
institutions for the care of their co-religionists' children.
However, although these were established under voluntary
and sectarian auspices, they were in large part funded by
the City and State of New York. The Hebrew Benevolent
Society and Orphan Asylum in the City of New York, for
example, received a parcel of land on 77th Street and Third
Avenue, donated by the City for the purpose of erecting a
building to house 200 orphans. The City also contributed
$30,000 toward building costs, and the State Assembly
agreed to contribute another $35,000. The Society had only
to raise $20,000. By 1874, the Society was receiving about 70
percent of its operating budget, or $23,203.97, from public
funds (Bernard, 1973, p. 10 and 14).
The very next year, the legislature adopted an act that
would stimulate even greater growth in the use of institutions to house children. The Children's Law of 187514 required that children between the ages of three and sixteen

be removed from poorhouses ("unless such child be an unteachable idiot, an epileptic or paralytic, or be defective,
diseased or deformed . . .") and were to be placed in a children's institution or home governed by persons of the same
religion as their parents (Schneider and Deutch, 1938-1941
p. 63).
The result was a rapid growth in specialized children's
institutions. In 1875, the year of enactment, there were only
9,363 institutionalized New York City children who were
public charges. By 1888, the number had increased by 68
percent, to 15,697. During this period, the amount of public
monies spent for the care of those children rose by 115 percent (N.Y. State Board of Charities, 1980, p. 181). By 1898,
the number of children in care away from their families had
risen to 18,000. The time that each child remained in care
also lengthened during this period. In 1875, only 8 percent
of all institutionalized children stayed more than five years:
by 1894, 23 percent were long-term residents (Bernard, 1973,
p. 34).
Public response to this change led to attempts at systemic change that would limit the number of children in
care. The Revised Constitution of 1894 gave more power to
the state supervising body, the State Board of Charities. This
body then issued tightened eligibility requirements and required public agency approval before children could be
placed in private institutions as public charges. The New
York City Department of Public Charities employed a staff of
examiners to investigate the circumstances of families before
the children were placed, and at yearly intervals thereafter.
The new measures were effective as long as they were
enforced. While there had been an increase of 15.8 percent
in the number of institutionalized children from 1890 to
1894, there was a decrease from 1894 to 1896 of 8.6 percent
(State Charities Aid Association of New York, 1898, p. 6).
The fact that New York was in the throes of an acute economic depression through 1895 makes this decrease even
more significant. The number rose again in 1897, however.
The Annual Report of the State Charities Aid Association of

November 1, 1898, stated that " . . the New Constitution
(was) remarkably successful and effective for about three
years, appears to have lost something of its restraining
force" (State Charities Aid Association of New York, 1898, p.
10). As the cost to the public again grew, so did public concern.
THE OPPOSITION OF THE "PHILANTHROPIC COMMUNITY"
TO MOTHERS' PENSIONS

Even though there was a developing consensus against
institutions, the defenders of the institutions profited from
the fact that, in 1897, social welfare leaders still regarded a
destitute mothers' subsidy as an alternative even worse than
institutionalization. To them, the primary objection was that
Senator Ahearn's proposed reform would route public
money to poor parents.
The bill was opposed not only by representatives of
childcaring institutions who stood to lose public funding if
the law passed: it was also opposed by officials of the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and by
other social work organizations 1 5 who, even though they
were against institutionalization of children, could not support a reform that would make benefit payments to poor
parents.
Notable social workers who spoke out against mothers'
pensions were Mary Richmond, Edward T. Devine, and
Josephine Lowell, founder of the New York Charity Organization Society and member of the New York State Board of
Charities from 1876 to 1889. Lowell was against mothers'
pensions even though she believed that institutions were
bad for children, and had previously stated that ". . . it
ought to be considered cruel and wicked to take children
away from a decent mother just for want of money to support them and friends to look after them. . . ." Her fear of
the encouragement of "pauperism", however, appeared to
have been stronger than her belief that poor children should
not be removed from their mothers.
The agency that took the lead in organizing the opposi-

tion to what some social workers called Ahearn's "Shiftless
Fathers' Bill" was the State Charities Aid Association, an
organization whose general secretary, Homer Folks, was actually an active proponent of keeping children out of institutions.
Why, then, was there such adamant opposition to subsidizing poor parents so as to prevent institutionalization?
According to I.M. Rubinow, who wrote in 1934, one explanation of the resistance of social work to "mothers' pensions" is that it resulted from the identification of social
work of the late 19th century with private philanthropy
(Rubinow, 1934, p. 487). The Boards of both children's institutions and charity organizations were largely composed
of philanthropists who were closely related to the industrial
elite.
Most philanthropists were adamantly opposed to any
form of outdoor relief. During one forum on mothers' pensions, for example, philanthropist, Otto T. Bannard, argued
that ". . . widows' pensions would eventually lead to such
horrors as old-age pensions, free food for the unemployed,
will breed candidates for alms, will repress self-help and
self-respect, is not American, and is the entering wedge of
state socialism (Rubinow, 1934, pp. 487-488).
Statements such as this were not simply a matter of rich
versus poor, however. To fully understand why mothers'
pensions in general, and Senator Ahearn's proposal in particular were so heartily condemned, it is necessary to understand the role social welfare organizations played in relation
to the political and philosophical debates of the era. One
must also understand the degree to which local social work
was shaped by the corrupt politics of New York City in the
late 19th century.
THE "ESTABLISHMENT'S"

VIEW OF THE POOR

Social workers, philanthropists and New York State officials of the latter half of the Nineteenth Century tended to
believe that the poor were responsible for their poverty. According to the New York State Senate's Report of the Select

Committee Appointed to Visit Charitable Institutions Supported
by the State in 1857, ". . . the kind of poverty which ends in
a poor house ... is not unusually the result of such selfindulgence, unthrift, excess, or idleness, as is next of kind to
criminality" (New York State Senate, 1857, pp. 9-10).
"Pauperism", as opposed to poverty, was of particular
concern to many nineteenth century Americans: its discussion constituted a major topic of the first meeting of the National Conference of Boards of Public Charities, in May 1874.
According to Frank J. Bruno, primary concern was for "the
weakness of the victims of destitution . . . for treatment, and
even for cure, and not much attention was paid to those
situations, external to the dependent, which might throw
some light upon the reasons for their dependence" (Bruno,
1957, p. 27).
According to the common wisdom of the rich of the era,
the poor, who chose their lot, were unwilling to work hard,
preferring a life of vice, ignorance and crime. They had
comparatively little self-control: Brace wrote that ". . . the
high lessons of duty and consideration for others are seldom
stamped on them, and Religion does not much influence
their more delicate relations with those associated with
them" (Brace, 1872, p. 40). F.A. Walker, in the December
1897 issue of Century Magazine, wrote:
"Pauperism is, in truth, largely voluntary to the full degree
in which anything can be said to be voluntary in a world of
causation, a matter, if not of definite and conscious choice,
then of appetites and aptitudes indulged or submitted to from
inherent baseness or cowardice or moral weakness. Those who
are paupers are so far more from character than from condition. They have the pauper taint; they bear the pauper brand
(Walker, 1897, p. 210; Howard, 1897).
Even Amos Warner, a social welfare leader who
pioneered in the consideration of social causes of poverty, in
his first edition of American Charities, published in 1894,
"treated poverty no matter what the cause, as synonymous
with 'degeneration' " (Bremner, 1956, p. 71).
One prevailing philosophy of the day was "Social Dar-

winism." Darwin's study of evolution was interpreted by
Herbert Spencer, an English civil engineer turned sociologist, to mean that those who were unable to ma;ntain
themselves in society should not be aided by those more
able, but should be allowed to die lest they reproduce more
of their own kind and thus weaken society. According to
Spencer, "The unfit must be eliminated as nature intended,
for the principle of natural selection must not be violated by
the artificial preservation of those least able to take care of
themselves (Bremner, 1956, p. 71).
The principles of Social Darwinism were not fully accepted in the United States, but were modified by a strong
tradition which still saw a value in charitable impulses
stimulated by the presence of poor people. According to
Tratner, "even Herbert Spencer, when accused of hardness
of heart because of his attitude toward the poor ... retreated to the position that voluntary charity could be
tolerated in that it encouraged the development of altruism,
a Christian Virtue" (Bremner, 1956, p. 82).
Those who were concerned with the care of dependent
children in the United States were often influenced by a Social Darwinist philosophy. They believed, however, that
even though poor adults were not redeemable, their children
could be taught and would be positively affected by positive
environments. Brace believed that since so many of the poor
died before adulthood, the survivors might be genetically
superior to their parents. He therefore argued that if poor
children were removed from the poor environment of their
parental homes and placed in positive environments on
farms and in country villages, their inherent virtues would
triumph and they would become productive and wellbehaved citizens (Brace, 1872, pp. 45-46). In accordance with
such philosophies, it was considered more appropriate for
dependent children of the later half of the nineteenth century to be cared for apart from their poor parents, who
therefore, would not need financial support.
The giving of alms or other "outdoor relief" was supposed to have encouraged "pauperism" and economic de-

pendency, "a pernicious social disease." Therefore, the givers of philanthropy in the 1890's "operated on the theory
that people ought to be self-supporting and that those who
were not must be led or driven into taking care of themselves" (Bremner, 1956, p. 124).
Many believed that the English were correct in their administration of poor relief, where new Poor Law provisions,
passed as early as 1834, eliminated outdoor relief, entirely.
Mr. Peabody, in his article, "How Should a City Care for its
Poor", published in December, 1892, said that, "We, like the
English, distrust out-door relief; we apply the "poor-house
test". If a person is not willing to go to a city institution, we
argue, he is probably not poor enough to need city help . . .
we defend the community from the pauper" (Peabody, 1892,
pp. 474-491). Only those who were thoroughly investigated
by a private agency and were deemed "worthy" should be
given limited help; preferably in the form of work.
Although industrial expansion brought growing wealth
for the nation, it also brought periodic depressions where
countless laborers were thrown out of work. At best, workers had to accept inadequate wages, according to what the
market would bear, and poor housing conditions. Until the
end of the century, these conditions tended to be largely ignored, however. While poverty was regarded as an indicator
of criminality and inferiority, money, and those who acquired it, by whatever means, became the nation's heroes.
Those who were unable to maintain themselves were considered genetically and morally unfit (Trattner, 1974, p. 81).
Even as the philanthropists and their social work agency
representatives embraced an "anti-poor" philosophy, there
are indicators of a more sympathetic public attitude (Gladden, 1892; and Abbott, 1894). The closing of the frontier,
and the obvious dearth of jobs during economic depressions
made the poor seem less like criminals and more like victims
(Bremner, 1956, p. 30). In many areas of the country, especially during and after the Civil War, the practice of providing public outdoor relief to those in need, continued.
In New York and in some other large cities, however,

where there were many more philanthropists and social
workers, the tendency was to provide "outdoor relief"
through private agencies only, and "indoor" or almshouse
relief through government. Not only did this policy follow
logically from the ideology of the "establishment", it could
also be defended as a way of preventing public graft and
bribery.
PHILANTHROPISTS'
I

OPPOSITION TO TAMMANY

Corruption in government was rampant in big cities.
During the reign of "Boss Tweed" in New York, the public
treasury was systematically raided. An investigation of the
Department of Public Charities in 1874 showed serious discrepancies, and led to a sharp reduction in the Department's
budget (Schneider . . ., p. 35). Social workers and others
complained that public relief went to aid not those who
were worthy and in need, but was primarily used to buy
votes, and to reward the politicians' friends.
In reality, the "Tammany Hall" politicians and their
public welfare system were in competition with private relief
agencies. Many poor persons found application to private
agencies demeaning and embarrassing, and preferred instead to seek financial assistance from politicians who asked
in return their votes rather than their self-respect.
The anti-corruption forces, which included the social
welfare community and many of their rich and powerful
board members, worked to put their own "reform" candidates into office. When these "good government" forces
gained power, Tammany's "alternative" welfare system was
destroyed with the cessation of public outdoor relief in New
York City. In the midst of a prolonged economic depression
that lasted from 1873 to 1878, the Board of Estimate voted
(during February 1875) to limit public relief to cash grants to
the adult blind, and to the distribution of a half-ton of coal
each to needy families during the winter. In December 1876,
in the midst of the coal distribution, they voted to discontinue all public outdoor relief except to blind persons.
Private charity was supposed to take up the slack. How-

ever, in reality, as the number of unemployed persons increased, that became an impossibility. During the suspension of public relief in the last half of 1874, for example, the
caseload of the Association for Improving the Conditions of
the Poor increased by 355 percent. In 1873 the organization
aided 5,292 persons; in 1874, 24,091. Naturally, each family
got less, since the dollars expended less than doubled.
It became evident that private funds were insufficient;
public funds were needed. In 1876 and 1877 the Board of Estimate voted money to private agencies for direct aid: on
January 20, 1876, the sum of $35,200 was granted to six private agencies to be expended "during the present winter for
food, clothing and shelter for the poor (Schneider, 1938-1941,
p. 35). Public money was again being used. This time, however, there was less of it, and control was in the hands of
the rich philanthropists and their agents rather than politicians whom they did not control.
By the time of the depression of 1893 to 1895, both city
and private organizations had developed work relief programs. While these were inadequate to the number of persons unemployed, they were consistent with the belief that
the giving of alms encouraged pauperism. The Twentieth
Annual Report of the Charity Organization Society of the
City of New York contains a clear statement of that philosophy. It read:
"The ideas upon which organized charity rest are that
pauperism-the degrading dependence of one person or family upon others for the necessities of life-should not be
encouraged or acquiesced in, but, on the contrary, that it
should be energetically and hopefully combated; that the
transofrmation of those who are by nature or by misfortune
dependents upon charity into self-supporting and selfrespecting members of the community requires patience, skill
and devotion; that a judicious combination of volunteer and
professional service is most likely to produce the desired result; and that when temporary or even permanent financial assistance is necessary, as it often is, such assistance should not
be given mechanically or carelessly-in other words, as alms,
or doles-but on full and accurate knowledge, on a definite
plan, and with personal interest in the individual who is

helped, as a human being" (The Charity Organization Society
of the City of New York, 1902, p. 13).
PRIVATE CHARITY'S ALTERNATIVES TO MOTHERS'
PENSIONS

Senator Ahearn's attempt was part of a growing dissatisfaction with one way of caring for dependent children, and a
move toward another. Although its failure meant that many
children who could live with their families would continue
to be cared for in institutions for some years, it also stimulated further action and development of alternative programs. The organizations that fought the bill, even though
they were against institutionalization of children, were
stimulated to look for alternative methods of addressing the
problem. In an effort to eliminate the need for mothers' pensions, then, the private charitable organizations developed a
number of programs designed to keep children with their
families. Day nurseries for the children of working mothers,
and programs of private relief were established and grew;
job-placing programs were developed. The State Charities'
Aid Association was constantly looking for alternatives that
would prevent the separation of mothers and their children
(Schneider .

. .,

pp. 181-183). They organized a program to

place single mothers in positions in the country where their
children would be accepted.
Indeed, as a direct outgrowth of the Ahearn bill, the
Charity Organization Society created their "Committee on
Dependent Children", which was to examine all applications
made by parents for the institutional care of their children,
and, as an alternative to placement, to help all "worthy"
families remain together. Since all applications for institutionalization were processed through the Department of
Public Charities, each day a representative of the Committee
went to their offices to examine the records. Home investigations were made of the most likely candidates for their services, and those families deemed "worthy" were aided. In its
Seventeenth Annual Report, the Committee proudly stated
that no special funding was needed for this program, because the Society "called upon friends, relatives, employers,

neighbors or . . . when necessary, turned to strangerseither individual donors or relief societies" such as the St.
Vincent de Paul or the United Hebrew Charities (The Charity Organization Society of New York, 1899, p. 14).
Few families were found worthy, however. During the
first year, the Society examined the records of 888 families
representing the possible placement of 1,607 children. Their
standards must have been exceedingly stringent, however.
According to their report, most of the families were not considered worthy of Charity Organization Society assistance:
599 families were rejected, and 1,111 children, or 69% of the
total, were institutionalized.
THE ULTIMATE PASSAGE OF MOTHERS' PENSIONS LAWS

Twelve years after the first introduction of the "Destitute
Mothers' Bill", in 1909, the first White House Conference on
Children issued a pronouncement that "Home life is the
highest and finest product of civilization ... children
should not be deprived of it except for urgent and compelling reasons . . .,"16 This pronouncement gave voice to what
had become, by 1909, a widespread sentiment in favor of
legislation to provide "widows' pensions", or financial assistance for mothers of children whose father were dead or
otherwise absent and unable to assume financial responsibility for them. Such legislation was at last initiated in 1911 in
Illinois and reached New York in 1915. These laws were the
precursors to the federal AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935.
A number of factors led to the eventual passage of these
reforms. According to Schneider, mothers' pensions finally
became a reality when social outrage demanded them. During the years from 1895 to 1915, the public's growing interest
in child welfare, in conjunction with other reforms of the
Progressive Era, led to an extension of responsibility for the
welfare of the dependent, delinquent and handicapped children (Schneider . ., p. 197). In addition, institutionalization
was costly. Epstein, who commented in 1933, stated that
"... public authorities outraged motherhood [not only] by
breaking up homes and paying for the support of dependent
children in institutions ... [but also because] the cost in

dollars and cents proved higher than if the mother had been
paid for raising her children" (Epstein, 1933, p. 624).
Support for mother's pensions had indeed grown. According to Mark Leff, a number of progressive newspapers
and magazines contributed to public demand for change.
The Delineator, a women's fashion magazine, began an
active anti-institution campaign in 1907 which eventually
grew into a crusade for mother's pensions. Other newspapers and magazines that contributed editorials and
endorsements were the New York Evening World, the
Scripps-McRae and Hearst chains, and Outlook, Nation, and
Public.
Soon after the establishment of juvenile courts, many
judges became aware that mothers' pensions were needed. It
became evident from the experience in such courts that (1)
many delinquents were the children of mothers who were
not around to train, influence and care for their children because they had to work, and (2) that many mothers and children were separated solely because of poverty (Cohen, 1924,
pp. 115-116).
By 1909, many advocates believed that children had a
right to be brought up in a family. At the White House Conference on Children in 1909, the Honorable Julian Mack,
Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court said:
"I cannot understand why poverty alone should give anybody the right to deprive the child of that which it needs most
in life-its own parents' love and care and sympathy . .. to
deprive the parent of that which he or she needs most in life,
the love and support of the child, the reciprocal relations be17
tween the parent and the child."
Some (but certainly not all) Charity Organization Society
and Children's social workers who had been against
mothers' pensions now supported them. What seemed like a
daring and unwise idea to the social workers and philanthropists of 1897 became public policy in most states by
1915, federal law by 1935, and has remained in force ever
since. Despite the fact that the number and type of mothers
covered was always limited, despite intermittent controversy
about the effects of public assistance on recipients, and de-

spite recent attempts to restrict that assistance; the complete
elimination of the AFDC program has never since been seriously proposed.
CONCLUSION

It should be noted that there are two principle explanations for the resistance to mothers' pensions. First, the
charitable organizations of the 1890's were committed to
their social philosophy. They believed they were right about
the nature of poverty, and of poor persons. A system of public mothers' pensions would be in direct contradiction to
what they believed was just, proper and effective. They
therefore acted on their beliefs in an effective, efficient and
well-organized way. They acknowledged the problem, and
offered what they saw as a solution, condemning Senator
Ahearn's solution because (1) they believed it would cause
more problems than it would solve, and (2) it would cause
them to lose some of their power to exercise control over the
behavior of poor persons.
The second explanation has to do with the nature of the
organizations involved and of their interests. The nature of a
bureaucracy is that it works not only to carry out its societal
function, but also to insure its own survival. According to
Merton's theory of "vested interests", it is to the advantage
of those in power to oppose any change that will "either
eliminate or at least make uncertain their differential advantage deriving from current arrangements" (Merton, 1968, p.
253).
It was their vested interests that accounted for the great
resistance put forth by the agencies. On the one hand, the
children's institutions stood to lose children and therefore a
portion of their funding. Earlier action by City and State had
already resulted in a reduction in the number of children in
care, and such children were needed if the institutions were
to survive. The organizations that dispensed private charity,
on the other hand, stood to lose their central function in the
social welfare field if public outdoor relief became the
method for aiding the poor. And, the implementation of a

program so contrary to their practices would have implied
extreme criticism.
The agencies that formed a coalition against the Ahearn
bill were organized in such a way that they could rapidly
mobilize support, and each agency had the ability to appear
at hearings and to testify. The State Charities Aid Association had full-time staff that could write letters, contact other
agencies, influence people, and plan strategies. Legislators
and public officials were used to hearing from and dealing
with officials of the charitable organizations, whose connections with powerful philanthropists were well-known.
Mayor Strong, a one-term "anti-corruption" Mayor in a city
long ruled by corrupt Tammany politicians, had been helped
into office by the very persons who also held membership
on agency boards.
On the other hand, in 1897, there was no organization
for mothers' pensions. At Mayor Strong's hearings in 1897
only two persons showed up to testify for the bill, a representative of Senator Ahearn, who didn't think that it was
necessary to attend, himself; and a woman who said she represented nobody, and therefore had no power, and no voters to influence. The testimony of the bill's proponents focused only on why the current system was harmful. Rather
than answer them, the proponents simply ignored the
charitable organizations' predictions of dire consequences if
the bill were passed. The testimony of the various representatives of the charitable organizations, on the other hand,
while acknowledging that the break-up of families was to be
avoided where possible, claimed that the solution was
wrong, would be harmful to the persons involved and would
be extremely costly to the public.
By virtue of their apparent expertise, their connections
with the powerful, their relationships with legislators and
public officials, and their logical follow-through, the
arguments of the charitable organizations' officials carried
more weight. It was not until later, when another faction of
social workers joined in alliance with politicians and others
to mount in an effort for mothers' pensions, that such legislation was successful.

NOTES
1.

The date of March 30, 1897 was reported in the Twenty-Fifth Annual
Report of the State Charities Aid Association (Page 80). According to
Homer Folks' article, "Proposed Legislation Concerning Children in
New York," appearing in The Charities Review (July-August 1897), the
legislation was introduced on March 13. The date of introduction of
the Ahearn Bill is not available in the records of the New York State
Legislature for 1897 because it was not signed into law.

2.

Senator Ahearn's bill provided mothers' pensions only for the poor of
New York City and not the State as a whole because such aid was
available in the rest of the state through a system of outdoor public
relief. Outdoor relief had been curtailed only in New York City.

3.

"Scored the Ahearn Bill", New York Times, (July 22, 1897) p. 12.

4.

"Parents' Compensation for Indigent Children; Senate Committee
Hearing on Ahearn Bill", New York Times, February 9, 1898, Page 3.

5.

According to librarians at the New York State Library, legislative records of the original hearings would not have been preserved since
the bill never became law.

6.

New York Times, June 5, 1895, page 8, column 3; June 6, 1895, page 2,
column 4.

7.

New York Times, March 4, 1894, page 13; January 1, 1896, page 9;
January 5, page 17; January 10, page 10; January 14, page 9; January
25, page 9; January 28, page 10; February 4, page 16; February 11,
page 10; February 23, page 17; February 25, page 16; February 28,
page 9; March 19, page 9; March 20, page 9; March 26, page 2; March
27, page 8; September 3, page 16; June 19, 1897, page 2; October 7,
page 4.

8.

New York Times, June 19, 1897, page 1; June 20, page 12.

9.

New York Times, April 1, 1897, page 1.

10.

New York Times, November 29, 1894, page 1.

11.

New York Times, August 6, 1896, page 3.

12.

New York Times, May 18, 1898, page 12; May 19, page 14.

13.

Estimates of the actual number of children placed vary. While
Thurston estimated that the number of children placed from 1853
through 1929 was 31,081, Langsam (Children West, 1964) reported

85,292 children placed. Her figures were taken directly from the annual reports of the Society.
14.

Laws of 1875,,Chapter 173.

15.

Opposing organizations included the Charity Organization Society;
the State Charities' Aid Association; the Society of St. Vincent de
Paul; and the New York State Board of Charities.

16.

"Letter to the President of the United States Embodying the Conclusions of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children," Proceedings of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children, 1909,
pp. 192-197; as found in Bremner, Children, 2:365-366.

17.

Proceedings of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children, 1909,
pp. 41-53, reprinted in Bremner, Children, 2:363.
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MINNEAPOLIS SETTLEMENT HOUSES IN THE
"NOT SO ROARING 20'S'
AMERICANIZATION, MORALITY, AND THE
REVOLT AGAINST POPULAR CULTURE
Howard Jacob Karger
University of Missouri-Columbia
The article traces the theoretical and ideological development of the
Minneapolis settlement house community during the 1920's. As
such, the article examines the social control function of Minneapolis settlements through their emphasis on Americanization,
morality, the concepts of neighborhood and democracy, and the
role of domestic politics within the settlement community. The article also explores the dialectical relationship between the social
control function of Minneapolis settlement houses and the altruistic
motives of settlement workers.

The majority of literature on American social settlements
focus on the larger houses (i.e., Hull House, Chicago Commons, University Settlement, South End House, etc.) located
in highly populated metropolitan areas. Moreover, the bulk
of the literature also emphasizes the "golden epoch of settlements," the progressive era from 1905 to 1919 (Davis,
1967; Bremner, 1956; Trattner, 1979). Consequently, little attention has been paid to the smaller settlements that were
less flamboyant, but nevertheless formed the backbone of
the settlement movement that spanned the distance from
New York to California.
This article examines the Minneapolis settlement house
community from 1920 to 1929. The Minneapolis settlement
houses existed in a somewhat typical, middle-range,
middle-western city. Unlike some of the larger settlement
89

houses, Minneapolis settlements were far from being bastions of progressivism, nor were they populated with noted
personalities such as Jane Addams, Robert Woods, Graham
Taylor, or Mary Simkhovitch. Like the vast majority of settlement houses, Minneapolis settlements existed outside of
the national limelight1

A BRIEF NOTE ON METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this article is historical sociology. Consequently, the intent of this article is interpretative
rather than purely historical. The point of this paper is not
to concisely record the development of the Minneapolis settlement house community of the 1920's, but instead, to
examine the role of ideology and social control as they impacted upon the settlement milieu. As part of that examination, emphasis will be placed on the role of social control
within the Minneapolis settlements and the translation of
that social control function into Americanization programs,
and later, into an almost messianic emphasis on morality.
The complementarity between history and sociology is
evident. However, like all methodologies it suffers from
inherent traps. Primary among those traps is sociological reductionism, that is, the subordination of important variables
for other, less important variables. For example, there exists
the danger of distorting the altruistic motives of settlement
leaders by subordinating those motives to ideological concerns. This would suggest that settlement leaders were
merely an arm of capital rather than willful actors who were
acted upon as well as acted upon the system in which they
existed.
The definition of social control used in this paper will
follow Coser and Rosenberg's (1957;97) explication which
states that social control is "those mechanisms by which
society exercises dominion over component individuals and
enforces conformity to its norms".
The use of ideology in this article corresponds to Althusser's (1971:152) notion that it is "a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of
existence". In that sense, "men represent their real condi-

tions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form" (Althusser, 1971:153). Moreover, ideologies are not a static and
hegemonous series of suppositions about the world, but instead, they represent ongoing social processes.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE EARLY SETTLEMENT MOVEMENT

The early settlement house movement in the United
States was marked by a benign form of paternalism characteristic of progressive era thinking (Rothman, 1980). By the
early 1920's, at least in Minneapolis, that paternalism gave
way to a more strident view of the role of settlement houses
in meeting societal goals. The genesis of that shift lay in the
social and political mileau of post World War I America.
The triumph of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia,
the spread of communist ideology into Germany, Hungary,
and other parts of Europe, and especially the founding of the
Third International (created in Moscow to stimulate
worldwide proletarian revolution), set off an unprecedented
wave of anti-red hysteria in the United States.
According to Clarke Chambers, (1967:117) the Red Scare
"hurt the settlements more than other reform associations or
welfare agencies because they had been so long associated
with an open-forum policy hospitable to the expression of all
kinds of economic and political theories by all sorts and
conditions of social dissenters". Jane Addams noted that
"any proposed change was suspect, even those efforts that
had been considered praiseworthy before the war". Minnesota and Minneapolis were not immune from the political
schisms that marked the 1920's. Long controlled by the large
grain companies, Minneapolis was known as an anti-union
and "open shop" town well into the 1930's (Stipanovich,
1982:165).
The nativistic and racial supremacy theories of the 1920's
was also evident in Minneapolis. In 1923, historian Theodore
C. Blegen (Stipanovich, 1982:24) estimated that there were
over ten Klu Klux Klan chapters in Minneapolis.
Prohibition also had a significant impact on Minneapolis. Long a central distribution center for commerce in

the upper midwest, Minneapolis provided the perfect distribution point for illegal whiskey bound for Kansas City and
Chicago. The illegal trade resulted in an increase in corruption and gangland activities (Stipanovich, 1982:170).
Minneapolis history is replete with its own set of contradictions. Settled by New Englanders in the 1869's and
1870's, the National Grange of the Patrons of Industry had a
branch in Minnesota. In the 1880's the Farmers Alliance,
later to become the People's Party, was established in Minnesota. The ire of the farmers was directed against the railroads, grain millers, the grain exchange, and the banks
(Stipanovich, 1982:157-8). Since Minneapolis was the seat of
commerce for the upper midwest, much of the protest focused on the city.
Minneapolis also fell sway to the anti-red hysteria of
World War I. The Minneapolis Committees on Public Safety
arrested leaders of the International Workers of the World
(IWW) and the socialist party. In fact, the Minneapolis activities against the IWW spurred on the national campaign
against the organization (Stipanovich, 1982:165). The Committees also attacked the Non-Partisan League, an organization founded in North Dakota in 1915 by Arthur Townley.
The Non-Partisan League later became the Farmer-Labor
Party, and in 1930, successfully ran Floyd B. Olson as governor of Minnesota.
In the midst of the political confusion that marked national and state politics, Minneapolis settlement houses were
asked to ply their trade. The settlements responded with
programs intended to protect the immigrant against injustice
and to uphold the order of American society. Both of these
goals could be incorporated under the umbrella of
Americanization.
THE "AMERICANIZATION"

MOVEMENT WITHIN THE

MINNEAPOLIS SETTLEMENT HOUSE COMMUNITY

The Americanization movement that characterized Minneapolis settlement activities through the middle 1920's was

not a specific set of programs, but rather emphasized particular theoretical perspectives and ideologies. Americanization encompassed policies for education, financial aid, and
oftentimes merely a sympathetic understanding of the difficulties faced by the immigrant family.
The Americanization movement, spearheaded by the settlement houses, spanned the years from the 1890's to the
middle 1920's. Though originated as a humanitarian impulse
motivated by charity and Social Christianity, Americanization later developed into a "100% American" crusade driven
by nativism, racism and fear; and by the early 1920's
Americanization meant conforming for the sake of social
unity (Bolin, 1969:2). The primary thrust of the Americanization movement was on developing a sense of patriotism and
loyalty. These themes were stressed repeatedly from the
onset of World War I to the middle 1920's. An example of
the intolerance and nativism that characterized the core of
the Americanization movement can be found in a correspondence between Margaret Chapman, head resident of
Wells Memorial House and Mrs. Belousoff, a former infant
welfare nurse who returned to Petrograd after the Russian
Revolution of 1917 (St. Mark's Outlook, Dec. 22 1917:2). Mrs.
Belousoff wrote:
The Country is going to economical destruction in full meaning of these words. Every day brings troubles. Country is all
lighten up with murders, robbing and many other things of
the same type. But we are Russian-still talking. Our leaders
do not feel, or probably do not want to see, what will happen
with Russia if things will go longer this way. Sometimes I
think our Allies will take care of us . ..
In responding to Mrs. Belousoff's letter, Chapman (St.
Mark's Outlook, March 19, 1917:45) wrote:
The most offensive and dangerous thing with which this nation is confronted, is the wicked disloyalty of those who have
come from foreign parts, only to abuse our institutions and to
seek to disrupt our national family life . . . The best possible

is not to interne them, or to place limitations upon their
movements but, to ship them back to the countries from
whence they came .

..

We have been altogether too lenient,

too soft and gentle, in dealing with the traitor within our
gates. We shall do so no more we hope.
The Americanization movement did not reflect Jane
Addams' view of tolerance of sharing, but rather, a militant
pro-Americanism tinged with anti-internationalism and a
virulent distruct of "foreign ideas". The goal of Americanization is summed by a brief article in St. Mark's Outlook
(March 10, 1917:5).
Some time ago Mrs. T.B. Wells gave us a great table talk on
"Nationalism". The next week when a young woman came register
for gym and was asked her nationality, she said: "I used to say I
was a Scandinavian, but since hearing Mrs. Wells I know I am an
American."
Americanization was also the principle focus for Robbins
Gilman, head resident of North East Neighborhood House
(2). Within the community of northeast Minneapolis,
Americanization, at least until the middle 1920's, was an
omnipresent force. Nearly every activity at the house including social clubs, the employment bureau, the day nursery
and kindergarten, the health programs, and the war time activities, were considered as adjustment programs for the
immigrant. Gilman's (Headworkers Report, January, 1919,
North East Neighborhood House (hereafter NENH) Papers:4)
statement that "all the work done at North East Neighborhood House was Americanization work", was well founded.
In 1919, Robbins Gilman founded the North East
Americanization Committee, an organization composed of
social workers, public school principals, and other leaders of
the First Ward (Headworkers Report, May 1919, NENH:1).
The principle activities of the North East Americanization Committee consisted of a series of weekly lectures held
at the St. Anthony Commercial Club, as well as various folk
dance festivals and choral presentations. The objective of the
committee was to help Americans understand their immig-

rant neighbors by teaching them about old world customs,
national heroes, and other aspects of immigrant life. An
additional purpose of the committee was to show native
Americans that the foreigner was not a bolshevist, but a person with something to offer American culture (Gilman:831).
Despite Gilman's pronouncements that the North East
Americanization Committee had as its guiding principle the
"contributions theory of immigration", a la Jane Addams,
(1911a: 39-41; 64-66), this progressive view was not centrally
shared. A northeast Minneapolis paper, the North East
Argus, (NENH, February 1, 1919) editorialized that the
"Americanization Movement, which will soon be in Full
Swing all over this fair land of ours, will promptly take care
of sporadic attempts to 'pull off' any Bolsheviki nonsense in
this country, or in this city".
Gilman saw his main role as being that of an interpreter
of American values and institutions to the foreign born.
Anna Quayle, assistant head resident of Wells House, agreed
with Gilman (St. Mark's Outlook June 12, 1920:9) when she
maintained that the main goal of the settlements was to perform the "rare function of a minister of understanding or as
if often said, interpreter".
THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND DEMOCRACY: SHAPING
IDEOLOGY THROUGH MANUFACTURING A WORLD VIEW

The unification of disparate neighborhood elements was
a chief component in the Americanization plan of the Minneapolis settlement houses. For example, above the door at
North East Settlement House was a sign which read: "Organized to weld a cosmopolitan neighborhood into an
Americanized civic and social unit".
The "neighborhood movement" was an attempt to remediate the social evils that came on the heels of urban
industrialization. These social evils included autonomy (i.e.
extreme individualism and the license to break group
norms), immorality, and the sense of anomie that characterized urban life. Settlement work was an attempt to

make the anonymous city dweller into a franchised citizen.
Group life was seen as the cure for excessive individualism and social instability. Strong groups could control
individualistic impulses and encourage people to value their
ties with each other.
The creation of group life was based on strengthening
the family, the school, the playground gang, the club, the
vocational or labor group, the ethnic group, and the
neighborhood group. A major goal of that strategy was the
creation of a strong and unified neighborhood system which
could be called into service to enforce social order. This unified neighborhood could thus meliorate the twin features of
autonomy; license (the inability of the group to exert restraint on its members), and selfishness (the weakening of
people's devotion to their reference group).
The creation of a tightly woven social organism also
serves another social control function. Namely, when a
neighborhood is tightly organized, social control is more
easily applied by an extant force. The solidification of a
community insures that the social entity that wishes to control the community has a viable leadership to negotiate with,
and ultimately, to use in its service. Without unity, a community becomes harder to control, with disparate elements
running amok under no one's reins. By stressing neighborhood unity, the settlements struggled to create a social organism that was tightly structured and well organized, and
hence, a neighborhood that could be more easily managed
by the forces of the state. Thus a tightly organized
neighborhood was a crucial strategy in the Americanization
program of the Minneapolis settlement houses. The relationship between the concepts of "neighborhood" and "democracy" was another crucial part of the settlements' Americanization program.
DEMOCRACY AND IDEOLOGY

The notion of democracy, or the idea that liberty and
law go together, was a mainstay of the settlement house

movement. The belief in the value of democracy was a quintessential element in the program of Americanization.
Neighborhood involvement was a lesson in civics: when
neighborhood problems were successfully resolved, immigrants learned that change could occur through voting or
other political activity. Apart from the obvious social function of "policing the community", civic involvement also
ensured that neighborhood people would focus on the political rather than the economic arena. By focusing on community problems, there was less propensity for neighborhood
residents to concentrate on the economic inequities and,
thereby, less chance of them becoming affiliated with radical
organizations. The focus on community problems allowed
the immigrant to vent his or her economic frustration on
relatively safe targets: corrupt city officials or inept municipal administrations.
Political choices have always been relatively limited in
American Political life. Except in rare instances, few vaible
non-mainstream political candidates have emerged. Thus, by
socializing the immigrant into accepting the available political choices, settlement workers promulgated the desired
ideology of democracy. Through their actions, settlement
workers helped manufacture the social reality of the immigrant, a reality that was to be bounded by the conventions of
the American economic system.
Socializing the immigrant into the democratic mode of
thought was done not only through the informal mechanism
of neighborhood involvement, but also through more formal
means of political education. Pillsbury House maintained a
"well-attended class in political education" (Minneapolis
Tribune, February 13, 1921), and North East House sponsored a citizenship class where "the men of foreign birth
learned English and the principles of the American government" (Minneapolis Journal Circa 1923). Unity House contributed to the democratic socialization of the immigrant by
providing a social evening in which "Mr. Emmanuel Cohen
and Mr. J.C. Haynes ... Spoke in such a way as to enlist

the attention of working men on such topics as 'Good Citizenship' and 'City government' " (Minneapolis Tribune, February 13, 1921).
The combination of neighborhood involvement and formal political education ensured the immigrant would be well
exposed to the precepts of democracy and civic responsibility.
Many citizens of the 1920's saw a strong relationship between Americanization and morality. As nativism became
tinged with racism, there was a strong tendency to associate
Americanism with morality. This proclivity was fueled by
the belief that assimilation was weakening the genetic stock
of Americans, and thus, any signs of social weakness, e.g.
crime or immorality, was interpreted as being "unAmerican" (Grant, 1916). It therefore became important for settlement houses to protect the immigrants from moral temptation.
Though the shift in emphasis from Americanization to
moralism should not be exaggerated-both programs continued throughout the 1920's and well into the 1930's-there
was indeed a marked change in the focus of settlement activity. In fact, the emphasis on virtue would accelerate, until
by the end of the decade, it would reach almost the proportion of a moral crusade.
MORALITY, WOMEN, AND THE REVOLT AGAINST POPULAR
CULTURE

World War I ushered in a re-examination of the evil of
alcohol. Unity House, under Henry Burt, "organized the
local communities for suppression of vice and stimulate(d)
public officials in making effective the restrictions of the
War Department on the social evil and the sale of liquor"
(Minneapolis Tribune, September 11, 1917). Wells Memorial
House had the same concern as Unity House when Margaret
Chapman (St. Mark's Outlook, October 20, 1917:6) wrote that
the hygienic atmosphere surrounding our soldiers and
sailors may be morally looked after by educational propaganda of local organizations in relation to both the social

evil and the sale of liquor". When prohibition was finally
enacted after World War I, every settlement house in Minneapolis endorsed it (Minneapolis Tribune, February 19,
1919).
After prohibition the moral concerns of settlement
houses shifted to other areas. Destructive social influences
were enumerated by a Women's Cooperative Alliance report
on north Minneapolis. This 1925 report listed destructive social influences as "pool halls, dance halls, soft drink parlors,
motion picture theatres, gangs (with possible causes of delinquency being small stores, hangouts, sale of cigarettes),
lumber yards, vacant lots, dumps, prostitution, and sale and
manufacture of intoxicating liquor" (Pratt, 1925:1).
Although the Women's Cooperative Alliance was not officially connected to the settlement movement, Minneapolis
settlement houses were also investigating the same issues
(3).
The moral concerns of the Minneapolis settlements were,
in part, a reaction to the materialism and popular culture of
the 1920's. Margaret Chapman, head resident of Wells
Memorial House, (St. Mark's Outlook, January 3, 1925:9)
wrote:
Yes, I know, my dear Materialist, the newspapers have recorded, daily, the doings of the wicked world and its sinning
mortals-thefts, disloyalties, hypocrisies, villainies, murders.
It has been a tragic review of God's children gone away from
him.
The post World War I decade had ushered in a moral
revolution. Young men and women from all social classes
triumphantly celebrated the liberation of sex from its Victorian constraints. This liberation took the form of a new mass
culture of movies, dance halls, amusement centers, cafes and
clubs. The sexual familiarity bred by this new cultural
perspective frightened the upright and moral guardians of
social order. Popular culture encouraged romantic courting,
and especially, cross-class mixing. It removed sex from its
reproductive and familial context. Moreover, doctors, psy-

chologists, and popular advice literature advocated open
sexuality between husband and wife and the value of loving
companionship. While pre-marital intercourse was still
taboo, there emerged a greater tolerance toward general sexual activity so long as it was based on the prospect of marriage. It was these social forces acting in concert with each
other, that from the perspective of class based reformers,
threatened the social order and American society.
Northeast Minneapolis had the unseemly distinction of
having the second highest juvenile delinquency rate in Minneapolis (Gilman papers, Box 50, NENH, 1925:39-49). In
Gilman's view this crime wave was largely due to the destructive influences of motion picture theaters, bowling alleys, pool halls, soft drink parlors, and dance halls. This
commercialized recreation, according to Gilman, accounted
for 90-95% of the anti-social actions of youth (Headworkers
Report, November 1930, NENH).
At the root of the settlements' revolt against popular culture lay the notion of "domestic politics" (Chapman, 1984).
The development of domestic ideology-or the "cult of
domesticity", "true womanhood", and "women's sphere",
as this ideology was alternatively labeled in nineteenth century American-served as a basis for "sisterhood" and for
women's perception of their moral imperative to reform
society and challenge the assumptions of male political and
social culture (Cott, 1977; Epstein, 1981).
According to Richard Chapman (1984:2), the settlement
houses were built on a tradition that connected "domesticity" to women's reform activities. Chapman (1984:2) maintained that:
...the settlement house movement-which emerged in late
nineteenth century American cities-provided an institutional
outlet and an organizational base whereby middle-class
women expressed an urbanized form of domestic politics seeking social and political change.
That the settlement movement was heavily influenced by
intellectual women reformers appears to be indisputable.
John Rousmaniere (1970:45-66) maintains that the settlement

movement provided a socially approved philanthropic avenue for educated women who wanted to pursue a career
rather than marriage. He further suggests that the settlements created a colony for the reconstruction of familiar
ideological ties as well as a social home for young college
women confused by a hostile social world. This colony provided a haven, in many ways, similar to the safe haven provided by the women's colleges from which they graduated.
The "calling" that was a part of the attraction of women
reformers to the settlement movement encouraged a special
concern for women's problems. Gilman showed a sensitivity
to mothers' problems when he described the matron of the
day nursery. He wrote (Headworkers Report, 7th Annual
Report, NENH, 1921:2) that "her larger function is a deep
human, sympathetic understanding of the causes back of the
needs in the lives of the mothers". Unity house showed a
similar sensitivity to women's problems when its headworker maintained that women often "break down when
they are obliged to carry the load of day work and the care
of the home and of the children" (Year Book of the Church of
the Redemer, 1913, First Universalist Church:44).
It was this definition of the problems of women that
gave rise to the day nurseries, kindergarten, day care, well
baby clinics, mother's clubs, and the various other settlement activities geared to women's concerns.
Another aspect of domestic politics was that of scientific
home-making; the natural, efficient, well-ordered and nurturing modern household. In effect, this movement was in
part designed to create the ideal working class woman. An
article in the Minneapolis Tribune (December 26, 1916)
exemplified the perfect woman:
She washes and irons and does housecleaning for daily wages
...Between these 9-hour working days, she scrubs and keeps
clean her little home; she mends rips in Helen's and Gena's
dresses and sews patches on Tony's and Paul's and Johnny's
pants. She is our ideal . . . because she refuses charity. It is
this that makes her great. She epitomizes the Spirit of
America: Independence, Self-Help.

Domestic science was in itself class based: Middle class
women taught working women how to run efficient and
well-managed homes. It was perhaps this kind of irony that
led Alice Kessler-Harris (1982:119) to write (in relation to
women reformers) that: "Released from the home by their
privileged class position ... (they) . .. spent their best efforts trying to convince less privileged women to perform
housework more productively and child care more efficiently."
The settlement's emphasis on domestic politics was tied
to its perceived responsibility to family life. In Minneapolis,
F.A. Gross, Director of the German American Bank (St.
Mark's Outlook, January 26, 1924:12), observed that "you
cannot legislate people into being moral or temperate ...
the home is the place where character is made ... (Wells
Memorial House) in all enterprises is immediately related to
homemaking and family life".
The analogy between the settlement house and the
mother was often noted by settlement writers. In almost
metaphysical terms, the neighborhood was the family and
the settlement house its mother. For example, Gilman wrote
that "the Settlement philosophy is based upon the infinite
love of the ideal mother with the strength and protection of
the ideal father: (Gilman papers, Box 50, NENH, n.d.). This
same analogy is in evidence when Pillsbury House described
Miss Elizabeth Taylor, its head resident, as "a mother to the
men and women, the boys and girls, and the babes; a very
young mother, it is true, but the power and strength to carry
burdens is not always due to age, is it?" (Minneapolis Journal, November 26, 1906:5).
The settlement leaders regarded the family as the quintessential element in positive group life. It was regarded so
highly because of all the available institutions, the family
alone had the most power to control selfishness and encourage conformity. It could train and control the individual because it had the power to envelope him. However, the settlements realized that the power of the family over the individual was weakened by social forces, among them commercial and popular culture. It was thus hoped that the revival

of strong neighborhood life could strengthen the disintegrating family, and as such, be a useful component in ensuring
social stability.
SOCIAL CONTROL AND ALTRUISM

To see the Minneapolis settlement house involvement in
Americanization and morality based activities as pernicious,
is to deny a central truth of the settlement phenomena.
Namely, social control and altruism were inextricably woven
into the complex fabric of the Minneapolis settlement
movement of the 1920's.
For example, a statement by Robbins Gilman (Headworkers Report, NENH, December 11, 1918:4), head resident of
North East Neighborhood House, exemplifies the altruism of
the settlements. Gilman stated that, "those who live in settlements must be endowed with an abundant amount of
Christian grace which is built upon the 'substance of things
hoped for, the evidence of things no seen' . . . we live in a
faith that what we do or what we stand for sometime,
somehow, or somewhere may result in social good".
Quotes similar to Gilman's statement are common
throughout the Minneapolis settlement house records. Altruism, sacrifice, charity, beneficence, and love are common
settlement themes. These claims are by no means disingenuous; they in fact represent the firmly held beliefs and values
of the settlement movement.
However, equally prominent was the social control function of the settlements. Although social control was of central concern to the Minneapolis settlement house community, its leaders did not perceive that function as malevolent.
Settlement leaders engaged in social control activities not because they were pressured by the elite to perform that function, but instead, because they had a vision of social peace
and harmony. In effect, settlement leaders believed that
capitalism was reformable and that middle-class values were
the backbone of the nation. Therefore, the engine that drove
settlement leaders was a belief in social order, but also a
strong commitment to selfless service. For settlement workers, the class conflict engendered by capitalism could be

eradicated by the proper application of concern, understanding, and love. Social harmony was perceived to be in everybody's best interests. To the 1920's settlement workers, the
settlement mission was deeply rooted in altruism.
Within the Minneapolis settlement movement there
existed a dichotomous relationship between social control
and altruism. Apart from enforcing social control, Minneapolis settlements also provided positive social functions.
For the newly arrived immigrant, settlements functioned as
what Berger and Neuhaus (1977) call a "mediating
structure". Like churches, voluntary organizations, and civic
clubs, social settlement housed mediated between large impersonal institutions and alienated individuals. This mediation included intervening on the part of wronged workers,
helping with naturalization, and working toward improved
neighborhood services.
Although the conservative ambiance of the 1920's dampened the reform spirit of the Progressive era, it did not
entirely overwhelm it. Even Margaret Chapman, the conservative head resident of Wells Memorial House, (St. Mark's
Outlook, January 26, 1924:12) warned that:
...the situation is most serious and until men of your caliber
all over the city use your influence and see to it that city officials are clean upright, fearless men, this young generation
now growing up in the streets of the city will one day take the
reins into their hands.
Moreover, even in the midst of strident declarations
touting Americanism, Minneapolis settlement houses were
able to maintain some components of Addams' "contributions theory of immigration". Mrs. C.C. Bovey (Box 1,
NENH, Circa 1925:1), a longtime member of the Board of Directors of North East House, remarked that she "was so interested in foreigners with their many fine traditions and
customs ... we should absorb what they have to offer, just
like they absorb what we have to offer . . .". Chapman (St.
Mark's Outlook, January 26, 1924:12), in a justification of
Americanization programs, maintained that "among the
older groups of men and women, old time prejudices and

suspicions are being gradually forgotten in the real friendships that are being formed, thus making it less possible for
the reactionary to appeal to sectarian differences".
The complexity of the "moral crusades" and the
Americanization programs is apparent. These settlement
concerns were based on the protection of the social order, as
well as the desire to protect the immigrant. If they were
reactionary-as they obviously appear to be-they were undoubtedly less strident than the general sentiment of the native American population. By the 1920's, Minneapolis settlement leaders were less shapers of their times than they
were products of them. Though a bit more enlightened, settlement leaders were no different than the rest of the population. To judge the actions of settlement leaders in the 1920's,
apart from the general Zeitgeist of the period, is to pass
judgment on them by our standards rather than theirs. In a
decade characterized by the lynchings of blacks, intolerance
for anything not wholly American, and a generally reactionary style that permeated all aspects of American life, the actions of the Minneapolis settlement movement, despite its
blandness, might well be considered a triumph.
SUMMARY

The benign paternalism that marked Progressive era settlement work gave way to more strident techniques of social
control in the 1920's. As the article illustrates, the xenophic
and nativistic tendencies of America surfaced as a response
to World War I and the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Fearful
of an internal revolution, American society became less
tolerant of foreign ideas and cultures, and consequently,
demanded an uncompromising allegiance to what was perceived as Americanism. Settlement houses-in many ways a
mirror of their times-responded to this challenge by working to create "100% Americans" out of their immigrant
neighbors. The Americanization emphasis, while always
present within settlement work, reached a new zenith from
roughly 1919-1929.
The Americanization emphasis reached into every program and event sponsored by Minneapolis settlement

houses. This Americanization program was overarching,
thorough, and almost punitive in its emphasis. Devoid of
the tolerance that characterized Progressive era paternalism,
Americanization programs were uncompromising in their
demand for assimilation.
By the middle 1920's, Americanization activities of the
settlements gave way to a mission designed to foster morality. The settlement's concern with morality was in part
fueled by the rise of popular culture. The introduction of the
automobile (with its concomitant opportunities for mobility),
the advent of the motion picture and its protrayal of premarital romantic love, and the introduction of contemporary
dancing and the physical familiarity that it bred, fundamentally challenged the religious and moral precepts upon which
the settlement movement rested. The settlement's dedication
to inculcating morality was, in effect, a response against the
intrusion of popular culture into the life of the neighborhood.
Lastly, this article ties in early 20th century feminism to
the fabric of the Minneapolis settlement community. This
brand of feminism had its roots in the conservative view of
domestic politics and was embedded within the belief in the
sanctity of family life.
The genius of the settlement house movement was based
on a 'marriage of conscience and convenience' (Rothman,
1980). On the one hand it met the real needs of the immigrant group. On the other hand, settlements met the needs of
capital by helping to insure a stable social and economic
climate. Essentially, the settlement movement was a bridge
between the classes, and as such, was a way to help diminish the class conflict that was at the root of an unjust
economic system.
This article has attempted to critically examine the general belief in the social justice function of the settlement
movement. Through an emphasis on Americanization and
morality, Minneapolis settlement houses exhibited a strong
allegiance to the social control function of settlement work.

This allegiance to social control existed in a dialectical relationship with the altruistic motives of settlement workers.
Specifically, Minneapolis settlement houses in the 1920's
were not only servants of the immigrants, but also social
control agents who enforced a social conformity, and
engendered within the immigrant a belief in the American
social, political, and economic system. In that sense, the
mission of the settlement houses was to promulgate the
ideological perspective of capitalism and to serve the plutocracy by working toward social harmony through minimizing
both social conflict and tile injustices of the American classbased economic system. Consequently, Minneapolis settlement leaders operated in the service of the plutocracy whose
views they shared, and by whose charity they were able to
maintain their organization. Despite their role as social control agents, Minneapolis settlement leaders were inspired by
a motivation which was rooted in charity, altruism, and a
love for the constituents that they served.
The settlement house movement is indeed a complex
form of social service organization. It is replete with contradictions in both purpose and function. In short, a study
of the Minneapolis settlement house movement defies a
single answer in contrast to the complex questions that it
poses.

1) Throughout this article, quotes using incorrect grammar
and punctuation were left as they appeared in the original
sources.
2) References to North East Neighborhood House have
been used extensively through this article. Apart from its excellent records, there is reason to suggest that it was one of
the most respected settlement houses in the country. Albert
Kenedy, in a report to the Council on Social Agencies (Report to the Survey Committee, 1923, United Way of Minneapolis Files, Box 1, General History Social Welfare History
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Archives, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis hereafter
SWHA), stated that: "the work of the North East Neighborhood House, on the side of participation in the public life of
the district ranks high. It is indeed in this respect, one of
the best settlements in the country."
3) Throughout the 1920's, Catheryne Cooke Gilman (wife of
Robbins Gilman, head resident of North East Neighborhood
House) was the paid director of the Women's Cooperative
Alliance.
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HARRY LURIE'S ASSESSMENT
AND PRESCRIPTION:
AN EARLY VIEW OF SOCIAL WORKERS'
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING POLITICAL ACTION*

Joe M. Schriver
Social Work Program
Arkansas College
Batesville, Arkansas

Harry Lawrence Lurie's recommendations and analyses concerning
social workers' involvement in political action are reviewed. By
reviewing some of Lurie's concerns and activities from the 1930's
into the 1950's in this area, it is possible to gain helpful guidance
and insight into contemporary concerns about social workers in the
political arena. Lurie argued consistently for greater involvement
by social workers in political action as individuals, as members of
professional organizations, and in coalition with other groups outside of social work who were concerned with progressive social
change. Lurie also articulated many of the conditions preventing
effective political action by social workers.
INTRODUCTION
Harry Lawrence Lurie's many speeches, writings, and
professional activities offer fertile ground for helping students of social work and social welfare history gain a more
* This paper is a revised version of a paper presented at the Social Welfare

History Group Symposium at the Annual Program Meeting of the Council on Social Work Education, Miami, Florida, March 1986.

complete understanding of the complexities of the development of the social work profession from the 1920s into the
1960s. His beliefs, activities and concerns, however, also
offer much of potential benefit to the non-historian social
work practitioner or educator. By attending to his
assessments and recommendations about social workers'
proper roles in political action during his own era, social
workers today can gain helpful insight. Lurie offers guidance
on what leads to successful political involvement as well as
what leads to failure and impotency for social workers in the
political arena.
By looking at Lurie's concerns and recommendations in
the context of the current socio-political environment it is
possible to gain new perspectives in several areas of concern
and controversy for many social workers today. In Lurie's
assessments and recommendations one can find advice, for
example, on the importance of broad-based coalition building in effective political action. This is a political strategy
recommended by many contemporary social workers as an
important means of increasing political effectiveness in service to social work goals and to the constituencies social
workers serve (e.g., Amidei 1982, pp. 112-13; Haynes and
Mickelson 1986, p. 70). In Lurie's work one can discover
suggestions for becoming more effectively organized within
the profession in order to improve political potency. Such
contemporary efforts as PACE mirror some of Lurie's
recommendations in this area. Lurie raised some important
questions about the meager results of social work education
in preparing social workers with skills and commitments
necessary to be effective in political action. Contemporary
educators and practitioners alike might do well to reconsider
some of his concerns. The realization by some social workers
today that many forces which run contrary to social work
goals and values are much better organized and more skilled
in effecting political change (e.g., Buffum and Haynes 1987)
was also apparent to Lurie in his time. Lurie would have
had much to offer to the current debate and controversy
about the potential costs and benefits of moving toward

privatization of social welfare services and of vastly decreasing governmental responsibility for many of these services
(e.g., Gilbert 1986; Abramovitz 1986). Social workers today,
concerned that as a profession and as individual professionals we must become effective leaders in political action and
the creation of social policy at all levels as demonstrated by
efforts to make the National Center for Social Policy and
Practice a reality, would find support for their efforts in the
analyses and prescriptions of Harry Lurie.
Perhaps even more important than offering guidance in
the more widely accepted contemporary issues and problem
areas as those mentioned above, Lurie's assessment and activities also have much support to offer those who hold less
widely accepted and more radical notions of political activism that call for social workers to be willing to go beyond
traditional social work methodologies, political parties and
processes when those methods, parties, and processes no
longer respond to their needs and to those of their constituencies (e.g., Burghardt and Fabricant 1987, pp. 455-463).
A model for individual commitment, involvement and risktaking when necessary to effect political change such as nuclear arms reduction or to redress injustices such as political
persecution can also be found in the activities of Lurie and
some of his contemporaries.
Lurie and His Beliefs
Harry Lawrence Lurie died in Ogunquit, Maine on June
25, 1973. His obituary appeared in the New York Times and
offered a fitting and succinct summary of Lurie's professional activities and roles. He was referred to in the obituary
as "a social worker, scholar, author and a founder and
executive director of the Council of Jewish Federations and
Welfare Funds ....
Mr. Lurie was a leader for half a century
in social work in public and private agencies" (New York
Times 1973).
In many of Harry Lawrence Lurie's professional activities which spanned more than four decades from the 1920s
into the 1960s, he displayed and called for heightened politi-

cal awareness, involvement and skill on the part of social
workers. He believed that such attributes were vitally important to the achievement of social work goals, but he also
found them to be sorely lacking within the profession.
Harry Lurie believed that the roles and responsibilities
of social work should extend far beyond those concerned
with individual adjustment and social palliation. He believed that while these were necessary aspects of the social
worker's responsibility, they were not the only, nor the most
important, of the social worker's duties. Social workers were
responsible, in addition, for social criticism and for social
reconstruction directed toward removing the social and
environmental barriers to individual well-being and security. Indeed, the social worker, in Lurie's eyes, was responsible not only for supporting progressive social changes instigated by other elements in society (such as labor) but the
social worker was also responsible for being a salient for
such changes. It was not sufficient even for the social
worker, then, to be a supporter and follower of progressive
change; the social worker must be in the vanguard and play
the role of leader in social change efforts, Lurie believed. In
order to fulfill this responsibility, he maintained that the social worker must become intensely involved in organization
and political action directed toward removing the root causes
of individual malfunction and insecurity. The fact that social
workers had been timid about and often were opponents of
such actions was no excuse for continuing such a narrow
and reactionary perspective, Lurie contended.
Throughout his career Lurie called upon social workers,
as individuals, as members of their professional organizations, and as allies of other progressive movements and
organizations to become involved in and indeed to lead,
political action efforts. Lurie's career was marked by numerous examples of his own involvement, both as a participant,
and as a leader, in political action efforts. Only a few selections from Harry Lurie's many writings and presentations
have been used in this article. The selections have been carefully chosen to focus as specifically as possible on Lurie's

assessments and prescriptions in the areas of social work
and political action. The selections have also been chosen to
reflect chronologically the developments and continuities in
Lurie's thoughts and actions in the area of political action
during some of the most active years of his professional life.
Lurie on Social Work and Political Action
In 1932, in response to the continuing and worsening
Depression crisis, the American Association of Social Workers (AASW) Executive Committee appointed a Committee on
Federal Action on Unemployment. Among its members was
Harry Lurie (Fisher 1980, p. 71; Lurie 1933, p. 639).
In a report on the Committee's work given by Lurie in
the June 1933 annual session of the National Conference of
Social Work (NCSW), he pointed out that social workers had
a responsibility to become involved in formulating constructive solutions to social problems, even when such formulations for change "become controversial issues between political parties and economic classes" (Lurie 1933, p. 639). If the
social worker chose not to become involved in such political
action, Lurie and the Committee contended in the report,
the worker "thereby aligns himself with reactionary elements and with laissez-faire methods of social organization"
(Lurie 1933, p. 639). Social workers clearly had the responsibility for involvement in change, and it was "desirable to go
farther by taking the initiative in stimulating and sponsoring
important legislative advances and extending our interest to
a national program" (Lurie 1933, p. 640).
While Lurie was involved in efforts of professional social
work organizations to influence political decision-making,
he saw such efforts as being too infrequent and usually ineffective. He continued, however, to call consistently upon social workers and their organizations to counter national
events and political decisions which he saw as detrimental
to those most in need of social work services-the poor and
the unemployed.
Lurie's response, for example, to such actions as the
Roosevelt administration's dismantling of early New Deal

emergency programs was to call for political action to reverse
the setbacks. Such political action was essential to halt and
reverse these moves by what he viewed to be an increasingly reactionary national administration and Democratic
party (Lurie 1934, p. 1-2). He called upon social workers in
particular to become involved in political action. To him it
was not optional, rather it was a responsibility of social
workers, and to be passive or against progressive social welfare measures was reactionary and "tantamount to a criminal
indifference to social needs" (Lurie 1935a, p. 1).
Lurie's impatience with social workers' timidity about
getting involved in political activity to push for social welfare legislation was obvious. As he saw it, "social workers
and social agencies, on the whole, have not played a conspicuous part in the development or promotion of broad
programs of social legislation" (Lurie 1935b, p. 1). This was
not only true, in his eyes, of individual social workers and
their agencies, but their professional organizations were qually guilty. He pointed out specifically that the NCSW
played no role at all and that the AASW discussed a program
but had never formulated a detailed plan for such a social
welfare program. He agreed that AASW had endorsed a few
progressive issues such as federal responsibility for relief
and that it had opposed the termination of federal relief responsibility. But he found the AASW to be vague in its
position on the aims of social security, and it was, in his
opinion, indifferent or negligent in the areas of housing and
health. In addition, it lacked a definite position on labor
standards and organization (Lurie 1935b, p. 1; Lurie 1937a;
see also the brochure "An Institute on Modern Social Work
Problems" 1937). He believed that there were a number of
non-social work organizations which were far ahead in this
area, such as the League of Women Voters, the AF of L, and
the Federal Council of Churches of Christ. It was his disappointing conclusion that "as a whole, it may be stated that
social workers and social agencies are timid, inactive and
have conflicting opinions in this important field of effort"
(Lurie 1935b, p. 2). In fact, he believed that social work was
not only lax in pursuing social legislation, it was actually a

force against it: "Viewed as a whole, social work today is
following a conservative role in social progress." As he put
it, "inaction is a sign of acquiesence with the status quo"
(Lurie 1935b, p. 2). It was his contention then, that social
workers and their organizations could not choose to simply
be uninvolved or neutral because in his eyes, "a passive social institution is a decaying institution" (Lurie 1935b, p. 3).
A large part of the reason that social work "as a whole"
was playing "a conservative role in the social progress" and
was not an active force for social reform through political action was due to its continued over-emphasis on casework,
Lurie contended. The continued loyalty to casework as the
dominant function of professional social workers presented,
he believed, not only a problem for the profession as a
whole, but was a "dilemma" for the individual social worker
as well. (For a more detailed treatment of Lurie's views on
the proper role of casework in social work see Schriver,
"Harry Lurie's Critique: Person and Environment in Early
Casework Practice," forthcoming in Social Service Review.)
His position on casework, as it related to social workers' responsibilities in the area of political action, can perhaps best
be summarized with the following quotation: "shall he [the
social worker] continue to create, if he can, these little islands of security which may give some tangible expression
to his effort or shall he plunge into the general turmoil and
engage in the larger battle for social welfare" (Lurie 1935c, p.
14).
Lurie believed that for the individual social worker to be
most effective in political action, or, as he described it, in
"the larger battle for social welfare" would "require identification with a workers' movement, an organization of individual workers of all ranks and vocations seeking through
political and economic means to place the whole of our
common life under democratic control" (Lurie 1935c, p. 15).
These comments emphasize the necessity he saw of uniting
individual social workers and their organizations with other
organizations seeking similar goals. Much of what Lurie had
to say in this respect was founded on his faith in the
capacity of the individual (in this case the individual social

worker) to play a substantive role in effecting needed change
in spite of a tremendously unequal distribution of power.
Lurie believed that through unity, organization, and political
action the great power inequalities could be redistributed.
It seems to have been this belief that kept Lurie in the
fight for what he believed was a better system of social
organization. He doggedly refused to accept what he considered the continuing footdragging of many mainstream social
workers and he continued to urge that social workers get involved in political action both to stop the backsliding of the
New Deal accomplishments and to push for more comprehensive and basic answers to unemployment, insecurity,
and social problems. In a paper he wrote in 1936 called,
"Political Action for a Social Welfare Program," (Lurie 1936)
he urged social workers to take the lead in creating and pursuing a platform of social welfare legislation even if that
meant creating a third party to do it. By this time he no
longer saw any real difference between the Republican and
Democratic parties. Since they did not "deserve the support
of intelligent social workers ... we must turn to a new
party, if necessary a minority party," he urged (Lurie 1936,
p. 1).
Lurie was not naive, however idealistic he might have
been, in his call for such a third party. In being more
specific about the tactics and program of such a party, he
displayed a good deal of pragmatism. In the first place, he
admitted that there was at present no sign of such a party
though he felt sure the demand for one would grow. He was
also realistic in suggesting that such a party would need to
be extremely careful not to alienate and frighten business
interests to the point of complete disruption of the economic
system (Lurie 1936, pp. 5-6).
Lurie stressed that an important role of social workers in
such party efforts was to help develop political platforms
that would include adequate social welfare programs to meet
human needs (Lurie 1936, pp. 6-7). He believed that social
workers must connect with and support parties which offered "the possibility of a constructive social order." Social

workers should not allow themselves to be put off by compromising "on the terms of a lesser evil." They must instead
seek basic changes to improve social welfare, for "in a
rapidly changing world, the future belongs to the idealist"
(Lurie 1936, p. 7).
While Lurie was adamant that social workers must not
compromise when it came to programs to adequately meet
human needs, he also realized that they could not succeed in
bringing about such programs alone. In fact, in a lecture in
an April 1937 series he delivered in Los Angeles at "An Institute on Modern Social Work Problems" (1937) he noted for
example, that because of social workers' connections primarily to groups who are resistant to change (i.e. conservative
private philanthropists), or to groups without sufficient
power to effect change (i.e. the poor), "The more advanced
proposals for social legislation" came largely as a result of
the efforts of groups other than social workers (Lurie 1937a,
p. 1). Because of this, Lurie stressed the need for social
workers to align themselves "with progressive forces in
labor and in politics" (Lurie 1937a, p. 2). In another lecture
in the series which he called "Organized Labor and Social
Welfare," (Lurie 1937b) he concentrated specifically on the
growing role of the labor movement in social welfare and
political action. He noted that the increasing interest in the
area was "based upon an awakening philosophy of the close
relationship of economic and political action" (Lurie 1937b,
p. 1).
As the New Deal years continued to pass and international events surrounding World War II began to take precedence over purely domestic concerns, it became more difficult for Lurie to (as he put it), keep his "mind on the
limited field of social work" (Lurie 1938). He continued,
though, to urge his social work colleagues to remain politically active. In a 1941 paper presented to the NCSW he
urged social workers to attend to "Social Action [as] a Motive Force in Democracy" (Lurie 1941). In the paper he outlined, defined, and made recommendations for an enlarged,
but realistic role for social workers in social/political action.

He reasoned that "when established social institutions
and legal relationships are challenged and transformed by
the emergence of new cultural, economic, and political
phenomena, the process and the results may be called social
action" (Lurie 1941, p. 631). Likely in reference to the then
current world situation he noted that war and civil strife
were the most destructive and most rapid forms of social action. It was his contention that social work sometimes influenced the changing of social processess through social action, but not very often. The tendency of social work was instead to approve social action in the past or future, but not
to be involved in it in the present. He saw some rather obvious reasons for social workers not being directly involved
in ongoing efforts to bring social change. These reasons
were bound up in what Lurie (1941, pp 631-32) believed was
the basic conservatism of social work which was in turn
rooted in the nature of the conservative, voluntary, private,
philanthropic sponsorship of social work efforts. He believed
that while, in theory, necessary social changes could come
through voluntary action, in practice the people who controlled material resources had not been willing to make the
decision to bring about needed changes. As a result, he contended that most major social changes had come through
government action. He offered as examples the abolition of
slavery, the acceptance of labor's right to organize, income
taxes, women's suffrage and social security (Lurie 1941, p.
633).
Lurie (1941, p. 633) contended that another reason that
social workers had not been in the forefront of social
changes brought about through political action, was one of
skill. He argued that because of their historical experiences
largely in the private sector, social workers were simply better at persuading wealthy contributors to support voluntary
and thus more conservative actions than they were at political action to bring about social change through government
actions with its potential for being less conservative.
Because social workers looked to the same conservative
interests for support of their efforts, they were hesitant to be
seen as advocating causes which could be controversial or

might run contrary to those represented by their benefactors:
"Knowing of the overt or latent opposition to less conservative measures, we are uneasy about proposals that may be
charged with having a pinkish tinge or are definitely considered to be an outgrowth of radical movements" (Lurie
1941, p. 636).
Lurie (1941, pp. 636-7) also found a partial explanation
for social workers' impotence in social/political action in the
fact that conservative forces in society were much better organized than progressive interests. He reasserted that the
only hope for bringing about the substantive changes he felt
necessary was for the progressive/radical forces to organize
to counteract and overcome the superior organization of the
conservative forces. In this effort he believed the social
worker, in alliance with other progressive forces, should
play a significant role. He contended that:
Within the ranks of organized labor, among groups of professionals and intellectuals who are able to advance beyond the
basic ideologies of their class, and in the undercurrent of
popular dissatisfaction with the lack of essential economic
progress there is a potential base for popular strength that can
become a counterweight to conservative opposition ....
We
have the difficult task of enlisting these natural allies without
frightening the other elements (Lurie 1941, pp. 637-38).
To exercise such influence meant, to Lurie, going against
considerable odds. Social workers must realize, he
cautioned, that
organized pressures, especially from groups that have traditional prestige, are more important influences than real expressions of popular opinion. We have not yet learned how to
make the views of a hundred thousand unknown individuals
equal the weight of a single identifiable conservative leader
who speaks for a fraction of that number. One of the perennial
shortcomings of legislators is that they do not seem to know
how to count (Lurie 1941, p. 639).
Lurie believed that political action to accomplish social
work goals had the greatest chance of success when it resulted from broad-based and disciplined organization of social workers and others with similar interests. He, however

also recognized that social workers, for a variety of reasons,
several of which have been discussed here, were a long way
from such broad-based and disciplined organization. He
recognized that it was not only the superior organization of
conservative forces which was to blame for social workers'
failures in the area of political action, but he also pointed
out that "party and group discipline is alien to social work.
We seem to be the true rugged individualists" (Lurie 1941,
p. 639). Lurie (1941, p. 640) concluded that given this reality
social action, to be effective, must be an organized salient
within social work and that it must free itself sufficiently from
the general body to engage in militant action without the impediment of carrying the entire group along with it. Obviously, a successful movement requires that we enlist as large a
part of the field as we can reasonably secure without destroying the essential core of our program. Social action, large or
small, depends upon popular approval, since it represents
some desired action on the part of the majority in an agency
or in a community.
Once again, it is possible to see Lurie's efforts to balance the
need for broad-based, unified action with the reality that we
would have to settle for and work from considerably less
than total agreement and completely unified action.
An example of Lurie's efforts to put into operation his
notions about a "salient" within social work capable of decisive action without the necessity of obtaining unanimous
agreement from the entire organization can be found in his
involvement beginning in 1945 with the National Committee
on the Human Aspects of Reconversion (NCHAR). The
Committee was an interdisciplinary effort to prepare for a return to a peace time economy in anticipation of the war's
end. Lurie was a Vice-Chairperson of the Committee. In his
words
the Committee on the Human Aspects of Reconversion [h]as
set up as its first order of business, the assembling of information from the social work and religious fields on the human
aspects of reconversion and the use of this information as
quickly as possible in support of the unemployment compen-

sation bill which seeks to extend unemployment compensation
in the various states on the basis of payments of $25 per week
for a 26-week period. (Lurie 1945, p. 1)
During the same period Lurie was also involved in the
Social Actions Committee and was a member of its Steering
Committee. The Social Actions Committee was related to
and financially supported the NCHAR (Lurie 1945, p. 1;
King 1945). Both Committees were formed to carry out political cation. The NCHAR was more interdisciplinary in its inclusion of the "religious field" and its purposes were more
specifically related to lobbying for President Truman's Reconversion programs. The Social Actions Committee was
more broadly directed and was made up solely of social
workers interested in political action. It was an ad hoc committee and was purposely formed to be outside the formal
structure of the mainstream NCSW and AAWS organizations. Lurie explained the reason for its ad hoc and independent structure: "I am of the opinion that an ad hoc
committee of individuals can move more quickly than an instrument which has to represent officially an organized body
set up for various other purposes" (Lurie 1945, p. 1). This
had long been a criticism of Lurie's about both mainstream
professional associations, and especially about the AASW.
Still another component of the problems Lurie saw in
social workers' lack of skill, involvement and success in
political action efforts, was in their education. In 1946, in a
paper titled "The Next Twenty-Five Years," Lurie addressed
the educational preparation of social workers. In the paper,
he noted that current social work education was much
broader than what had been available to social work
"pioneers." It now included a broad general undergraduate
education as well as graduate education including "special
techniques required in social case work, public welfare,
group work, social agency administration and community
organization" (Lurie 1946, p. 4).
Given this broad preparation, Lurie wondered why so
many social workers still chose "the limited areas of our
techniques in dealing with individual maladjustment" rather

than the broader areas of concern such as "economic, social
and political organization" (Lurie 1946, pp. 4-5). He believed such a limited view of social work "results in an indifference or even antagonism toward some social workers
who still feel that social work has a real contribution to make
to political action" (Lurie 1946, p. 5).
Lurie also continued to be involved in a variety of political action efforts into the 1950s. These activities included his
involvement as one of many prominent signers in the Spring
of 1949 of an "Open Letter to the President and the Congress
of the United States" (1949) urging an end to the Cold War.
The signers urged that negotiations and reciprocal understanding replace the fear and hostility characterized by the
arms race. Other signers of the letter included Wayne McMillen, Bertha Reynolds, Mary Van Kleeck-all social
workers-as well as Linus Pauling, Lee J. Cobb, Aaron
Copeland, W.E.B. DuBois, Robert S. Lynd, Arthur Miller
and Scott Nearing ("Open Letter to the President and the
Congress" 1949). In addition, Lurie was involved in efforts
to aid a college professor in the early 1950s who had fallen
victim to McCarthyism and anti-communist hysteria (Tandy
1953). These activities are only two later examples of Lurie's
willingness to become personally involved throughout his
career in political action efforts to aid individuals as well as
in support of more broad-based efforts to bring about social
and political change.
Conclusion
Lurie's support for and involvement in political action to
accomplish social work goals throughout his career, serve as
useful reminders that while controversial and often unsuccessful in terms of results, political action has long had supporters of its rightful place within social work, though those
supporters have been a minority in the field. In the
sociopolitical climate of today, more social workers and our
organizations might do well to heed these reminders.
Lurie's call for and demonstration of social worker involvement in the political arena is especially important because of its comprehensive and activist nature. He recognized that in order for social workers to be effective in the

use of political action it must flow through all aspects of our
professional lives. Individually and collectively, through
both education and practice, as actions of social workers as
members of a distinct profession and in coalition with other
progressive groups, Harry Lurie called for us to be politically
aware and active. Only in this way did he believe we could
fulfill our professional responsibilities to those we serve.
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ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION:
THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE
DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION
DONA HAMILTON

LEHMAN COLLEGE, CUNY

This study examines the effect that bureaucratic attributes and the
dual function of the National Urban League (NUL) had on its ability to respond quickly to New Deal programs and legislation. With
the exception of its decentralized structure, bureaucratic attributes
contributed to the organization's effectiveness. Its structure limited
its ability to implement national programs and pressure for national policies. The NUL was unable to make a permanent change
in its structure that would be more compatible with its targets. Its
dual function, attempting to change individual behavior and
societal institutions, helped it maintain a support base without becoming more conservative.
The National Urban League (NUL) was founded in 1910
in response to the problems experienced by the large
number of urban black Americans who had migrated from
rural to urban areas seeking jobs and a better life. Throughout its history the NUL has been a major national black
organization, providing leadership and a broad range of resources to help the urban black population make social and
economic advancements. The NUL believed that if given an
equal opportunity, the black population could compete successfully with other groups in the country. Unemployment
and discriminatory employment policies were seen as major
impediments to the advancement of black Americans. Its
motto, "not alms but opportunity," is illustrative of these
concerns.
Prior to the Great Depression, the NUL concentrated on
vocational education and the expansion of job opportunities

for black workers in the private sector. Efforts to combat
pervasive job discrimination were done on an almost caseby-case basis. The NUL, through its Vocational Opportunity
Campaigns and through personal contacts, tried to persuade
potential employers to give black workers the opportunity to
prove that they could be efficient, honest, and reliable employees. The League rejoiced when it was able to help a
black worker become "the first" black milkman in a city or
"the first" black office clerk for a major business (NUL Papers, 1930a; Weiss, 1974; Parris and Brooks, 1971).
In 1933, with few private sector jobs available and with
the New Deal administration creating work and work-relief
programs for the unemployed, the NUL turned its attention
to helping black workers make gains through government
programs and new legislation. However, the NUL thought it
would be necessary to make some basic changes within the
organization if it was to respond effectively to the changes
occurring in its external environment.
This article analyzes the ability of the organization to
make these changes by examining two inter-related qualities
of the NUL: (1) its bureaucratic attributes and (2) its dual
function. These organizational characteristics enhanced and
limited the adaptive capacities of the NUL during a turbulent historical period, the Great Depression. This study relies
on primary source data, the NUL Papers and Opportunity,
the official organ of the NUL.
Bureaucratic Attributes
Robert Michels' theory, "the iron law of oligarchy,"
indicates a natural tendency for organizations to become
more bureaucratic because a weak bureaucracy is more vulnerable to the external environment. However, as an organization becomes more bureaucratic, it becomes less compatible with its social change goals. It avoids controversial issues
because it does not want to alienate its supporters. The
organization becomes more conservative and more oligarchical. The internal environment of an organization also pushes
it towards oligarchy. The personal motives of "managers"

(e.g., promotion and job security) cause them to be faithful
to the bureaucracy instead of its social change goals
(Michels, 1949).
Few have disputed Michels' observation that organizations tend to become more bureaucratic. It is generally accepted that a primary goal of all organizations is to survive.
However, other studies of organizations indicate that this
concern for survival does not always result in the organization becoming conservative and oligarchical (Blau and
Meyer, 1956; Zald and Ash, 1966; Sills, 1969; Ash, 1972;
Oberschall, 1973).
William Gamson, in his study of 53 social movement
organizations, found that all of the organizations became
more bureaucratic but he did not find this to be incompatible with the organization's social change goals. The more
bureaucratic attributes an organization had, the more likely
it was to be successful. The bureaucratic structure provided
a unity of command and a means for handling internal conflicts. It kept the organization ready to take advantage of opportunities when they came along. The well established
organizations were more able to take advantage of opportunities provided by a crisis than were newly established
organizations (Gamson, 1975).
Jo Freeman's analysis of women's movement organizations supports the thesis regarding the benefits of bureaucratic attributes. However, she contends that different organizational structures mold strategic possibilities. The effectiveness of an organization's structure depends on its target for
change. The organization may create a structure that is effective for a particular target but when the organization moves
on to another target, its structure may no longer be effective.
It is difficult and time consuming to change a structure and
make it more compatible with a new target (Freeman, 1979).
These theories lead to an analysis of the NUL's bureaucratic attributes and their effect on the organization's ability
to remain viable during a period of severe economic depression and rapid social change. By 1930, the NUL was a well
established bureaucracy. Its bureaucratic attributes included

a constitution, by-laws, departments that specialized in certain aspects of its work (e.g., industrial relations, research,
publications), an organizational hierarchy, and terms of affiliation. The constitution gave the Executive Board the
power to make policy and appropriate funds but there appears to have been a collegial climate within the organization with the staff very involved in formulating policy (NUL
Constitution, 1930-36; NUL Executive Board Meetings,
1933-39).
The organization was a confederation with 42 affiliates,
mostly in the Northeast and Midwest, and a national office
in New York (NUL Papers, 1930b; NUL, 1980). Eugene
Kinckle Jones served as the Executive Secretary of the NUL
and T. Arnold Hill, Secretary of the Industrial Relations Department, was the main liaison between the national office
and the affiliates. There was a dependency between the national office and the affiliates that encouraged cooperation
and cohesiveness. The national office needed the affiliates to
carry out its various programs and to support its efforts to
change national policy. The affiliates benefited from the
prestige of the NUL and the information and guidance the
national office provided. This mutual dependency was an
incentive for the national office and the affiliates to avoid activities that might cause conflict between them. Yet there
was tension between the two because the affiliates did not
always help to carry out national programs; perhaps because
some of these programs were considered too controversial in
respective affiliate cities. The affiliates were totally dependent on local contributors so many avoided controversy because they feared this might impede fund raising and limit
local support of their programs.
The Terms of Affiliation set standards for the establishment of affiliates and for some aspects of their operation
(Terms of Affiliation, 1925-32, 1935, 1939). Shortly after its
founding, the NUL sought to expand by affiliating with
existing local organizations with goals similar to the
League's. Many of these organizations feared that their affiliation with the NUL would encroach on their autonomy.
The NUL found that it had to allow these organizations a

great deal of autonomy if it was to expand and become a national organization (Weiss, 1974). This created a loose confederation that caused problems for the League in its efforts
to respond quickly to New Deal legislation and it tried to
overcome this. Its involvement with the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) illustrates its efforts to do so.
One of the first acts of the New Deal administration
created the NRA in 1933. Its purpose was to stimulate private industry to produce more and thus enable it to hire
more workers. The act was also to regulate workers' hours
and wages through the establishment of fair practice codes
(Leuchtenberg, 1963). One of the NUL's major concerns, in
regard to the NRA, was the exclusion of agriculture and
domestic workers from code coverage, thus excluding twothirds of the black work force. This meant that most black
workers had no protection against exploitation by employers
(NUL, 1933).
The NUL responded to the creation of the NRA by announcing a new program at its regional conferences in 1933.
T. Arnold Hill, Secretary of the Industrial Relations Department, explained that "It might be necessary to recast and reshape the programs of the League in light of new social
changes" (NUL Papers, 1933a). Consequently, an Emergency
Advisory Council (EAC) would be established, made up of
prominent blacks (business men and women, educators,
ministers, and other professionals) around the country. The
EAC would address NRA issues and educate black workers
about the various recovery programs, including how to
apply for benefits and programs. Local EACs, which the affiliates were asked to establish, would be coordinated by the
national EAC. The program would have an "unofficial relationship" with the NUL (NUL Papers, 1933b). This parallel
structure (EAC) allowed the national office to create and control a program at a local level, circumventing some of the resistance the affiliates might have had to the program. This
was a significant departure from the League's reliance on the
affiliates for implementing programs. There was also a radical deviation from the NUL's traditional policy. Membership
in the EACs was limited to blacks. When this policy was

questioned at one of the regional conferences, Hill responded, "The advantages of this form of organization is
(sic) that they (blacks) are able better to express in unmistakable terms just what the Negroes want" (NUL Papers,
1933b).
The structure created by the national office worked well.
Most of the affiliates became involved along with prominent
blacks throughout the country. By the end of 1933, 196 EACs
had been organized in 32 states and the District of Columbia
(NUL Papers, 1933c). (The NUL had affiliates in only 19
states so this program helped the organization to expand
(NUL Papers 1930,b). The EACs enabled the NUL to collect
many incidents of code violations and incidents of discrimination in New Deal work and work-relief programs. This information was passed on to New Deal officials. The EACs
also helped blacks gain a better understanding of New Deal
programs, especially eligibility criteria (NUL Papers,
1933d,e). However, two-thirds of the black work force remained uncovered by the NRA codes.
In 1934 the NUL established even more control over the
EACs by developing a formal plan of organization that gave
the national EAC (essentially the national office) the power
to approve all members and the right to remove any members who did not follow EAC policy (NUL Papers, 1934a).
This formal plan was probably developed to protect the
image of the NUL as well as establish more control. Although the EAC had an "unofficial relationship" with the
NUL, the League was visibly involved. It tended to be a cautious organization and did not want the EACs to be "in any
way political" or radical (NUL Papers, 1934a).
The activities of the EACs began to decline when the
NRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935. This eliminated
the reason for them in the minds of many (NUL Papers,
1935a). The NUL considered making the EACs a permanent
part of its structure because "a good deal of work (could) be
done by making permanent those that do exist, and reviewing some of those that have lost interest." It was decided
that "a shortage of staff" made it "inadvisable to list this as
a major activity for the coming year" (NUL Papers, 1938a).

The NUL's concern about the substantial gains that organized labor was making as a result of New Deal legislation
was the catalyst for creating a structure, like the EAC, for a
new labor program. It provides another example of the
organization's efforts to make its structure more compatible
with its target for change. Organized labor had control of a
large proportion of jobs in the public and private sectors yet
many unions refused to admit black workers. The NUL
feared that blacks would be permanently shut out of jobs
and thought that the discriminatory policies of organized
labor needed to be addressed in some way. It considered
using the EACs for this but decided that a program with a
narrower focus would be more effective (NUL Papers,
1934b).
It created a Workers' Bureau that, like the EAC, circumvented the autonomy of the affiliates. The Workers' Bureau
established black Workers' Councils and coordinated their
activities. The NUL had difficulty raising money for the
labor program from its usual sources (white philanthropists
and philanthropic foundations) so it turned its attention to
the black middle class. It formed an all-black committee, the
Committee of 100, to campaign for middle class blacks to
support a movement aimed at black workers (NUL Papers,
1934b). Getting support for this program among blacks was
not an easy task. Many blacks were anti-union because of
bitter experiences with unions in the past. The NUL's labor
program was criticized by the black press, the black church,
and black fraternal organizations. It was also criticized by
more militant blacks as being too mild and "muddling the
issues" (Cayton and Mitchell, 1939). The League was able to
overcome some of this criticism because the chair of the
Committee of 100 was the publisher of The Chicago Defender
and an NUL board member was the editor of The Pittsburgh
Courier, two black newspapers with national circulations.
These papers provided at least a forum to present the prounion argument to the black community (Parris and Brooks).
The Committee of 100 was able to raise enough money
($2000) to launch the labor program but not enough to sustain it for any length of time. The program was more controversial than the EAC and fewer affiliates participated.

Lester Granger, Secretary of the Workers' Bureau, traveled
around the country speaking to groups about the League's
labor program and organizing Workers' Councils. He also
alienated some affiliates when he organized in cities where
they were opposed to the program. By 1935 there were 42
Workers' Councils in 17 states and 73 by 1937 (NUL Papers,
1935b, 1937a; Hamilton, 1984; Granger Oral History, 196061).
The Councils pressured organized labor to prohibit discrimination in unions; they helped black workers to understand the advantages of belonging to unions; they informed
New Deal officials of incidents of discrimination in New
Deal programs; and they campaigned for an antidiscriminatory clause in all government contracts that would
prohibit the participation of unions that were discriminatory
(Hamilton; NUL Papers, 1934c, d, 1935c, d).
The labor program was of short duration due to the
NUL's financial problems, but in some areas the councils
were instrumental in getting black workers admitted to
unions. Supervision of the Workers' Councils by the national office required fairly frequent contacts between the
Councils and the Workers' Bureau and the League did not
have the staff or money to sustain this program for a long
period of time. By mid-1937 the activities of the Councils
were on the decline. The Committee of 100 was practically
inactive (Hamilton; NUL Papers 1937a). Conflicts had developed between the Workers' Bureau and some of the affiliates opposed to the labor program (NUL Papers, 1938b).
Radical groups infiltrated some of the Councils and the NUL
closed these down. There were conflicts within some of the
Councils indicating that the craft versus industrial union
conflict had spilled over into them (NUL Papers, 1936a,
1937b, c, 1938c; Cayton and Mitchell, 1939). Granger took a
leave of absence (NUL Papers, 1938d). All of these events
contributed to the demise of the labor program. By the end
of 1937 only 25 councils remained active. The NUL thought
the labor program could be revived with extensive field
work but this was never done-in all likelihood because the

resources to do so were not available (NUL Papers, 1937d,
1939a, b, 1940a).
The more centralized, temporary structures created by
the NUL appear to have been a viable way for the organization to overcome the limitations its decentralized structure
placed on its ability to respond quickly to New Deal legislation, but it was too costly. Its efforts to develop new national
programs and to change on-going programs without this
kind of structure were rather futile. The following activities
of the NUL illustrate this point.
The League continued to be concerned with helping
black workers become involved with organized labor and at
the 1937 Annual Conference proposed a national program to
organize black domestic workers into a union. This would
put them in a more advantageous position to bargain for
better wages and working conditions. There were affiliates
for and affiliates against this proposal. Those against it
argued that the League had no control over outside employment agencies and therefore setting up standards of work
was outside of its realm of capabilities. Furthermore, such
activity might interfere with its financial base because employers, local funding boards, and foundations would be
against it. Those in favor of the proposal argued that it was
part of the NUL's job; it had a binding obligation to help
poor black women. These proponents believed that such a
program was likely to improve chances for funding. "Collective action" was "an advanced program approved by liberal
thought that generally characterize(d) League supporters"
(NUL Papers, 1937e). It was a field where blacks could lead
and reap the benefits. Failure to assume this leadership
would cause the NUL to lag behind progressive public opinion and lose its dominant position (NUL Papers, 1937e).
Many of the affiliates had been inundated with black
women seeking employment throughout the Depression and
domestic work was likely to be the only work the Leagues
had to offer them. As a result, many of the affiliates had
been involved with black domestic workers and concerned
about their plight. These women worked long hours for very

low wages. Nonetheless, the NUL was not able to get the financial and affiliate support needed to launch a national
program directed at black domestic workers. Some of the
Leagues continued their efforts to improve conditions for
them but the autonomy of the affiliates as well as the NUL's
financial situation mitigated against the proposed national
program (NUL Papers 1933f, 1934e, 1939d, 1940b).
Late in the Depression, the NUL weighed the advantages of continuing with its Employment Bureau. This had
been a major program in its Industrial Relations Department
since the department was established in 1925 (Parris and
Brooks, 1971). It had been conceived as a means for helping
black workers obtain better jobs, to find employment for
blacks in areas where they had been excluded because of
race. During the Depression the employment service had become mostly a service to help black workers obtain relief.
Since the League had few jobs to offer at that time (those
few it did have tended to be at the lowest end of the occupational ladder and paid very low wages), most who sought
employment at League offices became certified as unemployed and seeking work, thus making them eligible for relief (NUL Papers, 1939e, f). This service clearly went against
a goal of the organization-the expansion of job opportunities for black workers. The NUL firmly believed that it
was important for blacks to be gainfully employed. It did not
want to facilitate the creation of a large black population dependent on "the dole" (Hamilton, 1984). The NUL thought
its resources might be put to better use. Furthermore, the
federal government was helping the states set up employment offices, perhaps making the League's services redundant (NUL Papers, 1940c).
The affiliates were surveyed on this matter in 1939.
While some of the affiliates considered their employment
services essential and helpful, others thought that the service
thwarted efforts to remove racial barriers and expand job
opportunities. Those who thought the employment service
was essential argued that the special needs of black workers
made it necessary to have a service tailored to meet these

needs. Those who questioned the usefulness of the service
thought it did not warrant the amount of resources needed
to provide it. Opinions among the affiliates seem to have
been dependent on local conditions and customs. Some
states used discriminatory practices that did not "lend a
sense of dignity to Negro labor." (NUL Papers, 1939g). Separate seating arrangements in employment offices and the
classification of occupations by race made black applicants
feel that they were not being given equal access to jobs. In
some cities there were separate offices for blacks and whites
and referrals were made to the "black office" only when the
job order could not be filled with white applicants. Some
states had integrated services with few or no black staff
members and some states had offices that were integrated
with a number of black employees (NUL Papers, 1938d,
1939h, i).
The majority of the affiliates chose to continue their employment services. Some may have done so because they believed that the League's services provided an essential black
perspective that could not be provided by the government
office. Others may have continued with the service because
they feared losing a major program and consequently a great
deal of financial support. At any rate, the employment service continued to be a prominent part of the NUL program.
Few affiliates were willing to redirect their resources. The
autonomy of the affiliates prevented a change in the direction of programs.
The affiliates' autonomy seems helpful in the sense that
it allowed them to make decisions about programs based on
their perception of local needs. For example, it appears that
there were some cities where black workers would benefit
from the continuation of the League employment service.
The structure was not helpful to the extent that it limited the
League's ability to respond quickly and to control resources.
However, making a permanent change in the structure of the
organization proved to be very difficult as evidenced by the
following account of the NUL's attempt to gain more control
over the affiliates.

At the latter part of the Depression it proposed an
amendment to the Terms of Affiliation that would give the
Executive Board the power to confirm the affiliates' staff appointments and review the work of an affiliate employee
"who, in the judgement of the NUL, is not performing his
duties satisfactorily and in accordance with the standards
and practices of the NUL" (NUL Papers, 1938c). This was
clearly a move on the part of the national office to
standardize affiliate activities.
This attempt to amend the Terms of Affiliation created
much dissension between the national office and the affiliates, and it was not until 1940 that the Terms were
amended. The Executive Board did not get the power to confirm affiliate staff appointments but it did get the power to
"review the work of any affiliate employee. . ." (NUL Papers, 1940d). This amendment extended the power of the national office over the affiliates to some extent. The decentralized structure remained and the national office and the
affiliates each continued to try to gain more power within
the organization.
As the national office tried to amend the Terms of Affiliation, the affiliates formed the Executive Secretaries' Council
to air some of their grievances with the national office and
to push for more involvement in the NUL's decision making
process. The Secretaries' Council was concerned about the
infrequent contacts between the national office and the affiliates. This lack of contact fostered "fear, suspicion, and a
lack of faith in the national office" (NUL Papers, 1939j). It
was unhappy with staff changes, especially since the affiliates had not been officially informed of these changes but
had heard rumors about them (NUL Papers, 1939j).
These criticisms occurred at a time when the NUL was
in dire financial straits and as a result, had sharply curtailed
its contacts with the affiliates (NUL Papers, 1939k, 1940e). To
make matters worse, T. Arnold Hill, the main liaison between the national office and the affiliates for about 25
years, was dividing his time between the NUL and the Department of Labor in Washington. In addition, the Executive

Secretary, Eugene Kinkle Jones, was ill and had less energy
to devote to the administration of the organization (NUL
Papers, 1940f).
The national office's response to the Secretaries' Council
did not ease the latter's concern and it asked for representation at the quarterly board meetings (NUL Papers, 19 4 0g).
The Steering Committee, acting on behalf of the Executive
Committee, denied this request by choosing not to recognize
the Secretaries' Council "as part and parcel of the NUL's
constitutional set-up." It was not "an organic part of the
structure" and therefore the NUL could not "grant the right
of the Executive Secretaries' Council to be formally represented at each . . . quarterly meeting. . . . (NUL Papers,
19 4 0g, h). The bureaucracy prevailed; a bureaucratic attribute of the NUL, its constitution, was used to circumvent
the secretaries' attempt to gain more power within the
organization. This incident shows how difficult it is for an
organization to make a permanent change in its structure
and how bureaucratic attributes can help to control internal
conflicts.
The tension between the national office and the affiliates
seems to have some positive aspects. It served as a balance
of power and prevented either from gaining complete control
of the organization. This slowed the tendency toward oligarchy and fostered a dialogue. However, the NUL would have
been a much stronger national organization if all of its affiliates had been involved in its national programs. This
would have given NUL leaders much more leverage with
New Deal decision makers when they pressured them for
certain policies.
The Dual Function
Mayer Zald and Roberta Ash believe that the main problem for social movement organizations is maintaining a base
of support. These organizations have goals that are not
quickly or easily accomplished so the enthusiasm of members may wane. It is easier to hold the participation and
commitment of members, they contend, if the goals of the

organization are directed toward changing individual behavior rather than changing society (1966). Judith Trolander,
in her study of community funding boards during the Depression, found that these boards tended to be composed of
the more conservative elements in the community and preferred giving to organizations that did not challenge the
status quo (Trolander, 1973).
Freeman's study of women's movement organizations
points out the benefits of the dual function in that
movement-consciousness-raising (changing individuals)
and
lobbying
(changing
societal
institutions).
Consciousness-raising was a main activity of the newer
branches and attracted many new members. In the meantime, the older branch was able to continue its pressure on
legislators with a stronger support base (Freeman, 1979).
The NUL had been, since its founding, a dual function
organization that provided services aimed at changing individual behavior, e.g., helping black workers develop skills
and "good" work habits, and pressured for societal changes,
e.g., pressuring for the prohibition of discriminatory employment policies. However, the affiliates were very dependent on their local funding organizations. Fear of losing financial support is a logical explanation for the affiliates' lack
of cooperation with the national office. Many of the affiliates
that engaged in social action had difficulties with community funding boards (NUL Papers, 1933g,h, 1935e, 1936b,
1937f, 19391). This caused some affiliates to avoid controversial issues and activities. For example, some of the affiliates
promoted employment services that stressed their efforts to
develop characteristics of "loyalty, honesty, and industry" in
black workers as "safeguards against loss" (NUL Papers,
1939m). This probably seemed safer to them than engaging
in social action to fight discriminatory policies. When an affiliate did run into difficulties, the national office, at the request of the affiliate, tried to help. The NUL recognized the
difficulties inherent in the affiliates' relationships with their
major sources of funding. For example, when considering
the labor program, the NUL stated, "It might be necessary

in view of the stand on labor problems for the Leagues to
divest themselves of the support of Community Funds and
white patronage" (NUL Papers, 1935f).
The experience of the Executive Secretary of the Kansas
City, Missouri League is a good example of the problems the
affiliates encountered with their funding boards. The Kansas
City League was one of the Leagues that had cooperated
with the national office in the implementation of the labor
program and the Executive Secretary of that League had had
on-going difficulties with other groups in the city. When he
was on the verge of losing the support of his funding organization, the Council of Social Agencies, he wrote to Hill for
help. He told Hill the League's "techniques did not fit in
with community mores" (NUL Papers, 19391). An evaluation
by the Council of Social Agencies was devastating. It accused the secretary of political involvement and said he
lacked community organization skills. It demanded that he
resign along with the entire board, with the exception of the
recently elected president. A new board would be appointed
by the Council and the League president. The report described the two functions of the League as incompatible. It
was not possible for the UL to be a "coordinating community organization agency" and an agency functioning "as an
articulation and expression of a minority group's struggle for
economic opportunity and increased social equality" (NUL
Papers, 1939n). The Kansas City League was accused of
stimulating action of other groups, the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and the National
Negro Congress. Some whites thought "outside agitators"
were involved. The immediate source of contention seems to
have been a suit filed by the secretary to allow blacks to play
golf on the municipal course. This was regarded as advocating for social equality for blacks (NUL Papers, 19390).
Hill went to Kansas City to help resolve the problem and
was able to delay the Council's threat to cut off the League's
funds and to bring the parties together to discuss their differences. Hill's report of his visit concluded that it was indeed difficult for a League to "be a coordinating agency

which required the cooperation and confidence of all agencies in the city" and at the same time help black people
make social and economic advancement. When "the League
attempted to do the latter ... it would alienate forces that
would help it do the former" (NUL Papers, 19 3 9p). He
thought it was possible to do both but this "in large measure depended upon the tact of the Executive Secretary and
the support the Board gave him" (NUL Papers, 193 9p). The
experiences of the Kansas City secretary emphasize the uneasy truce that existed between blacks and whites in some
urban areas and the difficulties caused by the affiliates' dependency on local funding boards.
It seems feasible that the dual function of the organization helped it to survive. The League was able to emphasize
its efforts to change individual behavior and thus not
alienate its sources of funding. At the same time, it could
engage in activities aimed at institutional change as long as
these activities did not attract too much attention and were
not too controversial. For example, the NUL's lack of publicity regarding its activities related to the NRA was questioned by an affiliate secretary. Eugene K. Jones responded
that "it was often unwise to publicize the type of activities
that have been carried on by the League in Washington recently" (NUL Papers, 1933a). It was explained that "the very
nature of the work done by the National, certain accomplishments could never be reported as resulting from Urban
League work, and over-emphasizing this phase of activity
could be more detrimental than beneficial" (NUL Papers,
1933b).
Although the organization was cautious and preferred
not to call attention to its efforts directed at institutional
change, it was willing to take risks on some issues about
which it felt strongly. In addition to creating a labor program that was initially unpopular among its black constituents and many of its white supporters, it testified in
favor of a controversial social security bill, H.R. 2827 (Hill,
1935; NUL, 1935). This bill was regarded as a communist
proposal to get the support of the workers (the Lundeen or

Workers' Bill). The bill emphasized that unemployment was
"a disease of the capitalist system" and therefore the beneficiaries of that system should compensate the victims
(Mitchell, 1947). According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "the
Unemployed Councils controlled by the Communist party
persuaded Ernest Lundeen, a left-wing Farmer-Labor congressman from Minnesota to introduce the bill. . ." (1959).
It is not possible to know exactly why the NUL risked
testifying in favor of this bill but perhaps it did so because
the bill embodied policies that the League strongly favored.
Social security would cover all workers, it would be administered by the federal government, and it would be entirely
funded by employers. Those most in need were to be given
priority for benefits (Hill, 1935). The organization's realization of the importance of this bill for black workers seems to
have superceded its concerns about protecting its image. The
dual function of the organization may have helped it to survive this testimony.
Conclusion
The NUL's bureaucratic attributes, for the most part,
enhanced the organization's ability to adapt to changes in its
external invironment and these attributes increased during
the Depression. The League created temporary structures
that were more centralized and therefore enabled it to exercise greater control over local programs. However one attribute, its decentralized structure, limited the NUL's adaptive
capacities. It did not lend itself well to national programs
and efforts to change New Deal policies. The NUL tried to
change this structure by amending the Terms of Affiliation
but this proved to be very difficult. Although the League's
bureaucracy controlled internal conflict, the decentralized
structure remained.
Its efforts to gain more control over the affiliates show
some tendency toward oligarchy but the organization did
not become more conservative. It wanted control of the affiliates so that it could implement programs that many of the
affiliates regarded as too controversial for their respective

communities. In addition, it deviated from its usual interracial policy by creating all-black groups. It also testified in
favor of a radical social security bill.
The dual function of the organization, changing individual behavior and changing societal conditions, seems directly related to its ability to survive the Depression. In all
likelihood, this was not a conscious strategy developed by
the organization. Shirley Jenkins' study of modern day
ethnic organizations indicates that these organizations tend
to be multi-service organizations because their clients are
poor and in need of help in many areas (Jenkins, 1980,
1981). This appears to be the case for the NUL. It tried to
meet the various needs of its constituents in different ways.
However, it was able to emphasize one aspect of its work
over another when it appeared that this would help the
organization hold on to its supporters. Thus the dual function helped the organization avoid becoming more conservative. It remained a fairly flexible, pragmatic organization,
important adaptive qualities.
This study has focused on two internal characteristics of
the NUL and consequently, does not include many important dynamics. It is not the intent of this article to assume
that the NUL's difficulties were entirely related to these
internal qualities of the organization. They appear to have
had some effect on the organization, limiting and enhancing
its effectiveness; but a major reason the NUL proceeded cautiously seems related to its position in society. It represented
a minority constituency that lacked status, political power,
and financial resources. This limited its access to resources
and decision makers and made it a very vulnerable organization.
The NUL was a well established organization at the
onset of the Depression and was able to help many black
workers take advantage of New Deal programs. However, it
was not able to bring about any significant change in the
plight of black Americans, particularly legislation to prohibit
discrimination by organized labor and employers. Some
blacks gained employment through union membership,

others through the new civil service system; but too large a
proportion of black workers were unemployed and on welfare as New Deal work and work-relief programs ended.
Two-thirds of the black work force, domestic and agriculture
workers, were excluded from coverage under the Social Security Act (Wood, 1939). Perhaps a reason for the conflict
within the organization at the latter part of the Depression
was related to the disappointment that staff and board
members felt when they realized that not as much had been
accomplished as they had hoped. The organization turned
inward. The national office tried to make the organization's
structure more centralized by amending the Terms of Affiliation and the affiliates tried to make the structure more decentralized with the formation of the Executive Secretaries'
Council. Less time was devoted to social change issues and
more time to the maintenance of the organization. During
this critical period, the bureaucracy controlled internal conflict and the NUL survived to continue its struggle to help
black Americans make economic and social advancement.
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FROM COUNTRYWOMAN TO FEDERAL
EMERGENCY RELIEF ADMINISTRATOR:
JOSEPHINE CHAPIN BROWN,
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This study documents the life and career of Josephine Chapin
Brown, an early leader in public welfare and rural social work.
Historical research showed that Brown's ideas on social work and
on professional training for social work were often against the
paradigm of her time. For example, Brown was a committed ruralite when social work was primarily urban; Brown supported social
work training for public welfare workers in the agricultural colleges (many now state universities) when social work was committed to a more elitist training model. As a result she was ostracized
by many of her influential contemporaries. Her orientation towards
building coalitions with rural sociologists made her even less popular among her social work colleagues. In spite of Brown's many
contributions to rural social work and public welfare, her life and
works have remained undocumented by social work biographers.
Because the battles she fought and lost are still current, a review
of Brown's life history might not only be of historical interest but
also enlighten contemporary debates.

Introduction
The life and work of Josephine Chapin Brown, born in
Ogdensburg, New York, on October 20, 1887, has remained

undocumented in spite of her pioneering contributions to
the fields of public welfare and rural social work.' Although
Brown was a farmer, a researcher, a family welfare worker, a
public figure and a fairly prolific author, one possible explanation for her relative obscurity in social work history lies in
her own reserved personality. Yet, further examination of
her life and career leads us to another hypothesis. Brown's
ideas about levels of training for social workers were unorthodox and against the paradigm of her time. The record
shows that powerful social work leaders, having disagreed
with Brown on her training proposals and on her modus
operandi during her tenure at the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration (FERA), remained antagonistic toward her
when the "relief crisis" was over. Yet, many of Brown's
most controversial ideas such as the training of social workers for public welfare in the agricultural (state) colleges of
the nation became a reality decades later with the advent of
undergraduate social work education.
While the main objective of this manuscript is biographical, the politics of social work and social work training
in the early days of the profession come clearly to the fore
by following the wax and wane of Brown's professional
career. History casts Brown as having entered a number of
sensitive debates in the course of her career, often suffering
personally for the political loses of certain themes. She was a
ruralite at a time of ferment in that field; she was a
generalist when specialization began to make its mark in social work and she continued to support a "democratized"
model of training when the profession, having survived the
Depression, became more elitist. Social work and social
work education continue to be indicted even today for their
abandonement of public welfare as a central concern.
Brown's life work was devoted to creating a cadre of well
trained rural and public welfare workers within the fiscal
and political constraints of those two fields. Although she
personally lost many of her battles, the issues are still pertinent and unresolved today. Her life story might provide
some insights.

Youth and College Years
The daughter of Silas Edgar Brown (or Browne), a surgeon, and of Mary Chapin Bacon, Josephine Chapin Brown,
received her early schooling at the Ogdensburg Free
Academy and the Balliol School in Utica, New York. She
attended Bryn Mawr College from 1906 to 1908 and then
again from 1911 to 1913, graduating with an A.B. in Physics
and Biology. Brown's course of study incluced Chemistry,
Philosophy and Psychology, Latin, Greek and German (Bryn
Mawr College Archives, 1920).
During her college years, Brown's family moved to St.
Paul, Minnesota. In 1908, Brown was forced to leave Bryn
Mawr for two years due to financial difficulties (Bryn Mawr
College Archives, 1914) during which time she taught Latin
and Mathematics at the Oak Hall School for Girls in St. Paul,
Minnesota. In June 1911, Brown was awarded the Thomas
H. Powers Memorial scholarship enabling her to return for
another year of studies at Bryn Mawr. In 1912, Bryn Mawr
President M. Carey Thomas wrote to Brown letting her know
that the college had received a scholarship gift "with the request that this scholarship be awarded to you as a token of
admiration for your ability and character" (Bryn Mawr College Archives, 1912). At Bryn Mawr, Brown was considered
an excellent student; she was older than most of the members of her graduating class and was held in high esteem by
teachers and peers alike.
Bryn Mawr College enrollment records indicate that
Brown was a Presbyterian. Her religious nature, highlighted
in later years by her conversion to Catholicism, seemed apparent from an early point in her life. Soon after her graduation from Bryn Mawr, during 1913 and 1914, she worked as
a Pastor's assistant at the House of Hope Church in St. Paul.
To the biographer, Brown emerges as an upper-middle class
woman who with great determination sought to confront her
family's reverses of fortune and was successful in her quest.
In 1914, probably at the recommendation of the Dean of
the College at Bryn Mawr, Brown secured a position as
teacher of Greek and Social Problems at the Misses Shipley's

School in Bryn Mawr, a prestigious private academy. She
did not, however, remain there for long. Brown manifested
the restlessness and intolerance of monotonous routine characteristic of the early social reformers. In fact, in 1916, she
wrote for her Bryn Mawr Class Bulletin: "I didn't write for
the bulletin last year-probably because there wasn't anything interesting to write about teaching at a boarding
school. Too many other people were doing the same thing."
"Now," she stated in her 1916 letter, "I have something to
write about" (Bryn Mawr College Archives, 1916).
By 1915, Brown had returned to Minnesota and begun
work as a "substitute officer and teacher" at the Home
School for Girls in Sauk Center, an institution for delinquent
girls (Minnesota State Archives Collection, 1915-1916). Sauk
Center was Brown's introduction not only to the helping
field but to the rural environment that she would devotedly
study and serve later in her life. Of that experience she
wrote:
Since August, I've been working for the State of Minnesota in
the Home School for Girls. There are eight 'cottages' holding
about two hundred girls between the ages of 8 and 18. They
are sent here by the Juvenile Courts of the State for various
offenses-and we are trying to send them out fitted to support
themselves. Girl after girl has gone out to build or at least settle a home of her own . . .Because the school is in the country, there is a huge farm where the girls work in the spring
and summer. Part of my job is to take them to the field, and I
expect to spend many hours this spring grubbing in the earth
and keeping them out of mischief at the same time (Bryn
Mawr College Archives, 1916).
The Countrywoman
The rural revitalization that followed the work of Theodore Roosevelt's 1908 Country Life Commission spurred a
back-to-the-land movement. The Commission had inspired a
"country-life" campaign in the hope of returning the best
leadership to the country (Swanson, 1972). At the end of
1913, Kenyon L. Butterfield, a renowned Massachusetts agriculturalist and member of the Commission wrote in the
Survey: "The forces of the countryside are gathering for a

great forward looking movement. What shall the New Year
bring us in our country-life campaign" (Butterfield,
1913:252). Apparently, Brown was caught in the fervor of
this country-life campaign, the beginning of her evolving
interest in the country. The year 1916 found her preparing
for a farming venture.
Before embarking upon a project on an Idaho farm,
Brown took the "Short Agricultural Course" at the University of Wisconsin. This was a course offered by Agricultural
Extension, a service with which she would also show significant familiarity in later years. About this period she
humorously wrote:
The last year has been varied. An ambition to raise chickens
put an end to my career at the Girls' Training School ...

It

was a question not of loving my work at the School less-but
of loving (?) chickens more! It was a hot summer in St. Paul,
interrupted by a hotter three weeks at Madison, Wisconsin,
where I tore from hens to cows and sometimes pigs-trying to
prepare a little for a venture in farming. The Agricultural Short
Course was most interesting....
On the first of October we started for Idaho-our worldly
goods accompanying us on a freight car. My partner in this
wild undertaking-is-for we are still going on-a Wellesley
girl who lives in St. Paul-and who shares my longing for a
cow, a few chickens and a garden. I somehow feel like Robinson Crusoe writing about it, for though we were not cast upon
an island, it certainly was a desert. We were grateful for three
ranges of mountains-but we longed for trees while we grubbed in the sage brush for firewood-climbed fences, pitched
hay, milked our two cows, fed the chickens and the pigs and
harvested the corn .

.

. We were eight miles out on forty

acres-all irrigated land in the Boise Valley. We lived alone
most of three months in the little cottage on the place-with a
Winchester 22 leaning against the chimney in the living room.
Not even a coyote nor a rabbit was the worse for that rifle . ..
They must have smelled it!" (Bryn Mawr College Archives,
1917).
Brown's farming efforts in Idaho came to an end soon.
In spite of their dedication, the two young "back-to-thelanders" found the Idaho environment hard to manage. Yet,

Brown learned to regard highly and appreciate the strengths
and generosity of farm families. Her feelings are revealed in
her comments about the unsuccessful Idaho venture:
The country was full of charming people-and the air was
wonderful-but we could not have the air and neighborsand the ranch was too big for us to handle alone. We wanted
something we could do ourselves -something smaller just for
chickens and a cow. So at Christmas time we sold out what
we could-packed the rest and came back to St. Paul, leaving
the irrigation ditches which we had not purchased-to their
fate. If any one is tempted to pity us on a lovely Christmas
day-don't do it! We dined with the best of neighborswhose names deserve to go down for posterity for their kindness to the 'boys who lived on that ranch.' The best is to
come. These neighbors had nine children all the way from two
to nineteen years old.! (Bryn Mawr College Archives, 1917).
Those early farm experiences were to serve Brown well.
As a member of various social service organizations years later, and particularly at the Family Welfare Association (now
Family Service Association of America, FSAA), she was
often to call upon her experiences on the farm and with
country families. Her expertise transcended the theoretical.
She had, in fact, tried for quite a few years to make a living
on the farm and knew first hand the demands and problems
of the rural environment.
The onset of 1917 found Brown and her homesteading
companion looking "for a farm near St. Paul" where they intended to make their "chicken business pay" (Bryn Mawr
College Archives, 1917). Finally, they settled on a dairy farm
in Marine, Minnesota, where they farmed until the year
1920. Years later, Brown would rely on her farming experiences in Marine to lend credence to her testimony when, as
a social worker, she was asked to talk about rural needs. In
1930, for example, while staffing a project on rural social
work research for the Social Science Research Council,
Brown was invited to attend a meeting of the National Social
Work Council where the "Social Needs of Village and Farm
People" were being discussed. At that meeting, Brown said:

My only claim to being heard at this time in talking about
rural social needs is the fact that I feel I come before this
group not as a social worker but as an ex-farmer. For several
years . . . I was a hard working partner on a very small dairy
farm in Minnesota, and having gone from that dairy farm to
do case work in a very rural county, I learned to appreciate
fully the value of my experience on that farm in learning what
it meant, or some of the things it meant, to live in the country
and do work in the country.
For four years I milked cows twice a day, dug out straw stacks
and carted hay and cleaned out barns, ran a separator and did
house work, took care of chickens and pigs and ran a garden.
There were just two of us working on this place and we did all
the work inside and out of the house ... I think of social
workers, people who go to talk to rural people as to what they
might to do improve the conditions under which they live,
talk to them about their children who have perhaps gotten
into difficulties or who aren't doing well in school, and I think
the social workers who have only knowledge of city life who
go to these people and talk to them in such terms, go to farmers wives who are working as we did from early morning
until late at night, exhausting physical labor, I just wonder if
their reaction isn't more than ours was one of aggravation that
somebody who knows so little of what you are really up
against when you live on a farm in the country should come
in and try to talk how you can remedy some of your social
needs (National Social Work Council, 1930:33-34).
Brown, the countrywoman, had little patience with social workers who spoke only theoretically about rural needs
and issues.

Life as a Local Rural Worker
Whether the chicken business paid or didn't could not
be clearly ascertained. In 1920, Brown took a position with
the United Charities of St. Paul (now Family Service of St.
Paul) as Visitor and District Secretary for South St. Paul. The
United Charities was at that time engaged in providing relief to the poor, a function it continued until 1933. Whether
Brown's responsibilities were solely urban or whether she

did rural visits could not be ascertained. Her district, however, must have been close to the farm where she had lived,
an area of Washington County on the St. Croix River 2 between Minnesota and Wisconsin, for while working for the
United Charities, she speaks of going back to the tiny little
village of Marine, near her former farm, to experience the
neighborliness of the folk.
Between 1921 and 1923, Brown served as Executive Secretary of the Dakota County Welfare Association still in
Minnesota. At that time, the total population of Dakota
County, located directly south of St. Paul was 29,000 people,
with only two cities "so small that they would have been
considered villages in the East" (Brown, 1922b:667). It was
during those years in Dakota County that Brown began to
forge her own thoughts about rural service delivery. Brown
was convinced that rural helping was based on personal
knowledge and understanding of the people involved; she
always stressed that she had validated her rural theories by
assessing them in light of the comments of her former
neighbors and the recipients of her services.
During the 1920's and 1930's, when the enforcement of
child labor laws for farm children was a major task of social
workers, Brown, unlike other social workers, appreciated the
circumstances that made farmers feel that all children should
work and advised her colleagues on how to best approach
the problem. During the same period, when the Country
Life Movement was stressing farmers' participation in community activities as a way of promoting the welfare and improvement of farm people, Brown often advocated for country people, arguing that in spite of "social vision and consciousness", physical exhaustion and not lack of ambition
curtailed the community involvement of the farmer and his
wife (National Social Work Council, 1930:36). Above all,
when city trained caseworkers stressed the merits of professionalized or formalized relationships, Brown provided a
realistic perspective by highlighting the major components
of a rural social worker: the ability to talk to rural folk in
their own terms, to understand their unique conditions, to
share with them their plights as a neighbor would, without

imposing on them external or highly intrusive solutions.
You can't walk into a farmer's barnyard when he is working
hard and just say right out to him, 'Now your children ought
not to work so hard. Let them join this club and get some fun
out of life.' You have got to know that man. He has got to
know you. If you can go in there and get acquainted with
him, if he knows you belong in that community for a long
time, that maybe you have done some of the things he is doing, if you can look over his herd of cows and discuss with
him their merits and demerits, the ones that are good milkers,
if you can talk intelligently about his crops . . . if you can help
him realize that you know the situation he is in . . . you stand

a much better chance of persuading him to listen to you ...
(National Social Work Council, 1930:37-38).
Brown's advice, it should be noted, is still highly valid.
Rural social work experts continue to emphasize the need to
know the rural context, that is the many aspects of the rural
milieu that affect service delivery. While current notions of
rurality include more than agricultural areas and encompass,
in fact, all non-metropolitan environments, it is still important for workers to possess the same general understanding
of the rural environment and of the activities of rural people
that Brown discussed in her days. The key to good rural
practice continues to be the capacity of workers to establish
and maintain open dialogues with rural clients.
If it is a good thing for the City case worker to know her own
community, I find it is essential for the rural workers. It is one
of the steps she must take to become a part of her community.
In a large city, she may go about from office to clients and
back to her office without knowing much about or taking any
particular part in the political, social or religious life of the city
in which she is working; and this inactivity may not materially hinder the effectiveness of the work. In the countryquite the contrary is true. From county officials to clientseveryone I met at the beginning of my work considered me an
outsider, and casework had to wait upon better acquaintance
...(Brown, 1922:187).
During her years in Dakota County, Brown's thinking on
rural practice and education was not only crystalized but

also disseminated, for in 1922, she shared her knowledge in
published articles and presentations. She also attended and
"distinguished herself as a member of Miss Richmond's Institute of Casework" (Survey, 1924:429) the famous summer
gathering of charity organization leaders at the New York
School of Philanthropy. The central theme of Brown's writing was always the adaptation of the principles of casework
to the rural community. Brown emphasized the salience of
environmental factors in the country, the importance of education and prevention as well as remediation, and the central
role of what we now call "natural networks"--then
volunteers-in the provision of services. In the "Use of Volunteers in Rural Social Work" Brown wrote that while in the
city "the volunteer while desirable was optional", in the
country, "the volunteer was a necessity" (Brown, 1922b:268).
Further highlighting the importance of the work of local
residents, Brown stated:
In town the volunteer is on trial. In the country it is the social
worker who is in that equivocal position. The city volunteer
usually works in a district far from her own home and learns
both method and facts regarding her case from the trained
worker ... but in the country the same trained worker may
find that the volunteer has been a neighbor of her client for
thirty years and knows more about his family history, and
present situation than the average social worker ... Often this
information is accompanied by a definite theory of treatment
which the neighborhood may have employed for years ...
(Brown, 1922b:268).
Brown concluded her observations stressing the social worker's need for an open mind, humility and "tact in abundance," advice which is still applicable and sound in rural
areas.
A Decade at the Family Welfare Association and A Year
at the Social Science Research Council
Toward the end of 1923, Brown moved from Minnesota
to take the position of Associate Field Director in charge of
eight Southeastern states at the Family Welfare Association

of America (FWAA). The Survey reported that the American
Association for Organizing Family Social Work had recently
appointed Josephine C. Brown as a field worker to work in
Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida and South Carolina and to
be based in Louisville, Kentucky (Survey, 1924:429). Unfortunately, although Brown worked for over a decade with the
FWAA, no records of her activities there could be located.
According to authoritative sources at FSAA, Brown's field
service position included extensive travel and probably took
her into member agencies providing consultation and support to local staff. Brown was clearly the FWAA's rural
authority, for as we have already discussed, she spoke for
the agency on rural matters at meetings of the Social Work
Council. Furthermore, between 1929 and 1930, Brown was
permitted to take a leave of absence from FWAA to act as
Secretary of the Sub-Committee on Rural Social Work of the
Committee on Social and Economic Research in Agriculture
of the Social Science Research Council, a prestigious research
organization based in New York City.
At the Social Science Research Council, Brown worked
with some of the leading rural sociologists of the period,
such as Benson Landis, Edmund de S. Bruner, Dwight Sanderson and others, and with the prominent figures involved
in rural social work at the time, for example, Joanna Colcord
of the Russell Sage Foundation, Gertrude Vaile of Minnesota
and Emma D. Lundberg, Director of Research of the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration of New York State.
While it can be said that those acquaintances served Brown
well when she had to develop programs for the training of
workers for the Federal Emergency Relief Administration,
her friendship with the rural sociology and agricultural college leadership made her the target of criticism from professionally overzealous social work colleagues who opposed coalitions with sociology and rural sociology as a threat to the
still tenuous social work identity. 3
During her year at the Social Science Research Council,
Brown assisted in the production of a volume entitled Research in Rural Social Work Scope and Method (Black, 1932).

Three of the reports on the "state-of-the-art" were authored
by Brown, who was listed on the volume's title page as the
executive secretary of the Special Advisory Committee on
Rural Social Work. The first report outlined rural social work
as an area for research, listing methods such as case studies,
analysis of case records, reports of social agencies, census
reports and others as alternatives for investigators to consider. The second report evaluated the effectiveness of various county organizations in handling different types of
rural social work. The recommendations of this report have
an extraordinarily contemporary ring. Brown pointed out
that in rural services many problems resulted from (a) organizations modeled in urban settings and superimposed in
rural communities; (b) overzealous outside agencies eager to
impose "mandatory laws"; (c) competition for limited local
resources; (d) overworked rural social workers who then render sketchy services; (e) the stigmatization of social work as
dealing only with "special" populations; and (f) little sharing
of responsibility and poor use of local people. The third research report of the volume dealt with the training of rural
case workers. Brown stressed the importance of utilizing the
network of agricultural colleges to train as many workers as
possible in the basics of social casework applicable to rural
clients, underscoring environmental or community factors in
casework interventions. As has already been noted, these
ideas did not make Brown popular with many social work
leaders of the more exclusive schools who supported specialized, graduate level education. Brown further expanded
on the topics of these brief reports in The Rural Community
and Social Casework (Brown, 1933).
After a year with the Social Science Research Council,
Brown returned to the FWAA but must have spent more
time at the headquarters in New York City, for between 1930
and 1932, she also taught two courses in Rural Social Problems at the New York School of Social Work. It is also
known that Brown was for a while Acting Field Director and
Membership Secretary at the FWAA.
The Rural Community and Social Case Work (Brown, 1933),
a seminal work that was to guide rural social work for many

years appeared at the height of the Depression era. The book
brought forth much controversy among social workers, for
many controversial principles such as rural generalism were
unequivocally stated. In the foreword, Emma 0. Lundberg
of the New York ERA, suggested that the lessons being
learned through "the necessities of economical and humane
relief administration" would make permanent impressions
and that Brown's book would prove essential for a long term
program.
Lundberg's words proved rather prophetic on at least
two accounts. First, the states' temporary Emergency Relief
Administrations (ERAs) provided the framework for the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and for the
establishment of a county-based system of public assistance,
family social work and child welfare. Secondly, it was not
only Brown's book that carried the rural social work message
to remote county offices, but Brown herself, in her role as
Administrative Assistant in the FERA and as the person in
charge of the vast and ambitious training program for rural
relief workers sponsored by this agency.
Other studies have looked in detail at the themes of The
Rural Community and Social Case Work 4fi Here suffice it to
say that the book expounded upon Brown's farm experience
and understanding of rural life, drew heavily from the works
of the rural scholars of the time (N.L. Sims, K. L. Butterfield,
C. J. Galpin and J. M. Williams) many of whom were personally known to Brown, and set forth Brown's proposals for
a county-based, "undifferentiated" (generalist) program of
rural casework that incorporated the worker's basic knowledge and empathy for rural life and his/her understanding of
local rural leaders and resources. Brown foresaw rural needs
as inevitably leading to the establishment of a public
"casework" agency, but was not averse to utilizing a "private society" in the unusual county where one existed and
could better lay the foundations for the public effort.
Much of the success of any social agency's program rested, according to Brown, upon the qualifications and experience of the workers. She advocated training that dealt
specially with rural conditions; she believed that extensive

experience was required for employment in the rural countotal of "three years as a minimum requirement
ties: -a
and five years for the executive secretary" (Brown, 1933:72).
Brown also felt that certain personality characteristics were a
prerequisite for rural work:
Case work in the average rural county must be done without
the help of specialized social agencies and other resources
which are usually available in a city. The rural worker, therefore, should have initiative and ingenuity in developing resources and in recognizing and using whatever facilities may
be at hand.
If she is to work in a satisfactory partnership with the people
in the county, she should be willing to efface herself and let
others take credit for the accomplishments in which she has
had a share (Brown, 1933:70).
Brown's comprehensive and meticulous instructions to
county workers made The Rural Community and Social
Casework the target of both well-meaning and critical professional fun. In 1936, as the book was being widely circulated,
a poem, "why i do not think i would make a good rural case
worker" (Rettig, 1936:15) was published in The Survey. The
social worker poet suggested that, having read Brown's
book, she did not want to be a rural case worker "on account" of not claiming to be "a superwoman or a paragon."
In the Limelight: The FERA and WPA Years
On April 9, 1934, Brown became an Administrative
Assistant at the FERA offices in Washington, D.C. There she
worked with Harry Hopkins, Administrator and Aubrey
Williams, Assistant Administrator. The Civilian Personnel
Records files (National Personnel Records Center) indicate
that she was appointed to that position at a salary of 6,000
per annum. Her status as a federal employee changed at various times as she moved from the FERA to the WPA in 1935,
and later in 1939, when she became a "consultant" at the
same agency.
Although Brown performed various functions at the
FERA, it was the training of FERA workers that brought her

notoriety among her social work colleagues. Through its Division of Training and Research, FERA made available substantial sums of money for the training of relief workers in
various states. Short-term institutes and seminars and intense supervision were used as instructional tools. But the
most important FERA social work training project was probably the sending of selected workers for training courses to
schools of social work across the nation. Brown's plan for the
training of relief workers proposed to distribute available
federal monies on the basis of "the need for training in various states" (Brown, 1934). Brown wanted to insure that the
federal monies allocated for training did not "replace money
from the state budgets which ordinarily would be spent for
institutes and so forth" (Brown, 1934). She intended the
FERA training program to be something additional.
The FERA training plan consisted of two parts: "(1) to
make it possible for the state administrators to send a certain
number of carefully selected people to schools of social work
for a semester or a quarter; (2) to provide, in accordance
with the needs of the state and probably on a regional basis,
for planned institute programs" (Brown, 1934). This second
component of the FERA training plan was, in contemporary
language, a comprehensive in-service training program and
involved, in some places, putting on the payroll of the state
administration a "qualified teacher of case work" who devoted full time to planning and giving institutes, generally
in one or two states. Institutes utilized the facilities of the
state universities or other educational institutions, but were
under the auspices of the various state relief administrations. It was through this second component of the FERA
training program and by using resources within the states to
improve the skills of local workers on the job that Brown
hoped to meet the borad need for better prepared relief
workers.
According to the records, the FERA training plan was
carried out fairly close to Brown's original scheme. Interestingly enough, it was the long-term training component of
the plan that brought forth the most severe criticisms.

Schools of social work that had not been selected to do
long-term FERA training objected to the program and state
politicians responding to their higher education constituencies also joined the critical chorus.
At the inception of the plan in 1934, Brown made it clear
that the only schools that would participate in the FERA
long-term training were those schools recognized by the
American Association of Schools of Social Work (AASSW).
On this matter, Brown wrote:
There are in the country at least 60 educational institutions
which claim to have schools of social work. I have no way myself of evaluating the kind of work being done. I know that
some of the work is very poor. The American Association of
Social Workers have a Committee on Relations with Schools of
Social Work which is in despair over the task of evaluating the
courses given in these institutions.
The only way it seems possible to protect this office from the
barrage of claims to consideration in this program is to limit
the schools to which the students are sent to the members of
the Association of Schools of Social Work. Even within this
group, perhaps, there are schools which are not of very good
quality and I want very much to get those schools to put on
additional faculties and better facilities . . . If we go outside
this membership we have no answer . . . (Brown, 1934).
Schools who were not members of the AASSW were
only permitted to conduct short institutes for personnel
within their states. As Brown had anticipated, the decision
brought on a barrage of complaints, particularly from state
institutions, most of which did not have schools of Social
Work affiliated with the AASSW, but usually had departments of Sociology that offered social work courses (for
example, Oklahoma and Utah). From a biographer's perspective, Brown's decision to include in the FERA long-term
training program only the more established and exclusive
AASW member schools was dissonant with her own ideas
and commitments to the rural field and with her previously
sympathetic stance on the land-grant institutions and the agricultural colleges. The schools approved by the AASSW

tended to be private and located in the large urban centers
of the East Coast and the Mid-West, although as time went
by, other less urban schools were accepted into membership
by the AASSW. In this instance, it would appear that
Brown's decision reflected more a pragmatic administrative
judgement call than her personal commitments. But, in spite
of this, as is the case with important decisions, the matter
was not laid to rest for many years and those who initially
benefitted from Brown's judgement became her bitter critics
later on.
After the emergency period passed, Brown drew severe
criticism from some prominent members of the AASSW
when she apparently suggested that training for public welfare workers could be expanded to include the state universities and agricultural colleges of the nation. At that time,
prominent social work leaders severely criticized Brown's
proposal insinuating that it constituted "normal school training" for social workers and "the starting of state university
schools of social work wholesale" (Wisner, 1937). Elizabeth
Wisner of Tulane wrote to Edith Abbott of Chicago:
As to Miss Brown's plan, I was inadvertently drawn into a
discussion of her statement during a brief conference with
Miss Lenroot. 5 In August, Miss Lenroot wrote me that Miss
Brown was making a special study of education for her and
asked if I could see her in New Orleans. We had a very general discussion and I left the conference feeling very vague as
to the study. ...
During my conference with Miss Lenroot, she asked me to
read Miss Brown's memorandum, a copy of which had been
forwarded to Miss Breckinridge but which I had never seen
and did not have an opportunity to read carefully. One section
caught my eye and it was the one referring to the agricultural
colleges, etc. I pointed out to Miss Lenroot that Miss Brown
had in an earlier study, made in cooperation with Mr.
Carstens and various other people (for the purpose I believe,
of submitting some kind of application to the Social Science
Research Council), emphasized the importance of the agricultural colleges in rural training, home economics, etc., and that

I knew people had been critical of this study and that in my
opinion a repetition of that kind of a recommendation would
be most unfortunate.
The only other point discussed at any length was in a later
conference with Miss Van Driel present. She had, of course,
been furnished with a copy of Miss Brown's memorandum
and had time to thoroughly consider it. She felt very strongly
that Miss Brown was proposing "normal school training," as
she expressed it, and argued most effectively against any such
plan. I thought it was most fortunate that she was there to
discuss the memorandum with Miss Lenroot and I certainly
agreed with what she said. On my return to New Orleans, I
commented . . . on the dangers of having Miss Brown formulate educational memos . .. (Wisner, 1937).

Eidth Abbott, whose school at the University of Chicago
had received many FERA students, joined in the criticism of
Brown's attempts to broaden social work training beyond a
few major universities. In a letter written in 1937, Abbott
commented that she considered "very dangerous and unsound" the plan Brown was working on. She added, "of
course, her only experience is with an emergency program
and both she and Katherine (presumably Lenroot) think you
can start a new school over night in every state university
and turn out social workers wholesale" (Abbott, 1937).
History showed that the controversy over the provision
of training for public welfare workers particularly in rural
states which began circa 19356 culminated with the establishment of a second accrediting body for social work education, the National Association of Schools of Social Administration (NASSA) in 1942, separate from the AASSW
(Martinez-Brawley, 1981; Leighninger, 1984). For a decade,
the NASSA accredited mostly the land-grant universities and
agricultural colleges in their efforts to establish social work
training outside the large metropolitan centers.
Clearly, becoming involved in the controversy over
levels and type of training appropriate for rural and public
welfare workers was one of the most problematic aspects of
Brown's professional career, for she made enemies among
influential social work leaders who apparently ostracized her
professionally after the FERA years. Although the records of

the AASSW do not contain any other substantial references
to Brown's activities beyond 1937, the University of Chicago
files in the CSWE collection at the University of Minnesota
contain further references to Brown's unpopular stance on
the issue of training for public welfare work. As late as 1943,
Edith Abbott was asked by Leona Massoth, then secretary of
the AASSW, to comment on a manuscript by Brown entitled
"The Professional Education and Experience of Federal
Emergency Relief Administration Scholarship Students"
(Massoth, 1943). Abbott refused to even consider the manuscript for publication in the Social Service Review commenting that "her relations with Miss Brown" had "already been
so acrimonious" over disagreements on the FERA training
that she (Abbott) thought it best "not to see the material and
reject it" (Abbott, 1943). In relation to publication of the
manuscript by the AASSW, Abbott further commented to
secretary Massoth: "I should certainly think it would be
wicked to put any money into such a publication. It might
be worth mimeographing, but I would think that would be
the most that should be done" (Abbott, 1943). Whether Abbott was correct or incorrect in her assessment of Brown's
manuscript is irrelevant here. What is important to note is
that Brown paid dearly for her unorthodoxy regarding training issues.
There is no question, however, that Brown's endeavors
helped develop a cadre of social workers for the provision of
relief. In 1935, Brown reported to the National Conference of
Social Work that the FERA's "greatest venture had been its
popularly known training program in which ... through
special grants of money, 39 states secured for a number of
their present and prospective staff members, training opportunities of one-half year each at accredited schools of social
work" (Brown, 1935:236). Brown reported that 912 students
had attended, in one year alone, more than 21 schools and
that over half of them were planning to go back to school to
finish their graduate degrees. While by-and-large the training was rated highly by the students, Brown discovered that
many programs focused entirely on city problems with no
reference to rural problems ever made. Additionally, as a

pragmatist, Brown was concerned with the gaps that existed
between the theory taught in the schools and the realities of
practice.
There is not only a gap between urban teaching and rural experience but between the old social casework and what it has
to give us which can be applied to the administration of unemployment relief. There is also a gap between the entire content of social work training as we have known it and the practical, growing, vital needs of the new public welfare ...
(Brown, 1935:236-37).
It may have been that because of the lack of relevancy
that many training courses had for rural workers, Brown became involved and circulated the "unpopular" training plan
to which Wisner and Abbott referred. Unfortunately, more
details of this plan were not found in any of the records
searched although, as late as 1943, Abbott was still making
reference to her role in putting a stop to "many of the very
foolish things that Harry (presumably Hopkins) and Miss
Brown were planning to do and in fact had already begun to
do in some places" (Abbott, 1943).
In 1936, Brown once again addressed the National Conference of Social Work to provide a synopsis of the relief
situation on the dawn of the passage of the Social Security
Act. Brown suggested that although the major objective of
the FERA had been the provision of unemployment relief,
"at the same time every possible encouragement had been
given to the development of permanent programs of public
welfare and public assistance" (Brown, 1936:428). Under the
FERA, she said, the pendulum had swung far in the direction of federal control" (Brown, 1936:431). She acknowledged
the fact that with the advent of the Social Security Act, many
social workers had seen "with intense regret the responsibility for public welfare and public assistance placed upon the
states and localities" (Brown, 1936:432). But she was hopeful
that the improvements established under the FERA would
continue under local auspices, and asked for social work
cooperation on these efforts:
Permanent public welfare programs must be indigenous. They
must strike deep roots in the understanding and support of

private citizens and public officials. They must be wanted if
they are to endure....
In the states the efforts of social workers are badly needed to
back existing welfare departments as they work for high
standards of personnel and relief; to promote sound public
welfare legislation . . . to secure adequate state appropriations

for the social security categories and for general public assistance (Brown, 1936:432).
Thus, in spite of her experience as a federal administrator and her doubts about the resources of many local
communities, Brown continued to believe in rural social
work practice that capitalized upon local resources and had
the potential for being responsive to the unique conditions
of the various states. Her beliefs, however, never obscured
her perceptions of reality, for in 1939, she wrote that in spite
of the FERA structure, and probably because "local boards
and committees and other devices for the encouragement of
local participation and understanding" had not been used
intensively enough under FERA" (Brown, 1940:325) a public
welfare program had not taken root in local communities.
She further observed:
The period of transition, after the liquidation of the FERA at
the end of 1935, stands out as a time of confusion and near
chaos in public relief. It was a time of uncertainty, insecurity
and even terror for the relief client who could not get a work
relief job and who had no sure niche in the developing
categorical programs. Suffering was acute in too many sections
of the country. Funds for general relief were inadequate or
entirely lacking in state after state (Brown, 1940:325).
By the end of 1937, Josephine C. Brown's activities
within the WPA changed in nature. A humorous note appearing in The Survey (Survey, 1937) remarked that everyone
had thought she had resigned from the WPA in favor of a
long vacation, but that in fact she had only gone to Europe
briefly and had returned to her WPA desk to do a special job
of research and writing. Her Civilian Personnel Records
indicate a code change in 1937 and a void furlough in 1939.

She retained the status of "consultant" until her terminatior
in 1943.
In a vita Brown prepared for Catholic University (National Catholic School of Social Service Archives) Brown
states that between 1937 and 1939, she carried out a study ol
public relief for the publication of a book. Her second book,
Public Relief 1929-1939 which appeared in 1940 was dedicated to the "regional social workers of the FERA and WPA,
in recognition of their distinguished contribution to public
welfare in the United States." In this volume, Brown undertook the monumental task of explaining and documenting
the states' relief situation prior to the establishment of the
FERA in 1933, the purposes and workings of the FERA, the
transition to state-relief systems, (with the WPA taking responsibility for the able-bodied unemployed) and the establishment of state systems under the Social Security Act.
Throughout the volume she reveals and documents
Harry Hopkins' commitment to retain the best staff of the
FERA and to insure that the state administrations and the
WPA availed themselves of the best trained personnel. This
however, did not always happen in spite of Washington's
memoranda, for, "as a matter of fact, several states promptly
effected a complete liquidation of their Emergency Relief
Administrations with no immediate provision for another
agency to administer relief. The social work staffs were
allowed to scatter and the public welfare departments which
were set up later found it necessary to start all over again
with new personnel (Brown, 1940:318).
Brown's public relief volume was a major contribution to
the public welfare literature. In her ending paragraphs,
Brown best summarizes the accomplishments of an era:
Government relief rather than private relief has become a matter of course. In 1929, private relief loomed large in the consciousness of the socially-minded citizen ... At present all
but one percent of the huge total comes from public treasuries.
Equally axiomatic is the practice of making public agencies responsible for the administration of public funds (Brown,
1940:424).

Brown also dealt with what a decade of efforts in the public
relief field failed to accomplish:
Outside the inadequacies and inequalities of relief benefits,
the most serious problem in public welfare today is found in
the multiplicity of agencies, of categories, of standards, of
methods of intake and of definitions of eligibility. The local
confusion resulting from this complexity has serious implications for agency staffs and for the recipients . . . Next in importance to supplying Federal grants for general relief, and an
equalization system for all of the Federal grants to the states,
is the provision of a planned coordinated and integrated program, Federal, state, and some approach to equality of treatment of all persons in need who apply for public aid (Brown,
1940:424).
These statements were written by Brown in 1940 but retain a contemporary ring nearly five decades later.
The War Years: Life as an Educator
Although Brown had always been concerned about the
training of social workers, concentrating first on the needs of
rural areas and later on the needs of the public welfare field,
she never held a permanent academic position until 1939,
when she was appointed at the rank of Instructor at the
Catholic University School of Social Work in Washington,
D.C. According to her vita, Brown had taught courses in
rural social work at the New York School of Social Work during the years at the FWAA, but they must have been of
short duration for no records on Brown's tenure there could
be secured.
Brown's connection with Catholic education pre-dated
her appointment at Catholic University. At some point during the thirties, she had converted to Catholicism. The details of her conversion could not be reconstructed, but according to one of her colleagues at Catholic University, she
devoted much time to religiously sponsored helping activities, having at some point become a Benedictine oblate, that
is, a member of a lay organizations which followed the
teachings of St. Benedict and met regularly at St. Anselm
Abbey in Washington, D.C. (Mohler, 1938). Her conversion

to Catholicism was also corroborated in a memorial address
given by a friend after Brown's death in Princeton, New Jersey (Cuyler, 1977).
As early as 1936, Brown had addressed a forum at the
School of Social Work at Catholic University speaking on the
relationship of government and social work and carefully explaining the role of both the voluntary and the public sectors
in the provision of services (Brown, 1936b). Brown believed
that social work had made an indelible mark in the provision of emergency relief. Brown was cognizant of the fact
that most social workers employed by the FERA had come
from the private sector but was emphatic in stating the need
for those social workers to understand that the conception of
social work in a private agency was not always applicable to
the large public agency. Brown acknowledged the importance of politics in both the private and the public fields, although she humorously conveyed her awareness that at least
at the time, it was only in the public sector that social workers dared acknowledge the effects of political activity. As it
can easily be seen, much of Brown's thinking was ahead of
her time.
Brown's connections with the Catholic University School
of Social Service were formalized in 1939. Brown's expertise
were the areas of rural relief and public welfare, and she
stated that in her letter of application to the school. It is reported that she taught courses at the two Catholic social
work institutions which existed in Washington, D.C., at the
time, the Catholic University School of Social Work and the
National Catholic School of Social Service (Mohler, 1983).
Eventually in 1947, before Brown's retirement, the two institutions would merge into today's National Catholic School
of Social Service, The Catholic University of America. During her tenure at The National Catholic School of Social
Service, Brown was in charge of the Public Welfare Sequence, served as Secretary of the faculty, and as Director of
Admissions.
Records at the National Catholic School of Social Service
do not indicate that any special consideration had been

given in terms of academic rank or teaching load to the
broad spectrum of expertise Brown had brought to the faculty. One of Brown's colleagues recalls that Brown carried
quite a heavy teaching load and that few if any of her contemporaries were aware of the stature Brown had enjoyed in
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. Brown's humble and unpretentious ways would have underplayed her
former accomplishments and stressed comraderie as a
member of the faculty. She was seen as a rather quiet and
reserved person.
During the War years, Brown became very active in a
variety of war related efforts. On September 1, 1943, she was
appointed by the Board of Commissioners of the District of
Columbia to the Civilian War Services Board of the Civilian
War Services Division. Apparently, the Dean of the School
of Social Work considered Brown's participation in this
time-consuming endeavor one of the contributions the
School could make to the war effort (Brown, undated). One
of her main assignments as a member of the Board was to
serve on the Child Care and Protection Committee and on
the Family Security Committee. The first was responsible for
functioning on an advisory capacity to directors of nursery
services and the second provided a unique service to draftees and their families known as the Draft Aid Center.
During the War, Brown also served on the Citizen's
Committee on Day Care Services which tried to secure public funds in the District of Columbia to provide day care
programs for children of working mothers. This committee
was unsuccessful in those efforts and eventually established
the Foster Day Care and Counselling Association, a private
agency funded by the Washington Community Chest to
carry out those duties. The Foster Day Care and Counselling
Association was continued beyond the war years.
Because of these activities, Brown became very involved
in day care issues and made frequent public appearances representing the School of Social Service. She spoke
authoritatively of her concern for the children of working
mothers: "Women in war industries," she stated, "should be

recruited from those with no children or those with children
above school age" (Richmond News Leader, 1942). "WarWorking Mothers Asked to Stay Home With Children," a
headline in The Richmond News Leader read after one of
Brown's talks. Brown declared her beliefs to be consistent
with the policies of the War Manpower Commission and the
Children's Bureau.
We have come to recognize that as members of the labor
force women of present generations owe many of their gains
to those who answered the call of employers during the war.
Given Brown's progressive ideas in most areas, her opposition to working mothers during the war appears incongruous. It must be realized, however, that Brown always
weighed her decisions carefully and acted not so much on
ideological grounds as on pragmatic but careful assessments
of specific situations. For whatever reasons, Brown believed
that social workers should counsel mothers of young children against war-related employment. Yet, she also advocated that good day care provisions had to be made for the
care of the children of those mothers who decided to work
in spite of contrary advice. As a social worker, Brown was
very involved in the making of those provisions.
During the War years, Brown also became concerned
about the issue of mass economic insecurity of all workers.
She did considerable public speaking and writing, 7 primarily to Catholic audiences, criticizing the way in which the
United States economy fostered insecurity among working
people.
Throughout the past century periodic industrial depressions
were taken for granted-as well as the existence of a state of
economic insecurity in the lives of most, if not all, working
people.
The framework within which all these problems have developed is an economic system which operates on the theory
that any individual has unlimited freedom and absolute right
to use capital for profit regardless of the welfare of others. In
this system, human rights and welfare are made subservient
to the interest of trade. The successful man has a right to all

his profits, however large they may be, regardless of the needs
or interest of others.
As a result of this system our economic machinery has become
man's master instead of his servant. The worker's employment
and economic advancement are not relative to the real value of
his services but to the extent to which his employer can profit
by his enterprise (Brown, 1942:10).
Finally, a third theme that preoccupied Brown during
the years of the war was the relationship between private
charity and governmental relief activity. She had clearly expressed her commitment to the role of government in relief
during the depression years and had repeatedly stated the
role of organized charities and private citizens in welfare
work. As her thinking matured, and as she distanced herself
from public life, she continued to examine the relationship
between the voluntary and public sectors and to interpret
the need for cooperation and discernment on their respective
responsibilities. It must be remembered that this was a controversial issue for social workers even after the passage of
the Social Security Act. "Because the needs of millions of
people is too great to be met by the resources of private citizens and charitable organizations," Brown wrote in 1942, "it
is the duty of the state to make provisions for them, in addition to instituting regulatory measures looking to the securing of the rights of the workers and the reform of the system
itself" (Brown, 1942:10). The cooperation between citizens,
private agencies and government was essential, Brown
thought, although it had often been endangered by the attitude of the first two, failing to realize their close and inevitable alliance with public interests.
In the midst of all this activity, Brown earned a Master
of Arts in Sociology from the Catholic University in 1945 and
was promoted to the rank of Assistant Professor at the
School of Social Service. Finally, in 1951, shortly before her
retirement, she was promoted to the rank of Associate Professor.
During her years at the Catholic University of America,

Brown discovered that her eyesight was failing due to
cataracts and glaucoma. In July 1952, she tendered her resignation from the faculty, announcing her retirement to the
city of Princeton.
Her Retirement and Death
Little could be ascertained about the final years of
Brown's life in Princeton. For the most part, she lived a
quiet existence, centered around religious activities. Probably due to her severely failing eyesight, she did not participate actively in professional organizations any more, although the membership register of NASW continued to list
her until 1977. She apparently maintained her long-time professional association and friendship with Katherine Lenroot,
former chief of the Children's Bureau, who had also retired
8
to Princeton.
According to a friend sho knew and read to Brown as
her eyesight progressively worsened, Brown remained a
quiet and contented person until the time of her death. She
seldom spoke of her past professional life and her requests
were simple and brief. She enjoyed being read to, and her
favorite books and "those about the St. Lawrence River
which flowed by her native town of Ogdensburg, or else
books about Eleanor Roosevelt with whom she had done social service work in Washington" (Cuyler, 1977). Brown's
fervent Catholicism remained strong until her death; yet, her
religious practices were very ecumenical in nature, before
ecumenism was popular. She walked to mass at the Aquinas
Chapel in Princeton for as long as she could, although she
had to cross a busy intersection. She was also a member of
Trinity Church Episcopalian Intercessor's Group, through
which prayer were said at home for the needy all over the
world.
Josephine Brown died in Princeton, New Jersey on October 25, 1976, four days after her 90th birthday.
Summary and Conclusions
Biography serves not only to reconstruct the lives of the
prominent but also to help us interpret our own actions and

make us cognizant that the vested interests of today can and
do, indeed, shape the future. Josephine Chapin Brown was
one of many women pioneers who embraced causes ahead
of her times and was sometimes subtly and sometimes overtly chastized by her peers. Interestingly enough, Brown
would have probably not seen herself as a champion of
causes but rather as a pragmatist doing what needed to be
done with as much common sense as could be mustered.
Brown's offending key figures in social work was probably
unintentional; her embracing ways of thinking that turned
out to be more democratic than those espoused by her social
work contemporaries was probably also coincidental.
Brown's experiences were quite different from those of her
contemporary colleagues and her actions were shaped by
those experiences. Brown's sense of professionalism was
more open, more interdisciplinary, more secure in many
ways than that of her colleagues. At a time when social work
rigidly insisted on graduate training, Brown saw that jobs in
the country (and even in the cities) were opening up for
those without any training at all. She tried to impose a
measure of realism onto the professional paradigm but became unpopular for daring to do so. For those committed to
innovation in the professions, the price Brown paid for her
unconventional thinking well illustrates that threats to the
paradigm in academic disciplines or professions are not
viewed benenvolently, and even if eventually the new challenges are accepted, their initiators often fall into obscurity.
It has taken many decades for the profession to hear about,
if not recognize, the merits of Brown's challenges and contributions.
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information. The memories of a former secretary of Brown at Catholic
University provided clues as to the place of her retirement and death,
and finally, correspondence with Marjorie Cuyler of Princeton, a friend
of Brown during the final years of her life, helped supplement the written record and corroborate this researcher's inferences about Brown's
personal style and attributes.
The Minutes of the National Social Work Council meeting of March 7,
1930, list the river as St. Cloud. This might be a typographical error
since the village of Marine is on the St. Croix River.
Enlightening in this regard, is for example, a letter written by
Elizabeth Wisner of Tulane to Edith Abbott of the University of
Chicago, November 3, 1937. Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota Libraries, CSWE Collection, AASSW Series.
See for example, Martinez-Brawley, Emilia E. Pioneer Efforts in Rural
Social Welfare, (Penn State Press, 1980) and Seven Decades of Rural Social
Work, (Praeger, 1981); see also Davenport, Joseph and Judith,
"Josephine Brown's The Rural Community and Social Case Work: A Golden Anniversary Perspective" (paper presented at the 8th National Institute of Social Work in Rural Areas, Cheney, WA., 1983).
Katherine Lenroot was Chief of the Children's Bureau between 1934
and 1951.
Correspondence in the FERA/WPA files in the National Archives
showed that as early as 1935 Brown had been involved in discussing
social work training for the rural field vs. training in home economics
with the staff ot eh Georgia Relief Administration (Wilma Van Dusseldorp and Alan Johnstone). Brown had remained strong in emphasizing
the importance of social work training for rural services. Yet it was
clear that politically, from where she sat, she could not disregard the
contributions of other helping disciplines which like home-economics
had a long-standing association with agriculture.
See, for example, "Social Duties Rest on All," The Richmond News
Leader, Tuesday, November 10, 1942.
In 1968, on the occasion of an anniversary celebration at the National
Catholic School of Social Service, Brown declined an invitation to the
celebration on her behalf and that of Katherine Lenroot. Letter from
Josephine Brown to Dean Ferris, March 31, 1968, National Catholic
School of Social Service Archives, The Catholic University of America.
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SOCIAL WORK'S PROFESSIONAL MISTAKE:
CONFUSING STATUS FOR CONTROL
AND LOSING BOTH
GARY R. LOWE,
LECTURER IN SOCIAL WORK

Department of Sociology/Anthropology
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
The dimensions of control and power supporting monopoly are
central to the professional notion. These factors are implicit in the
attribute professional formulation traditionally put forth and
adopted by Social Work. This paper asserts that social work leadership between 1915 and 1952 misunderstood or ignored these crucial dynamics. This "mistake" led to practice methodology
(casework) and educational policies (graduate-only) that sought
status rather than occupational control. This flawed analysis split
the occupation in its formative years. The article concludes that
the result has been social work's inability to gain professional
standing.
The notion of a profession contains a fundamental assumption: any occupational group wishing to be recognized
as professional must first define and exercise control over
the boundaries of its realm of activity. Fundamentally, this
boundary establishes control over members in the profession
*
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by identifying who is "inside" and who is "outside." This
factor creates the foundation of authority thereby forming a
basis for the claims of "expertise" embedded in the professional ideal (Gerst and Jacobs, 1976; Johnson, 1981; Starr,
1982: 3-29). This paper discusses social work's lack of understanding of this assumption, and the results of this mistaken
analysis.
The issues identified in this discussion as central to social work's historical professionalization process are: 1) development of a scientific base coupled with a communicable
technique; and 2) the subsequent, and related, educational
policies that initially spelled out the roles of "professional"
and "non-professional."
The resolution of the first issue was CASEWORK, and
the second was the GRADUATE ONLY model for professional education. The period under review begins in 1915
with Flexner's speech to the Conference of Charities and
Corrections (Flexner, 1915:576-90), and ends with the formation in 1953 of the Council on Social Work Education
(CSWE). 1 Recent comment and discussion from within social
work (Specht et.al., 1984; Howe, 1980; Austin, 1983;
Leighninger, 1980 and 1984)2 indicate that we still struggle
with the issue of professionalization and the education/
training dimension continues to be a focus for active, even
heated debate. In an effort to contribute to this timely concern, this paper highlights what are believed to be historical
reasons contributing to social work's "mistaken analysis"
and offers thoughts on the consequences both past and present.
This paper first identifies the dimensions of CONTROL
and MONOPOLY as central to the notion of a profession
and the professionalization process. Applying these two dimensions and the power perspective they represent to social
work's professional development, I assert that leadership
during the period under review either misunderstood or ignored their importance. The mistaken analysis supported
practice and educational philosophies and policies that failed

to implement the requisite control and monopoly over the
logical realm of social work's early occupational activity-the
public welfare sector. Instead, the foundation that was laid
split social work and actually undermined its efforts toward
achieving professional standing. Specifically, the conclusion
is drawn that active, and successful, resistance to undergraduate training/education as entry-level professional preparation was a key factor that hampered social work's quest
for full professional development.
Before turning to the discussion, I want to emphasize
that the following review does not argue that professions
and professionalization are good or bad. I have taken the
historical record of social work at its word; that is, it wanted
to be a profession. I think the goal has not been achieved,
and I believe much energy has been dissipated by social
work as a result of our flawed pursuit. Ivor Kraft has pointedly observed:
Despite deliberate efforts ... to promote social work to the
status of a dominant and learned profession . . . these efforts
did not take, and it is now clear that social work is destined to
remain among the "heteronomous" or subfusc professions in
our culture (Kraft, 1980:2).
Taking Kraft's point, this paper clarifies and suggests
possible historical reasons, emanating from within the field,
that have contributed to social work's difficulty and failure
to realize its professional goal.
Professions and Prof essionalization
In the early Twentieth Century, a resurgence of professions occurred in the United States (Starr, 1982:3-144).
Medicine was the dominant example of this resurgence, and
provided the paradigm for other occupational groups, like
social work, who were seeking recognition as professions.
Medicine's success was idealized and incorporated into what
became known as the Attribute Model of Professions (Thoren, 1972; Stein, 1968; Kraft, 1969; Feldstein, 1971;

Leighninger, 1980, 1984). In this model, desirable characteristics, or traits, are identified and an occupation
presumably reaches professional standing by developing the
noted characteristics.
The Attribute Model is flawed, and one succinct statement of its primary flaw in regard to social work is provided
by Simpkins:
The attempted identification of social work as a profession
proceeds by comparing attributes and by emphasizing workers' unique knowledge and skill. The argument is of a syllogistic form: professions are activities identifiable by particular
traits, therefore social work is a profession . . . Whatever may
be thought of the logic of this argument, the principal flaw
lies in the major premise which is based on a naive acceptance
of 'trait' theory. In fact, no agreed list of professional attributes exists, most are just ragbags tailored to suit the needs of
whatever group is using them to aspire to professional status
(Simpkin, 1983:119-120).
The enshrining of the syllogistic nature of the attribute
model had occurred in social work by 1920, and the ends
(traits) of the process became viewed and confused as the
Means.
Feldstein (1971; also Goode, 1969) clearly states the essential nature of the occupational professional boundary: "If
a profession is to function with any kind of power it must
control not only the activity ot its members, but the activity
of the other workers in the territory or industry over which
it claims expertise." The power and control perspective does
not refute the usefulness of attributes, but places them in an
appropriately dependent, secondary position. The attributes
represent desirable characteristics that come after the
would-be profession has mapped out its basic boundaries.
The programmatic expression of these boundaries has customarily been the process of training and education, leading
to acceptance into the professional circle. This view of professions acknowledges the necessity of control and the resulting monopoly as prerequisites for gaining power, recognition, and/or the status exemplified by the attributes. By

applying the power and control perspectives, rather than
status, to a historical review of social work's occupational
development the nature of social work's mistaken professional development gains clarity and provides insights into
current difficult and contentious professional issues.
The Search for a Scientific Base, a Communicable
Technique, and Practice Unity:
In 1915, social work confronted the question of professionalization by inviting Abraham Flexner to address the
Conference of Charities and Corrections. Flexner concluded
that social work was not a profession. 3 Two years later in an
apparent response to Flexner, the first delineation of an individual practice emphasis, the casework method, appeared
in Mary Richmond's (1917) book Social Diagnosis. As Leiby
(1978:122) notes, Social Diagnosis was an organized statement
that served "to transform (friendly visiting) into the notion
of deliberate and constructive case-work."
A few months after the publication of Social Diagnosis, at
the annual meeting of the National Conference of Social
Work (NCSW), in a paper titled "The Social Caseworker's
Tasks," Richmond addressed Flexner's 1915 verdict that social work was not a profession by asserting that social work
now had a scientific method called "casework" (Drew, 1983).
This method contained the distinguishing characteristics of
"skill in discovering the social relationships by which a
given personality had been shaped; second, ability to get at
the central core of difficulty in these relationships; and third,
power to utilize the direct action of mind upon mind in their
adjustment (Drew, 1983: 39). As Lubove (1965) has pointed
out, casework evolved into social work's primary technology
exerting significant influence on the field's subsequent development.
During the Twenties, following the emergence of
Richmond's casework formulation, social work experienced a
period of great expansion. A national organization, the
American Association of Social Workers (AASW) was

founded in 1921. The AASW's stated purpose was that: "acting together, (members) shall endeavor through investigation and conference to develop professional standards in social work" (Pumphrey and Pumphrey, ed., 1961:307). The
AASW developed as a companion organization to the NCSW
which had existed since 1873. Both NCSW and AASW provided impetus during the '20s for social work to develop
standrads of education and practice that would have a broad
national focus, as well as the already noted professional
stand.
During this period, a struggle between generic and
specific casework developed that was not mere intellectual
play. 4 If Flexner's challenge to social work was to be met,
this potential splintering had direct bearing on the task: in
order to be professional by the Flexnerian attribute model,
commonality of function was essential and this diversity had
to be bound together into a unified whole.
A special committee was appointed by NCSW in 1925 to
study the issue of generic practice with the goal of bringing
clarification and unification to the increasing diversity in social work. The committee, known as the Milford Conference,
met for three years and approved a final report in November
1928 and published it in 1929.
The Milford Conference report emphasized that
casework was at the core of the developing social work occupation. The Milford Conference position did not stem the
tide of specialist association formation but it represented a
symbolic statement asserting that casework was the base for
future professional development regardless of the particular
or specialized practice setting.
Where Richmond's book had been a ground-breaking
definition and explication of a new activity, the Milford
Conference report reflected a developmental statement building on the established past and striving to point a future direction. With these and other events, by 1929 social work
had acquired many of the basic ingredients for professional

legitimacy called for in the Flexner attribute perspective. 5
Paralleling these practice developments was the debate over
how best to educate, train, and socialize the new professional worker. The opposing sides of the debate fell into two
broad categories: Agency-based versus University-based
preparation. The means of education/training and therefore
incorporation into the professional "select" was the pivotal
area by which social work established its understanding of
professional. The emergence of casework and the emphasis
on its scientific/academic enhancement shaped the ultimate
graduate-only professional education policy adopted by social work.
The Institutionalization of the Scientific Base and
Technique: The Graduate-Only Ethos Develops
In 1919 the Association of Training Schools for Professional Social Work (ATSPSW) was established to address
professional training/education issues. ATSPSW was the
forerunner of the American Association of Schools of Social
Work (AASSW). Between 1920 to 1923, James H. Tufts, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago completed
the first study of social work education and training with
support from the Russell Sage Foundation. Tuft's study
(1923) first analyzed existing social work practice and inferred from this the characteristics of social work in general.
Based on these characteristics, Tufts examined social work
education and training as it existed and offered recommendations for future developments. A contemporaneous
questionnaire study was conducted by Paul Beisser (1923).
The results were published under the title "A Measurement
of Professional Training: Deductions from a Questionnaire
Study of Social Work Positions." ' 6 The Beisser results were
presented in December 1922 to a joint meeting of the American Sociological Society and the ATSPSW. Beisser's study according to the Encyclopedia of Social Work (Boehm, 1977)
influenced social work educational thinking while Tuft's was

seemingly ignored. Beisser's study recommended "that social work (education) be considered a professional school,
provided it met certain requirements of autonomy within
the university" (Boehm, 1977:301).
Throughout the 1920s support grew for the establishment of educational standards and practices that would
maintain the perceived momentum toward professional
maturity. Consistent with Biesser, the principle of university
affiliation was firmly in place by the end of the decade. Advocates for agency-based training were unsuccessful in asserting their views. The professional ideal sought by social
work leadership of the time characterized agency-based
preparation as apprenticeship/vocational and therefore antithetical to the notion of professionalization (Blostein, 1977).
This same view would reappear later as an objection to efforts promoting undergraduate social work education.
In May of 1927, Edith Abbott of the University of
Chicago delivered an address to the annual meeting of the
AASSW titled "Backgrounds and Foregrounds in Education
for Social Work." Abbott's comments implied a maximum
definition for professional education:
Is it true that we have or should have any such thing as a
group of "routine caseworkers," and second, is it desirable
that two grades of social workers should be trained-those
who are to be constructive leaders in the field and those who
are to be merely routine technicians of some sort? (Abbott,
1942:36).
In the same speech, Abbott correctly asserted the fundamental role of training/education in the formation of a social work profession and its boundary function:
...in the final analysis it is clear that social work will never
be a profession and that social agencies can never be
standardized except through professional schools. Not until
some course of professional study is required as a prerequisite
for entrance (sic) can it be said that social work is really a profession (Abbott, 1942:40).

One year later Abbott's definition, supporting a singular
graduate-only definition, was explicitly stated in a paper
entitled, "Some Basic Principles in Professional Education
for Social Work";
. . our profession calls for character as well as education ...
character is frequently, if not usually, a plant of slow growth
and can be developed in a proper educational atmosphere better than anywhere else. That is one reason for our stress on
the development of graduate rather than undergraduate
schools; the undergraduates are not yet prepared, even with
careful supervision, to understand and carry the heavy responsibilities which our profession lays on its members (Abbott, 1942:47).
*

Abbott spoke for a dominant sentiment held by social
work education leaders of the time, that is, asserting a developmental argument that combined with the view that any
preparation other than university and post-graduate was
viewed as occupational, technical and thus non-professional.
Even with the growing graduate-only ethos, undergraduate
advocates were many and vocal during the 1920s (Hagerty,
1942). The baccalaureate advocates were not anti-graduate,
but viewed undergraduate preparation as appropriate for
professional entry-level, and a relevant foundation for
further graduate and specialized education/training.
Numerous dynamics during the 1920s supported the
momentum for the graduate-only definition articulated by
someone like Abbott. In addition to the "developmental"
argument, there was the apparent presumption, with
medicine as the model, that the advanced nature of graduate
study (with a liberal arts base) was, a priori more professional. A third issue promoting the post-baccalaureate model
was the genuine educational dilemma of incorporating the
practical field-work component into the traditional academic
liberal arts undergraduate model. By defining social work
education as post-baccalaureate, this fundamental educa8
tional problem was avoided.

In the same year as Abbott's speech, a book by Sydnor
Walker, Social Work and the Training of Social Workers (1928)
was published. Originally written as a Columbia University
Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, this "outsider's"
analysis of the social work field provided comparative
thoughts to those asserted by leaders such as Abbott:
Underlying most of the discussion which takes place as to
what educational preparation is desirable ...

is the assump-

tion that all persons entering (social work) need the same general type of training. The schools of social work often state
explicitly that they seek to prepare students of firstrate calibre
for positions of leadership. But if preparation of social work is
eventually to be a necessity for all entering the field, it may be
well to raise the question whether preparation is to be the
same for everyone (Walker, 1928:158).
Walker followed her hypothesis with an analysis of the
occupation and the implications for education and training:
In reading
cupational
horizontal.
comprised

much that is written one might suppose that all ocdivisions in this field were vertical rather than
The suggestion is offered that social work may be
of many "planes," calling for ... varied and defi-

nite grades of preparation .

.

. for the preliminary interviewer

in a welfare agency requires some background, but not that of
the man who runs a community chest . . . in view of the practical demands of the field, preparation ... will range from

specialization in vocational courses given in the undergraduate liberal arts college to a graduate course of several
years in a professional school (Walker, 1928:159).
Walker's discussion and analysis was relevant and accurate. Her conclusions rested upon extensive data collected
from the 35 schools of social work that existed in 1927-28.
While Abbott can be appreciated for high standards, there
was nothing asserted by Walker and others to challenge the
establishment and maintenance of high standards, nor the
diminution of effort toward professionalization.
Against this backdrop of debate, concrete developments

in social work education moved rapidly after 1930. By 1932 a
minimum curriculum had been articulated. In 1935, AASSW
ruled that only schools of social work affiliated with Association of American Universities (AAU) membership colleges
and universities would receive formal accreditation. By the
end of the decade, the two year post-baccalaureate Masters
degree was adopted as the only recognized professional credential. 9 Thus, when social work initially institutionalized
control and monopoly, exemplified by the 1937 graduateonly action, it adopted a single advanced degree as both
entry-level as well as the terminal professional practice degree. This action was the culmination of the attribute approach.
The graduate-only policy was taken in spite of evidence,
like Walker's, that social work had numerous levels of operation ranging from minimum entry to more advanced specialized practice. But, throughout the 1930s in the context of
the Depression and the growing public welfare sector, leadership moved social work toward the incorporation of a professional model that, in effect, defined as non-professional
the fastest growing number of occupational roles available to
it as an existing occupation and an aspiring profession. The
1937 action incorporated an emerging and significant contradiction: the majority-to-be of functioning social workers,
in public welfare, were non-professional by the "profession's" own official definition (Hollis and Taylor, 1951:8997). In effect, what social work accomplished with the 1937
graduate-only decision was a severing of its head from its
supporting and still developing body. The status of graduate
education had been asserted by the graduate-only policy,
but the status was attached to the education level only and
not to the content of social work activity, nor to a realistic
assessment of the public welfare occupation/job market.
Additionally, the presumed status accrued to an increasing
minority of those who were, in fact, involved in social work.
Reviewing the burgeoning social work personnel needs
beginning with the Federal Emergency Relief Administration

(FERA), Josephine C. Brown (1940) characterized the situation thusly,
...as a rule the local staffs in the smaller places, especially in
the rural counties, were necessarily made up of people who
were not social workers at all ... Many of these people who
were employed by local agencies as investigators, and often as
supervisors, had had their training and experience in other
professions and allied fields ... the social service staffs, then,
especially in the smaller places, came to be made up largely of
local people who were not social workers by virtue of any
previous training or experience and were called social workers
or case workers merely because they had been employed to
discharge a social work function in the Emergency Relief Administration (1940:277-279).
The Undergraduate Advocates
During the 1940s the National Association of Schools of
Social Administration (NASSA) was organized to promote
and support undergraduate social work education. NASSA,
formed in 1942, was an organization that ". . . identified
with the tradition that tax-supported institutions have a responsibility for professional and quasi-professional personnel" (Hollis/Taylor, 1951:37).
An articulate and forceful spokesman from the NASSA
ranks was Professor Mattie Cal Maxted of the University of
Arkansas. Maxted, echoing Walker, strongly asserted a role
for various levels of social work professional training and
education. She spoke to the AASSW in January of 1945 on
the topic of "The Need for Undergraduate Trained Social
Workers in Arkansas" and her theme was that by embracing
undergraduate social work preparation as an integral part of
professional preparation then social work in the broadest
sense would benefit:
The facts are that we may have thought of training for social
workers as graduate training, but the greatest percentage of
our social workers have had little or no training and for them
any training even though undergraduate is an advance
(Maxted, 1945:1).

NASSA's theme was consistently one of wanting to
strengthen social work, particularly its practice, and therefore its standing and recognition. Maxted again: "The profession of social work has had difficulty not from those who
have a little training but from those who have no training
and who do not know that any is necessary" (Maxted,
1945:5-6).
The NASSA message was not accepted by social work
leaders. Rather than acknowledging the substantive point,
the graduate-only status-bias ethos directed the energies of
AASSW toward co-opting NASSA. The efforts were effective. With the subsequent formation of the Council on Social
Work Education (CSWE), the graduate-only advocates managed to neutralize the undergraduate advocates of NASSA.
In 1952 NASSA disbanded and was absorbed into the newly
formed CSWE.
Maxted in her straightforward style, both observed and
prophesied at the final NASSA conference in 1952 that,
... thus it is the untrained ones who are molding public
opinion as to the nature of social work, and the attitudes
toward the profession are in danger of becoming crystalized in
the public mind by the standards set by these unprepared
workers (Maxted, 1952:5-6).
Not until the mid-1960s did social work begin to rectify
its mistaken attribute professional development by seriously
contemplating an undergraduate professional degree. Even
at that time the critical motivation for change came more
from quarters external to social work rather than from within
the field itself. Factors significant to this process were an
overall increase in federal funding for professional education, the Social Security Amendments of 1962 strengthening
the service role in public welfare, and the publication of the
H E W report Closing the Gap in Social Work Manpower (Daly,
1965).
The Consequences
Ty 1950, statistical profiles (see Hollis and Taylor, 1951)
confirmed the large and growing gap between those social

workers defined by academic credential as professional and
those defined as non-professional. A telling confirmation of
social work's mistaken professional direction was provided
by the public's perception of the field, particularly since
public sanction was a fundamental theme of the attribute
professional models. The dimensions of the flawed professional process were unwittingly reported in the widely
utilized Wilensky and Lebeaux text Industrial Society and Social Welfare (1965). First published in 1958, and used in
schools of social work into the mid-1970s, their chapter,
"Emergence of a Social Work Profession," reported results of
national surveys conducted in 1947 and 1953 to rank the social status of social work (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965:309312).
Wilensky and Lebeaux report that social work, or variations thereof, tended to rank in the mid-range of occupational status. The Wilensky and Lebeaux discussion assumes
social work to be a profession; even though, in at least one
of the reported studies, the occupational category listed
("welfare worker for a city") probably did not require a Masters (i.e., "professional") degree. Reflecting the attribute
status bias, they conclude that the "problem" of social
work's unrealized public and professional acceptance would
be solved ". . . as the educational level of the average social
worker rises" (1965:312). Rather than understanding and
acknowledging the urgent and cogent pleas of Maxted and
others, the thinking exemplified by their analysis reinforced
the schism between professional and non-professional. 10
Wilensky and Lebeaux reflected and reinforced the mistaken
professional analysis followed by social work that actually
neutralized the professional goal while seeming to promote
it.
Further, in regard to the power of the attribute/ideal
dogma passed down from 1915, Wilensky and Lebeaux in
the same chapter made an interesting assertion:
Figures on the number of professionally trained workers
greatly underestimate the true growth of professional consciousness, and public recognition of the profession in recent years.

The evidence is that many more people identify themselves as social workers than graduate from schools of social work, and many
more positions calling for trained social workers exist than
there are trained people to fill them (1965:309), author's emphasis).
Taken to its logical conclusion their statement provides
affirmation of how little social work had understood the very
end of professionalism, particularly control and power over
the occupational arena.
For example, imagine someone, anyone, simply declaring that they were "feeling" and "thinking" themselves to
be more professional today ("professional consciousness")
and on this basis asserting both the right and authority to
practice accordingly. No established profession would abide
such a declaration as a claim to authority. No client, patient,
or consumer would accept such a claim. Yet, forty-three
years after Flexner's address, a major social work history/
policy text was making just such a claim. The fantasy nature
of the Wilensky and Lebeaux statement serves as a marker of
how far afield and misguided social work's ideology had
been, and the powerful hold of the status attribute ideology.
Conclusion
Lubove has observed that, "the monopoly of a special
skill is the essence of any occupational groups' claim to professional status. But expertise alone fails to distinguish a
profession in the public eye . . ." (1965:117). Social work ignored the "monopoly" aspect in Lubove's statement and
concentrated on the "special skill," and the result was the
emergence of casework as the central skill/technology. Related to this key practice development was the educational
policy adopted in 1937 defining the master's degree as the
only recognized professional credential.
The 1974 incorporation of a baccalaureate level of professional entry represented a major step toward unifying the
social work occupation and promoting effective professional
control for itself. Even so, this legitimate action continues to

be met with resistance and ambivalent comment from established sources inside social work (see Specht et.al., 1984;
Constable, 1984). 11
Adding to social work's on-going internal struggle is the
current social/political mood in the United States. With a history of flawed occupational and professional development,
social work finds itself vulnerable to the assault underway
against the broad range of human services. If a realistic
understanding of the professional dynamic had been held
fifty or sixty years ago, then potentially social work and social workers could have played then and now a more central
and consistent role in the development of welfare policy. Instead, social work's energies have been dissipated in a mistaken search for status. By not defining into its notion of
professional a realistic and functional entry-level certification
representing fundamental control, social work secured for itself a future as a divided occupational group.
NOTES

1.

The C.S.W.E. end-point is important since it represented the first
amalgamation of social work education.
2. Howe presumes the attribute/ideal model of professional in its
finished form and then discusses social work's historical ambivalence
and difficulty with the model. Both Howe and Specht et.al., though
addressing quite different issues, by overlooking the fact that social
work has never staked out an effective occupational boundary claim
and sharing an a priori position regarding the meaning of profession,
discuss potentially relevant issues in generally irrelevant terms.
3. The attribute model presented by Flexner in 1915 can be summarized
by six key points: (1) intellectual operations, (2) scientific learning base,
(3) practical and definite ends, (4) educationally communicable technique, (5) self-organization, and (6) altruistic motivation. Also, see
Thoren (1972) footnote on p. 46 for a listing of many of the primary
attribute citations.
4. Hospital social workers had an association dating from 1918 followed
by the American Association of Visiting Teachers (1919), the Section of
Psychiatric Social Workers of the American Association of Hospital Social Workers emerged in 1922 and developed into the American Association of Psychiatric Social Workers in 1926.

5.

A system of associations and journals was well-established and the national census underway in 1929 classified social workers as "professional" (Leighninger, 1980).
6. The Beisser study is cited in Vol. I of The Encyclopedia of Social Work
(1977), but the author has been unable to locate the actual published
report.
7. Chapter 7 in Hagerty's book is titled "Graduate or Undergraduate
Schools of Social Work?" He opens the chapter with the following
comment: "I feel it would be absurd to discuss the above question
were it not for the fact that writers chiefly from so-called graduate
schools of social work have seriously questioned the advisability of giving training in social work to undergraduates" (1921:79). Later, in the
same chapter, "Are the so-called graduate schools offering real graduate
work? I have used the expression 'so-called' advisedly. There is a great
distinction between giving graduate work and giving work to students
who have graduated" (1931:84).
8. Hagerty discusses this issue and it surfaces in other discussions of the
time. The scope of this paper does not allow for a full treatment except
to observe that one thinks the issue was consistently side-stepped
rather than confronted.
9. In 1937, the AASSW adopted the position that "all professional education for social work was to be offered as graduate study after October 1,
1939" (Hollis and Taylor, 1951:29).
10. Wilensky and Lebeaux's discussion is interesting in hindsight. They
inform their reader in a footnote on page 312 that, "The National Association of Social Workers has recently (1956) declared it 'strongly opposes vocationally oriented undergraduate programs' of social work
programs."
11. Constable's discussion of the "new" educational challenge facing social work is interesting, when set against earlier commnentators like
Tufts (1923), Walker (1925), Hagerty (1931), and Maxted (1952).
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BOOK REVIEW
Trattner, Walter I., editor. Biographical Dictionary of Social
Welfare in America. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986. xiv +
898 pp. $75.00.
To the genre of reference books in which one can find
brief biographies of leaders of various professions, ethnic or
religious groups, or geographical areas, there has now been
added this fine volume honoring men and women who have
contributed to the development of social welfare in America.
The Biographical Dictionary of Social Welfare in America
(BDSWA) includes articles on 321 persons who were judged
to have achieved eminence in their efforts "to improve
communities or promote the financial, physical, and emotional well-being of individuals or groups that needed such
assistance" in America from colonial times to the recent
past. It does not include living persons, people known
primarily for their work as elected public officials, philanthropists, or those who were primarily abolitionists,
feminists, labor union leaders, or "intellectuals." "The emphasis, then, was on including epople who were doers (or
thinkers and doers), not solely thinkers, however important
their ideas (and writings) may have been, and not mainly
givers, however important their financial contributions may
have been" (pp. xi, xii).
Among the persons included under these guidelines are
one hundred and eighty-nine men and one hundred and
thirty-two women. Seventeen were born before 1800, Otwo
hundred and ninety-four in the 19th century (1801-1900),
and ten after 1900. Since one hundred and fifty-five were
born after 1870, it seems fair to conclude that at least this
many did most of their work in the 20th century. Even
though living persons are not included, there is a strong
emphasis on events of the present century.
The usefulness of the BDSWA may be suggested by
comparing it with the Dictionary of American Biography. The
DAB, consisting of twenty original volumes and seven supplement volumes, is not the largest general collection of

American biographies, but it is usually considered the most
scholarly work of this type. Both DAB and BDSWA exclude
living persons; the DAB, unlike the BDSWA, does not publish biographies until at least fifteen years after the subject's
death. It follows that the BDSWA subjects may be divided
into three groups: (1) those covered in both the BDSWA and
the DBA, (2) those not covered in the DAB because their
lives extended past the cutoff date (1965) for the most recent
supplement volume, and (3) those not included in the DAB
even though they did not live beyond 1965.
The first group made up of one hundred and sixty-one
persons, includes such well known figures as Benjamin
Franklin, Dorothea Dix, Jane Addams, and Eleanor
Roosevelt, such relatively unknown persons as Thomas
Eddy, Alice C. Fletcher, and Lillie M. Peck, and many in between. Persons who were active in several fields are usually
given fuller coverage in the DAB, while the BDSWA concentrates on their work in the area of social welfare. For people
who are notable primarily because of their work in theis
field, articles in the two reference works are usually quite
comparable, though they are frequently different enough to
make it worthwhile to consult both references.
The sixty-four subjects in the second group, who died
during the years 1966-1984, include Saul Alinsky, Roger
Baldwin, John Collier, Dorothy Day, Helen Keller, Martin
Luther King, Jr., Abraham Muste, Margaret Sanger, Whitney
Young, and many others. Biographies of some, but not all,
of these persons will undoubtedly be included in later supplement volumes of the DAB, but they are not presently
available.
The third group of BDSWA subjects were not included
in the DAB for reasons other than chronological ineligibility.
These 96 persons include Kate Barnard, Albert Deutsch,
Molly Dewson, Josephine Dodge, Charles Eastman,
Josephine and Pauline Goldmark, Mary Jarrett, Henry Moskowitz, Mary Ovington, Ellen Starr, Ida Wells-Barnett, and
seven dozen others. It is here that the BDSWA clearly goes

beyond the DAB and other reference works in developing its
special field.
On the whole, the BDSWA stands up well in comparison
with the prestigious and much larger DAB. Its articles, researched and written by one hundred and eighty-eight
different people who had to deal with widely differing collections of source material, naturally vary somewhat in quality, but they are all well written. Most are from two to four
pages in length, and are based on primary sources where
such material was available. Each includes a bibliography,
generally identifying the major writings of the subject, other
available primary sources, and the most useful books and articles about the subject.
The book includes a brief (three page) chronology of
significant events in the history of American social welfare,
1601-1982, a listing of the three hundred and twenty-one
subjects by year of birth (from Cotton Mather in 1663 to
George A. Wiley in 1931), a listing of the subjects by place
of birth (35 states, 24 countries) identification of the authors
of the articles, and a reasonably full index.
The BDSWA is a solid scholarly work. It should be available to all students and professionals who might wnat to obtain information about individuals who made significant
contributions to the development of social welfare in
America.
Maurice M. Vance
Florida State University
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An historical and sociological analysis of child abuse, its explanations and consequences for the individual and society.
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